• Informatization Policy
• /
• v.18 no.3
• /
• pp.88-107
• /
• 2011

This paper proposes a prepaid system promotion policy for the 3G(WCDMA) MVNO with regard to the newly included paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 32 (User Protection) and Article 38 (Provision of Wholesale Telecommunications Services) of the Telecommunication Business Act, which was revised on March 22, 2010. As of June 2011, there are only a few prepaid system subscribers to the mobile communications service due to various limitations, including prepay, interconnection, carrier selection, the MVNO policy, and number portability. However, overseas communications service regulatory agencies and service providers are increasingly presenting policies and strategies for mobile prepaid plans, in order to accommodate the various customer demands that are increasing the use of smart phones and data. This paper advances various proposals concerning promotion of the prepaid system by the 3G MVNO under the current Telecommunication Business Act, including separation of the prepaid data system and the mobile network; introduction of a monthly fixed-rate hybrid prepaid system, a top-up system and USIM system; introduction of mobile network carrier selection; differentiated retail discounts between prepaid and post-paid prices; revision of the retail discount policy for wholesale provision; increase in the number of mandatory service providers; and in-depth consideration of the introduction of a number portability policy for the prepaid and post-paid systems.

• International Journal of Railway
• /
• v.1 no.4
• /
• pp.129-133
• /
• 2008

Over the last $15{\sim}20$years, many countries have adopted policies of railway privatization to keep up with increasing competition from road and air transport. Although each country and case has its own history, market characteristics, political context as well as administrative process, railway privatizations (including railway restructure, concession etc.) in the west usually are accompanied with the establishment of new regulatory regimes. Therefore, railway governance has been innovating towards an interaction of government, regulator, industry bodies, user groups, trade unions and other interested groups within the regulatory framework. However, it is not the case in China. Although China had seen a partial privatization in some branch lines and is experiencing a much larger-scale privatization by establishing joint-ventures to build and operate high-speed passenger lines and implementing an asset-based securitization program, administrative control still occupies absolutely dominant position in the railway governance in China. Ministry of Railway (MOR) acts as the administrator, operator as well as regulator. There is no national policy that clearly positions railway in the transportation network and clarifies the role of government in railway development. There is also little participation from interested groups in the railway policy making, pricing, service standard or safety matter. Railway in China is solely governed by the mere executive agency. Efficiency-focused economic perspective explanation is far from satisfaction. A wider research perspective from political and social regime is of great potential to better explain and solve the problem. In the west, separation and constrains of power had long been established as a fundamental rule. In addition to internal separation of political power(legislation, execution and jurisdiction), rise of corporation in the 19th century and association revolution in the 20th century greatly fostered the growth of economic and social power. Therefore, political, social and economic organizations cooperate and compete with each other, which leads to a balanced and resonable power structure. While in China, political power, mainly party-controlled administrative power has been keeping a dominated position since the time of plan economy. Although the economic reform promoted the growth of economic power of enterprises, it is still not strong enough to compete with political power. Furthermore, under rigid political control, social organizations usually are affiliated to government, independent social power is still too weak to function. So, duo to the limited and slow reform in political and social regime in China, there is an unbalanced power structure within which political power is dominant, economic power expanding while social power still absent. Totally different power structure in China determines the fundamental institutional environment of her railway privatization and governance. It is expected that the exploration of who act behind railway governance and their acting strength (a power theory) will present us a better picture of railway governance as a relevant transportation mode. The paper first examines the railway governance in China and preliminarily establishes a linkage between railway governance and its fundamental institutional environment, i.e. power structure in a specific country. Secondly, the reason why there is no national policy in China is explored in the view of political power. In China, legislative power is more symbolic while party-controlled administrative power dominates political process and plays a fundamental role in Chinese railway governance. And then, in the part three railway finance reform is analyzed in the view of economic power, esp. the relationship of political power and economic power.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
• /
• v.19 no.4
• /
• pp.102-110
• /
• 2018

The study analyzed the effects of the floor plan characteristics on the apartment price under the national housing size in 3 Gangnam districts for decades, the primary apartment markets in Korea. The analysis showed that the storage spaces such as kitchen, warehouses and dressage rooms have a positive effect on the price. Especially, the highly opened space with three-side open plan and the one with the unified type of livingroom, diningroom and kitchen have shown the strong effect on the price. For the kitchen spaces, the I-shaped kitchen tends to be more expensive while a centered living room has a positive effect on the price. These findings have an academic significance as the direct effects of plan characteristics on price has been examined unlike prior research focused on the analysis of trend, basic statistics, and satisfaction level. It is noteworthy that these research finding has identified the productive implication for the future floor plan design and pricing and also be implemented in the purchasing decision making by buyers in the housing market.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.9 no.5
• /
• pp.493-499
• /
• 2023

Trade credit refers to a transaction where a product supplier allows an distributor to defer payment for a certain period of time for the purchase cost of the products. This practice is generally permitted as a means of differentiation between competing companies. Such trade credit is commonly granted based on the volume of transactions, aiming to increase customer orders. From the perspective of the distributor, trade credit allows for a deferred payment period for the purchase cost, leading to cost savings in inventory investment. These cost savings in inventory investment can be a factor in reducing selling prices with the aim of increasing customer demand. In this study, we analyze a model that determines the optimal selling price and order quantity from the perspective of the distributor, assuming that the supplier allows a deferred payment period dependent on the transaction volume. We assume that the final customer's annual demand exhibits an exponential decrease with respect to the distributor's selling price, using a constant price elasticity function. To analyze the problem, we assume that the product deteriorates at a constant rate over time and aim to establish an inventory model for the intermediate distributor. We also want to analyze the impact of deterioration on the inventory policies of the intermediate distributor.

• Journal of Sericultural and Entomological Science
• /
• no.12
• /
• pp.47-50
• /
• 1970

There are many factors affecting the development of sericultural industry in Korea. The setting of a rational pricing system for sericultural products is one of important activities of the Korean Government to improve the incentives to producers. The determination o： the prices for many years were based on the production costs including a certain level of profits. Some of cost items are in conflict both in cocoon producers and silk-reeling industries. Government officials have to evaluate these conflicting problems and estimate the consequences of their decisions. In this situation the final decision often became political decisions. This analysis is aimed at providing an alternative method of setting the prices of sericultural products. The criteria of the equilibrium employed in this analysis are based on economic principle which equilibrium condition is determined by the relationships between the marginal productivity of input factors and factor prices. In order to obtain the related information Cobb-Douglas'functions were fitted using KIST computer and data were obtained mostly from the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestru, An important assumption is that "Opportunity Costs" of factors input in both cocoon production and silk-Peeling industries are same, The major finding s obtained are as followings. 1) The sum of coefficient of production elastisity in silk-reeling industries is greater than one. Silk-reeling industries are operating under the situation of increasing return to scale and it is, therefore, expected to develop the industries as the capital-intensive large scale. 2) The cocoon producing farmers are under the situations of the decreasing return to scale and it is expected to continue their cocoon farming as the labor-intensive small scale, assuming the present level of production technology. As the development of commercial farming, the resources input in cocoon production will be shifted to the production for higher profitable crops, 3) The price elastisity of production is higher in cocoon production than in silk-reeling industries. It is expected that the price changing effects on domestic production will be resulted from cocoon producers. 4) Based on analysis results of marginal productivities and the opportunity costs of resources, cocoon price for meeting equilibrium price condition is to be increased by 8-16 percent or standard price level of silk increased by 6-8 percent. There were the possibilities of over evaluation on opportunity cost of resources input in silk-reeling industries, or income transfered from the farmers to the industries. It is recommended that the prices for meeting equilibrium price conditions are to be determined by 72 percent for cocoon and 28 percent for silk-reeling costs, based on standard level of the exporting prices.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
• /
• v.20 no.3
• /
• pp.175-209
• /
• 2019

The bundled discounting which the dominant undertakings engage in is problematic in terms of competition restraint. Bundled discounts generally benefit not only buyers but also sellers. Specifically, bundled discounts usually costs a firm less to sell multiple products. In addition, Bundled discounts always provide some immediate consumer benefit in the form of lower prices. Therefore, competition authorities and courts should not be too quick to condemn bundled discounts and apply the neutral and objective standard in bundled discounting cases. Cascade Health v. Peacehealth decision starts ruling from this prerequisite. This decision pointed out that the dominant undertaking can exclude rivals through bundled discounting without pricing its products below its cost when rivals do not sell as great a number of product lines. So bundled discounting may have the anticompetitive impact by excluding less diversified but more efficient producers. This decision did not adopt Lepage case's standard which does not require the court to consider whether the competitor was at least as efficient of a producer as the bundled discounter. Instead of that, based on cost based approach, this decision said that the exclusionary element can not be satisfied unless the discounts result in prices that are below an appropriate measures of the defendant's costs. By adopting a discount attribution standard, this decision said that the full amount of the discounts should be allocated to the competitive products. As the seller can easily ascertain its own prices and costs of production and calculate whether its discounting practices exclude competitors, not the competitor's costs but the dominant undertaking's costs should be considered in applying discount attribution standard. This case deals with bundled discounting practice of multiple healthcare services by the dominant undertaking in healthcare market. Under the Korean healthcare system and public health insurance system, the price competition primarily exists in non-medical care benefits because public healthcare insurance in Korea is in combination with the compulsory medical care institution system. The cases that Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law deals with, such as cartel and the abuse of monopoly power, also mainly exist in non-medical care benefits. The dominant undertaking's exclusionary bundled discounting in Korean healthcare markets may be practiced in the contracts between the dominant undertaking and private insurance companies with regards to non-medical care benefits.

• Magazine of the Korean Society of Agricultural Engineers
• /
• v.15 no.4
• /
• pp.3170-3180
• /
• 1973

This study of the subject will review past and present irrigation development in Korea. Particular attention will be given to water pricing structure and a case study on the purpose of rational operation and management of irrigation water and organizations, and the optimum irrigation water and organizations, and the optimum irrigation water fee inorder to reduce farmers burden and to rationalize the farmland associations management so as to achieve development of the rural environment. In 1971, the reservoir of the Farmland Improvement A sociation (FIA) produced only 775 millison $m^3$ of irrigation water or 77% of planned capacity of 1,015 million $m^3$. It was caused by inefficient maintenance of irrigation facilities; for instance, about 21% of reservoirs, pumping stations and weirs in Korea have been silted by soil erosion which hinder to water production according to an ADC survey. The first Irritation Association was established in 1906, whcih was renamed the Farmland Assoeiation by the Rural Development Enouragement Law in 1970. By the end of 1971, 411,000 ha of rice paddies were under the control of 267 associations nationwide. The average water price assessed by Associations nationwide rose from 790 won per 0.1 ha. in 1966 to 1,886 won in 1971. The annual growth rate was 20%. The highest water price in 1971 was 4,773 won her 0.1 ha. and the lowest was 437 won. This range was caused by differences in debt burden, geographic conditions and management efficiency among the Associations. In 1971, the number of Associations which exceeded the average water price of 1,886 won per 0.1 ha. was 144, or 55.1% of all Association. In determination of water price, there are two principles; one is determined by production cost such as installation cost of irrigation facilities, maintenance cost, management cost and depreciation ect. For instance, the Yong San River Development project was required 33.7 billion won for total construction and maintenance cost is 3.1 billion won for repayment, maintenance and management cost per year. The project produces 590 million $m^3$ of irrigation water annually. Accordingly, the water price per $m^3$ is 5.25 won. The other principle is determined by water value in the crop products and in compared with production of irrigated paddy and non-irrigated paddy. By using this method, water value in compared with paddy rice vs. upland rice(Average of 1967-1971) was 14.15 won per $m^3$ and irrigated paddy vs. non-irrigated paddy was 2.98 won per $m^3$. In contrast the irrigation fee in average association of 1967-1971 was 1.54 won per $m^3$. Accordingly, the current national average irrigation fee(water price) is resonable compared with its water value. In this study, it is found that the ceiling of water price in terms of water value is 2.98 won per $m^3$ or 2,530 won per 0.1 ha. However, in 1971 55% of the associations were above the average of nationwide irrigation fees. which shows the need for rationalization of the Association's management. In connection with rationalization of the Association's management, this study recommends the following matters. (1) Irrigation fee must be assessed according to the amount of water consumption taking intoaccount the farmer's ability. (2) Irrigation fee should be graded according to behefits and crop patterns. (3) Training personnel in the operation and procedures of water management to save O&M costs. (4) Insolvent farmland association should be integrated into larger, sound associations in the same GUN in order to reduce farmers' water cost. (5) The maintenance and repair of existing irrigation facilities is as important as expansion of facilities. (6) Establishment of a new Union of Farmland Association is required to promoted proper maintenance and to protect the huge investment in irrigation facilities by means of technical supervision and guidance.