• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.385-404
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• 2010

The purpose of this article is to examine the Delays of Performance under UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. In theory, there exist three clearly distinguishable categories of breach of contract, namely non-performance, non-conforming performance and late performance. In particular, delays of performance are the most common breach of sales contract including late delivery, late payment or late performance of any other obligation. In this regard, this article examines how parties can, through careful drafting, avoid or minimize legal problems in case of delay in performance. Especially, the export perspective focuses on the seller's interests, which require that sanctions be as lenient as possible if the seller has breached the contract but that there are prompt and adequate sanctions if the buyer has breached the contract. Furthermore, the seller should ensure that a short or medium delay in delivery will not entitle the buyer to declare the contract immediately avoided and take precautions against late payment, including delayed opening of a letter of credit.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The situation in Korean peninsula, globally and regionally, which followed the global huge uncertainty, changed a lot. Because of the political crisis, ROK falls into a chaos. And DPRK goes into a policy changing period by the internal issues, international sanctions and assassination accident in Malaysia, which is confirmed to be DPRK's Supreme leader, Kim Jong Un's half brother. Under this changing circumstances, the perspectives of regarding China and the Korean peninsula, must be undated accordingly. Only by understanding the Sino-US relations, the DPRK nuclear issue and the regional dilemmas can we formulate reasonable policies to contribute to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.192-199
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• 2015

Under the economic banner of "self-reliance," North Korea has focused on hydro and thermal power as its main energy supply sources. However, in the face of extreme energy penury caused by machinery and material supply instability in the wake of the collapse of the former communist block as well as equipment aging and deterioration due to floods and other disasters, North Korea and international aid organizations are increasingly turning their attention toward energy source diversification. In particular, renewable energy is recognized as the best strategic energy source for North Korea and it is a decentralized energy option that is suitable in light of North Korea's power distribution networks and its pursuit of self-reliance. Biogas can contribute to improving the human rights situation of North Koreans in conjunction with an increase in food production. For this reason, renewable energy is the most promising option for an energy source that is likely to secure humanitarian aid from international organizations such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). However, the implementation of such humanitarian aid has been hampered by rising concerns about the diversion of provided energy materials for military purposes and the disguised introduction of dual use items strategic materials as well as UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions of the international community against North Korea's military provocation, including nuclear tests and missile launches. This paper explores the possibility of solving this dilemma and proceeding with the humanitarian aid to North Korea by evaluating the potential for sanction and the risk of diversion of the possible products for biogas-related aid on the basis of the list of UN-sanctioned items.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.52 no.3
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• pp.39-55
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• 2021

The purpose of this paper is to confirm the trend of inland water fish farming in North Korea and to suggest a plan for inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea's inland water fish farming laid the foundation for production in the 1950s and 1960s, and production facilities were expanded until 1980. In the midst of the severe economic crisis in the 1990s, North Korea paid attention to inland water fish farming as an alternative to food production. The military took the lead in expanding the aquaculture industry and catfish farming was encouraged. In the Kim Jong-un era, North Korea's inland fish farming continues the tradition of catfish farming and promotes a policy of expanding inland cage farming. This study comprehensively reviewed recent inter-Korean relations, North Korea's food crisis and acceptability, and UN sanctions. As a result, inland water fish farming is the most promising field for inter-Korean cooperation in the field of fisheries. In the initial stage of inter-Korean cooperation in the field of inland water fish farming, humanitarian aid projects such as feed and seed support can be promoted. In the stage of expanding inter-Korean cooperation, knowledge sharing program and materials and facilities support projects can be promoted. Development cooperation and direct private investment are possible at the full-scale stage.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.53-83
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• 2023

The investment agreement prepared at the beginning of inter-Korean economic cooperation in 2000 can be evaluated as very ineffective as a product of mutual political and diplomatic compromise rather than an effective protection for our investment assets. South Korean companies suffered a lot of losses due to the freezing of assets in the Geumgang mountain district and the closure of the Kaeseung Industrial Complex, but they did not receive practical damage relief due to institutional vulnerabilities. Currently, North Korea is under international economic sanctions of the UN Security Council, so it is true that the resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation is far away, but North Korea's human resources and geographical location are still attractive investment destinations for us. Therefore, if strained relations between the two Koreas recover in the future and international economic sanctions on North Korea are eased, Korean companies' investment in North Korea will resume. However, the previous inter-Korean investment agreement system was a fictional systemthat was ineffective. Therefore, if these safety devices are not reorganized when economic cooperation resumes, unfair damage to Korean companies will be repeated again. The core of the improved investment guarantee system is not a bilateral system between the two Koreas, but the establishment of a multilateral system through North Korea's inclusion in the international economy. Specifically, it includes encouraging North Korea to join international agreements for the execution of arbitration decisions, securing subrogation rights through membership of international insurance groups such as MIGA, creating matching funds by international financial organizations. Through this new approach, it will be possible to improve the safety of Korean companies' investment in North Korea, and ultimately, it will be necessary to lay the foundation for mutual development through economic cooperation between the two Koreas.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.115-162
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• 2022

The Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), revised at the eighth Party Congress in 2021, reflect the Kim Jong Un regime's changes in strategic lines and ideological justifications on North Korea's socialism and communism, and its recent stances against the external environment. Moreover, they contain critical changes in the party's organizational system encompassing the central and the provinces. This study explores the organizational changes of the "monolithic guidance system of the party core" stipulated by the new party rules in January 2021, based on the analysis of the entire nine revised rules of the WPK since 1945. In the 2021 Party Congress, the Kim Jong Un regime, which officially came to power after the fourth Party Conference in 2012, has institutionalized the monolithic guidance system centered on the party core, or the head of state, Kim Jong Un. The newly set leadership and execution system, which reorganized party, government, and military organizational structure and accompanied the relevant personnel changes, was derived from the attempts for reinstating the Kim Jong Un regime as a more normalized party-state structure before its 10th year in power in April 2022. The "monolithic leadership system of the party core" established a system of "organizational leadership" through the organization of the Central Committee, directed by the Party Head, or General Secretary. The institutionalization of the new system resulted from the ten-year development of the revival of the party-state structure, which compromised the status of the military and reconfirmed the party's control of the military. This study explains the new system from the perspectives of both institutionalization and top-down unity, shedding light on the new party-military-government relations of the Kim Jong Un regime. The analysis contributes to a better understanding and forecasting of the Kim Jong Un regime's governance, which currently strengthens the monolithic leadership system as a crisis management system in the face of the "triple hardships" of sanctions, Covid and disaster.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 2021

This study aims to face common threats from the depletion of fish resources, the decline of production and employment as well as the increase of life risk in East Sea Rim countries, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia due to the Chinese fishing fleets entering East Sea. The recent competition in fishing among fishing vessels and fleets of national origin operating in the East Sea has induced a significant change in the ecological landscape of the fishing fleets cluster while having influenced production and employment in the fishing industries of South Korea and Japan as well as life threat on the fishermen in North Korea. It seems that the population organizational ecological theory can be applied to this change. It can be seen as the isomorphism of the selection process over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to avoid the environment in which these North Korean fishing vessels are pushed against the Chinese fleet in the North Korean part of the East Sea. To resolve the fishery disputes or conflict in the common waters in East Sea, first of all, Chinese fishing fleets will be required to put international pressure so as to solve the unfairness of the illegal fishing and overfishing by the International Fishery Organization or the UN violations of the sanctions against North Korea selling fishing rights to China. Although it is not easy for South Korea to cooperate with North Korea in the short term, South Korea will be able to support the fishery infrastructure in North Korea in the mid- to the long-term to prevent the loss of innocent lives for their fishermen and to raise their incomes.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.145-167
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• 2016

UN Security Council is entitled to power for determining the existence of the threat to the peace. Specifying the provisions adopted in accordance with the chapter 7 of the UN Charter, its resolution is deemed as document confirming its decision about the threat to the peace. In general, resolutions adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, are considered binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. Regarding to the terms of the Resolutions to be interpreted, the word "decide" is used as to the suspension of the ballistic missile program, the word "demand" is used as to the stopping of the the launch of ballistic missile, and the word "demand" is used as to return to the missile test moratorium. These provisions may be deemed to determining specific obligations to be imposed upon the States in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. On the other hand, the Resolutions may be limited to the decision, not leading to a sort of international legislation, the main purpose of which is to provide a legal basis for international sanctions against Northe Korea. North Korea missile test case has reminded us of continuing discussion about whether the decision of the Security Council lacks the legislative authority due to its decision process. Furthermore, having regard to the outer space and space activities, the outer space law regime would be not compatible with the Security Council decision process in that the former presupposes the agreement among all States parties, while the latter based upon the agreement between Council member States. Therefore, it is premature to consider the Security Council decision as becoming the lex specialis of the space law regime.