• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.45 no.4
• /
• pp.83-93
• /
• 2020

Sanctions by the international community can increase their effectiveness with the participation of major countries with global economic influence, and can lead to efficient sanctions against the target countries when different sanctions procedures and methods can be operated in an integrated manner. To this end, it is being carried out with the aim of maximizing the performance of sanctions through collective economic solidarity by inducing international participation centered on the joint agenda, such as drawing up a resolution for sanctions. In this study, the definition and purpose of sanctions imposed by the international community and by major specific countries were explained and an empirical analysis was conducted on the economic impact of each sanctions, focusing on the United Nations Security Council and the United States, which directly implement them. Based on the selected research model, the effects of economic sanctions on the international community and countries subject to sanctions by certain countries were mutually compared and analyzed in the data. Finally, the conclusion obtained from this study was stated and the implications were derived and the possibility of further research expansion was described.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.44
• /
• pp.254-290
• /
• 2018

Why did Kim Jong Un turn his foreign policy upside down in a sudden? US naval blockade became one of candidates for the reason since it had been threatened by Trump administration for the first time in December 2017. Has the blockades worked well like that in the international politic history? This paper reveals the effectiveness of naval blockade on sanctioning in the peacetime. This research analyzes three hypothetical arguments about the naval blockade based on the result of empirical tests with TIES Dataset. First, sanctions by blockading are more effective in gaining political benefits than the other economic sanctions. It was ranked the 4th effective way of sanction out of 9. And 56.3% of pacific naval blockades without packaged economic sanctions were succeeded, whereas the possibility of success increase up to 61.2% when blockade has been imposed in accordance with the other type of economic sanctions. Second, blockades deter military collisions, even war. When it comes to military provocation issue, blockading sanctions gain political interest far more than the other type of economic sanctions. The possibility of the success reaches up to 74%. Also, there wasn't any historical cases of war incurred by blockading sanctions within 5 years after the blockade end. Third, policy makers just need 1.2 years on average to see the end of sanctions when they choose the naval blockade as the method of imposing sanction on the adversary. It is impressively short span of time in achieving political goal compared to the other types of sanctions which are need 9 years on average. North East Asia sea could be the next stage for a naval blockade sooner or later. Because China and Japan not only possess capabilities of blockade but also have will to impose blockades to the others if conditions are set. And even the North Korea with lots of submerging forces could be a blockading threat in the specific area. So, the Republic of Korea has to pay more attention and be prepared for naval blockading sanction.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
• /
• v.22 no.1
• /
• pp.135-160
• /
• 2018

This study aims to predict the likely effect of economic sanctions on North Korea by examining case studies of Iran and Iraq. While UN sanctions against Iraq had immediate negative consequences for society, such as causing famine and reinforcing the authoritarian regime, sanctions against Iran had some productive consequences after they were reinforced by the U.S. and EU in significantly reduced oil exports and government expenditure, which in turn led to regime change and willingness to negotiate nuclear programs for economic recovery. Apart from these distinct differences, sanctions in both countries caused high inflation, shortage of necessary supplies, and increased unemployment. Case studies of Iran and Iraq also reveal that the sanctions disproportionately affected women and children, which implies that the recently reinforced economic sanctions of the U.S. and China against North Korea will cause more suffering of similarly socially marginalized groups in North Korea.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.39
• /
• pp.82-113
• /
• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.46
• /
• pp.239-276
• /
• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
• /
• v.22 no.4
• /
• pp.405-421
• /
• 2019

International aid to North Korea remains far below the humanitarian needs of vulnerable people. This paper examines the trajectory of international humanitarian assistance to North Korea over the last two decades with the focus on its decline in the context of the country's nuclear standoff and corresponding stringent sanctions. In so doing, the paper addresses major problems associated with North Korea's reception of foreign aid and operational constraints placed on humanitarian activities in the country. It shows that humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been largely shaped by geopolitical dynamics. A survey of UN reports and statistics also suggests a shifting trend in recent international aid to North Korea. The decline of aid and multiple operational obstacles faced by humanitarian organizations, for instance, have led to a fall in agricultural support and a proportional rise in health and related services. While UN Security Council resolutions include an exemption provision, humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been constrained by stringent sanctions, which have led to adverse consequences for the civilian population. In this regard, the paper suggests some policy directions for international aid to North Korea amidst negotiations over denuclearization, while stressing an urgent need to address the negative impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups in the country.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
• /
• v.48 no.3
• /
• pp.61-74
• /
• 2017

This study is aimed to analyze the change of chinese fishing vessels' entry into the East Sea off North Korea and suggest directions for countermeasures. Based on the real landing data in China, Chinese fishing vessels' squid catch volume and value in the East Sea off North Korea are estimated. Results show that at least 205 thousand tons of squid was caught by Chinese fishing vessels in 2014. If the catch amount is calculated by the unit price per kilogram at the same year in Korea, it would be 556.3 billion KRW. As the UN sanctions become stricter with the recent resolution 2371 passed, Chinese fishing vessels' entry may increase in the future to compensate decreased seafood supply from North Korea. Even though there are not many options left for Korea to decrease the impact of Chinese depletive fishing, the study suggests countermeasures such as strengthening cooperative crack down on the Chinese illegal fishing vessels in Korean waters; increasing cooperation with UN member countries to incorporate banning the trade of fishing rights in the next UN sanctions; establishing regional fisheries management organization and managing migratory species with China and Japan cooperatively in the long term.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
• /
• v.23 no.4
• /
• pp.373-394
• /
• 2020

The strengthening of multilateral international sanctions against North Korea has raised questions as to how effective they are in exerting pressure on the country's economy. In this paper, we address this question by examining their impact on the country's integration into regional and global apparel production networks. North Korea has in the past decade become an increasingly competitive exporter of apparel on the basis of consignment-based processing arrangements. Official trade data shows a sharp drop in North Korean exports of clothing since the sectoral ban in 2017. There is evidence to suggest, however, that exports have continued on a more informal and clandestine basis. North Korea's integration into apparel production networks has also taken the form of the dispatch of workers to factories in China's northeastern border regions. Yet there is evidence that the recent sanctions imposed on such practices has similarly led to illicit practices such as working on visitors' visas, often with the help of Chinese enterprises and local government. The resilience of North Korea's integration into apparel production networks follows a capitalist logic and is result of the highly profitable nature of apparel production for all actors concerned and a correspondingly strong desire to evade sanctions. As such, the analysis contributes to the literature on sanctions that suggests that the measures may contribute to emergence of growing informal and illicit practices and to the role of the clandestine economy.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.46
• /
• pp.29-56
• /
• 2020

Despite the deep concerns against the DPRK and the harsh sanctions imposed on it, the country renders the sanctions futile by facilitating various illegal trades such as the ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum or coal. Recently, the international community went into paying attention to solve this matter. Among the measures the community can take, "reinforcing the search and inspection of the DPRK related vessels transiting in the high and territorial seas" is the best policy approach to reduce the sanction evasion and provide the international community with considerable bargaining advantages. This measure requires the forceful action by legal enforcement agencies, also known as VBSS. (Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure) It would make the deals prohibited by the UNSCRs (United Nation Security Council Resolutions) less profitable by reducing the expected return on the deals and increasing the cost for them. So, it would make the illegal deals under the table less attractive. The DPRK has been able to render the sanctions futile by exploiting the limitations of the current maritime sanctions. The resolutions are short of being specific about law enforcement, and the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) is legally nonbinding. However, if the UNSCRs and the PSI are combined, they can generate a new source of power and exploit the weakness of the DPRK. Noting that the recent UNSCRs stipulated all the legal discussions in the resolutions are confined and applied only to the DPRK, the PSI can target the commercial trade as well as the WMD-related materials in the case of the DPRK's illegal maritime practices. Therefore, the PSI endorsing partners should go beyond mere commitments. They should discuss action plans to implement the maritime interdictions to the extent that they discourage the DPRK and its business partners continuing the illegal activities.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.5-26
• /
• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.