• 통상정보연구
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• 제6권3호
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• pp.373-384
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• 2004

While the bilateral trade volume between China and U.S. has been growing rapidly, the trade deficits of U.S. to China has also been expanding. This growing trade deficit of U.S. to China has several reasons: the increase of foreign direct investment to China, the transfer of trade deficit origins, the intervention of U.S. domestic politics to China-U.S. trade relations, and U.S. direct control on export to China. However, the increased U.S. trade deficit to China does not mean that U.S. is in a disadvantaged position in its economic relations with China, or its international competitiveness is deteriorating. When U.S. surplus in service trade to China is included, the picture would be very different. Also, as internationalization progresses and China's industrial structure adjusts, the trade deficit of U.S. to China would narrow.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.59-93
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• 2015

A Paradigm shift is in process in China's foreign policies during Xi Jinping's era. Such changes occur with changing national identities from developing country to great power, and from continental power to continental-maritime power. China's pursuit for sea power embraces its global strategy. Accommodating the new identity of maritime power, China is developing its maritime strategy. New silk-road strategy actively utilizes China's advantage in economy, while avoiding direct military challenges against the U.S. China seeks an associated balance of power with the U.S. On the other hand, China make its determination clear to protect its core national interests, particularly Taiwan straits issue, deploying Anti-Access and Area-Denial strategy. 'Pax-Americana 3.0' and 'China's rise 2.0' have convoluted and evolved in complexity. South Korea faces much tougher challenges ahead in its foreign and security environments.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.115-144
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• 2023

特朗普政府时期美国已表明了 "中国是美国的战略竞争者, 也是修正主义势力, 更是对美国繁荣和安全的主要挑战" 这种立场, 拜登政府也基本上继承了这种对中国的认识。中国也对此积极应对。因此, 美中战略竞争已成为当今国际体系中最重要的背景因素, 也对东北亚安全局势产生了巨大的影响。尽管如此, 观察最近韩美日三边安全合作的形成过程时我们可以发现, 尹锡悦总统上台之后韩国的对外战略调整对韩美日三边安全合作的形成起到了关键性作用。这是因为美国一如既往希望构建的韩美日三边安全合作的成败取决于韩日关系的改善, 而尹锡悦政府不顾韩国国内政治的制约因素, 果断推动了韩日关系的快速改善。随后, 在戴维营召开的韩美日三国峰会为未来三国在安全及其他更广泛领域的合作奠定了基础。中国对韩美日三边安全合作的形成提出了强烈的不满和抗议。但本文认为, 韩国虽然同意与美国和日本形成韩美日三边安全合作, 但韩国的战略目标与美国和日本的战略目标都不完全一致。比如, 回顾冷战结束之后的美日同盟发展历程, 美国与日本都对中国的崛起持有类似的看法和认识。最近几年美日同盟加强的实际目标也主要是如何应对中国的崛起。与此相反, 韩国历届政府都对韩美日三边安全合作持消极的态度。这是因为韩国想要追求的最主要的战略目标是如何减少或消除来自北韩的威胁, 而不是应对中国。面对北韩不断增强的挑衅与威胁, 过半数的韩国人支持通过加强韩美日三边安全合作来遏制或缓解来自北韩的威胁。因此, 只要北韩的核威胁与导弹挑衅持续存在, 那韩国的对外战略方向就很可能是加强韩美日三边安全合作, 以确保自身的安全与生存。所以, 如果中国想要减少韩美日三边安全合作给中国带来的战略上的压力, 最好的方案是降低北韩对韩国的挑衅和威胁, 在让北韩放弃核武器的问题上扮演更加实质性的角色。

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제17권3호
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• pp.83-93
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• 2017

본 논문의 목적은 트럼프 행정부 등장 이후 미국과 중국의 한반도 주요현안에 대한 입장을 분석하고 미중관계 속에서 한국의 대응을 모색하는데 있다. 이 글은 세력전이 측면의 미중관계 담론을 바탕으로 (1) 북핵 (2) 한반도 사드배치 (3) 한미동맹의 세 가지 조건 하에서 두 가지 가정을 전망케 한다. 하나는 미국의 세계질서가 지역질서를 지배하여 지역 질서가 안정적으로 관리되는 것과, 다른 하나는 중국 중심의 지역질서가 세계질서에 영향을 주어 미국과 역내 패권적 갈등이 발생하는 경우이다. 연구결과, 미중관계에서 압도적인 미국의 객관적 힘의 우위는 북핵, 사드, 한미동맹 등 세계 및 지역질서를 리드하는데 상당부분 유지할 것으로 보이며, 중국은 미국과의 갈등 속에서도 미국적 세계질서 유지가 가져올 정치 경제적 이익에 편승하여 한반도 주요현안들에 일정 정도 영향력과 협력이 기대된다. 이러한 전망에서 한국은 북핵, 사드, 동맹의 주요 제 문제들이 한미관계 강화를 우선으로, 변화하는 강대국 세력경쟁 사이에서 현실적 국익에 부합한 외교를 균형 있게 추진해야 할 것이다. 이른바 '시소외교(see-saw diplomacy)'가 필요하다.

• Acta Via Serica
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• 제5권2호
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• pp.91-110
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• 2020

This paper traces the trajectory of a variety of complicated economic and political developments between China and India - the world's most ancient civilizations connected by rich history. These recent developments, which are heavily acrimonious and include military clashes involving loss of lives, have greatly damaged bilateral relations. The paper examines the reasons behind the bilateral relations dipping to new lows. Aside from specific bilateral disputes like outstanding border problems, China-India relations have been affected by global and regional developments. The paper identifies rising tensions between the U.S. and China, the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the growth of the Indo-Pacific construct, as the reasons that have expanded distance and mistrust between the two countries. Both China and India are now part of country coalitions aiming to marginalize each other's strategic influences. The paper argues that such efforts by them are going to impact countries in their neighbourhood - such as in Central Asia - by forcing them to make complex choices in the areas of trade engagement and technological development.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.1-26
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• 2023

This article will analyze and forecast important variables and dynamics in global power politics after the war in Ukraine. It tries to use several perspectives to analyze international relations, particularly liberal internationalism and structural realism. In short, core variables are as follows; First, how is the US-led liberal international order and globalization being adjusted? Second, how will the U.S.-China strategic competition, which is the biggest and structural variable, cause changes in the international order in the future? The third variable, how stable are Sino-Russia relations in the context of a structuring U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle? Fourth, to what extent will third middle hedging states outside the U.S. and China be able to exercise strategic autonomy in the face of multipolarization? To summarize, the first of these four variables is the largest basic variable at the global political and economic level in terms of its impact on the international community, and it has been led by the United States. The second variable, in terms of actors, seems to be the most influential structural variable in global competition, and the US-China strategic competition is likely to be a long game. Thus the world will not be able to escape the influence of the competition between the two global powers. For South Korea, this second variable is probably the biggest external variable and dilemma. The third variable, the stability of Sino-Russia relations, determines balance of global power in the 21st century. The U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle, as seen in the current war in Ukraine, will operate as the greatest power variable in not only global power competition but also changes in the international order. Just as the U.S. is eager for a Sino-Russia fragmentation strategy, such as a Tito-style wedge policy to manage balance of power in the early years of the Cold War, it needs a reverse Kissinger strategy to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, in order to push for a Sino-Russia splitting in the 21st century. But with the war in Ukraine, it seems that this fragmentation strategy has already been broken. In the context of Northeast Asia, whether or not the stability of Sino-Russia relations depends not only on the United States, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the fourth variable is a dependent variable that emerged as a result of the interaction of the above three variables, but simultaneously it remains to be seen that this variable is likely to act as the most dynamic and independent variable that can promote multilateralism, multipolarization, and pan-regionalism of the global international community in the future. Taking into account these four variables together, we can make an outlook on the change in the international order.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.94-120
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• 2015

The Asia-Pacific Region has emerged as a arena of geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The Obama administration of the U.S. had laid out the concept of rebalancing strategy toward the region, concentrating its 60 percent of Naval Forces to the region till 2020 and consolidating its network of allies and partners. Whereas Chinese leader Xi Jinping also put forward the concept of new type of major power relations concerning its relations with the U.S. and a concept of 'the Asian Community of Common Destiny' aiming at a more intensified mutual relation among countries in the region. In doing so, Asia-Pacific region gradually became the arena where mutual competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China has crossfired. As a close ally to the U.S. and a partner to Japan, South Korea should develop trilateral naval cooperation by holding joint naval drill with the aim of humanitarian support and disaster relief. At the same time, Seoul also should make efforts to proceed mutual confidence building with Beijing by deepening military-to-military cooperation. These policy options will be helpful to enhance Seoul's security posture in the region.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.69-114
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• 2022

본 논문은 '균형'과 '편승'의 관점에서 대만 '신남향정책'을 분석한다. 구체적으로는 리덩후이 정부 시기부터 이어져온 남향정책의 변화양상과 특징을 살펴보고, 차이잉원 정부가 추진하는 신남향정책이 갖는 의미를 살펴본다. 대만의 대외정책은 미·중관계라는 대외적 변수에 의해 강한 영향을 받아왔다. 역대 대만 정부는 '탈중국'을 목표로 아세안 등 동남아 국가로 진출하는 남향정책을 적극적으로 추진했지만, 큰 성과를 거두지 못했다. 이것은 당시 협조적인 미·중관계와 중국의 강한 견제 등 변수가 작용했기 때문이다. 이러한 환경 속에서 대만은 미국과 중국 그리고 동남아 국가들 사이에서 적절한 균형을 추구해야만 했다. 그러나 트럼프 행정부 출범 이후 미·중 간 전략적 경쟁이 격화되면서 대만의 대외정책 역시 새로운 공간이 창출되고 있는데, 이는 미국이 중국의 부상을 억제하기 위해 인도태평양 전략 등을 구체화하는 과정에서 대만과의 협력을 중시하였기 때문이다. 차이잉원 정부가 추진하는 신남향정책은 미국의 '인도태평양 전략'과의 연계를 모색하고 또 인도 등 남아시아 국가로 진출을 시도한다는 점에서 기존 남향정책과 차별성을 갖고 있다. 탈중국을 적극적으로 추진함과 동시에 미국과의 협력을 모색하는 차이잉원의 신남향정책은 기존의 균형에 더해 미국으로의 '편승'으로 해석할 수 있다. 앞으로도 상당 기간 미·중 간 전략적 경쟁은 심화될 것으로 보이며, 민진당 정권 하에서 대만과 미국의 상호 협력적 관계 역시 지속될 것으로 전망된다. 신남향정책과 인도태평양 전략 간의 연계 등을 적극적으로 추구하는 대만의 편승전략 역시 강화될 것으로 보인다.