• International Journal of Contents
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• 제8권2호
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• pp.75-81
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• 2012

This study explores the important causal relationship between the public (domestic) and trade (international) disputes of South Korea and China. To understand the relations between the domestic and international disputes, Putnam's study of the two-level game theory has been conducted in order to analyze the effect of complicated social and political frameworks on international trade disputes. Due to the social and political differences between South Korea and China, this study provides three findings based on negotiation, policy, and strategic approaches.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제22권7호
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• pp.99-106
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• 2004

본 연구에서는 바이레벨 문제를 풀기 위한 2가지 접근법, 즉 Cournot-Nash 게임과 Stackelbgerg 게임을 서로 비교하기 위한 것으로, 하위문제가 결정적인 통행배정문제(deterministic traffic assignment)인 경우와 확률적 통행배정문제(stochastic traffic assignment)인 경우로 구분하여 분석한다. 바이레벨 프로그램(bi-level program)은 상위문제(upper level program)과 하위 문제(lower level program)로 구성된 수리적인 문제로 상위문제는 목적하는 특정함수를 최적화시키는 형태이며, 하위문제는 통행자의 행태를 반영하는 형태로 구축된다. 기존에 제시된 알고리듬중 바이레벨문제의 대표적인 풀이 알고리듬인 IOA(Iterative Optimization Assignment) 알고리듬과 기종점 통행행렬추정(OD matrix estimation)에 주로 사용되는 IEA(Iterative Estimation Assignment)은 상위문제와 하위문제가 서로 독립적으로 존재하면서 설계변수와 통행량을 서로 주고받는 형태를 갖고 있어 Cournot-Nash 게임형태이다. 이에 반해, 최근에 제시된 민감도분석(Sensitivity analysis)을 기초로 한 알고리듬들은 상위문제에서 결정된 설계변수 변화에 대해 하위문제의 통행량변화를 민감도를 통해 고려하기 때문에 Stackelbeg게임이라고 볼 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 이들 알고리듬들을 비교하는 데 연구의 목적이 있으며, 기존에 제시된 기법과는 다른 좀 더 효율적인 접근법을 제시한다. 예제 교통망을 이용하여 제시된 모형들을 비교해본 결과, 결정적인 통행배정모형을 하위문제로 설정한 경우에는 두가지 접근법 모두 동일한 상위목적함수 값을 보여 우위를 판단할 수 없었지만, 확정적 통행배정모형으로 설정한 경우, Stackelberg게임 접근법이 Cournot-Nash게임 접근법 보다 더 우수함을 확인할 수 있었다.

• 정보과학회 논문지
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• 제42권5호
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• pp.681-689
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• 2015

개인정보는 살아 있는 개인에 관한 정보로서 성명, 주민등록번호 및 영상 등을 통하여 개인을 알아볼 수 있는 정보를 말한다. 정보주체의 민감한 정보를 포함하고 있는 개인정보는 유출시 각종 범죄에 악용될 수 있다. 이를 막기 위해 데이터를 공개하거나 배포하기 전에 개인 식별 요소를 제거하는 방법을 사용한다. 하지만 이름이나 주민등록번호 등의 식별자를 삭제 또는 변경하여 정보의 공개를 제한하더라도, 다른 데이터와 연결하여 분석하면 개인정보가 노출될 가능성이 존재한다. 이러한 문제점을 해결하기 위하여 본 논문에서는 서비스에 활용될 속성은 낮은 수준의 익명화를 수행하여 실제 사용될 정보의 유용성을 높이고, 그와 함께 연결 공격을 방지하여 하나의 원본 데이터 테이블에서 둘 이상의 익명화된 테이블을 동시에 제공할 수 있는 익명화 기법을 제안한다. 그리고 협조적 게임이론에 기반을 둔 실험을 통해 본 제안의 우수성을 입증한다.

• 한국유통학회지:유통연구
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• 제11권4호
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

본 연구에서는 최근 이동통신단말기보조금을 둘러싸고 이동통신서비스사업자와 이동통신 단말기제조업자 사이에서 발생한 갈등상황을 중심으로 2인비영합게임을 정의하고 그에 대한 최적전략게임해를 도출하였다. 연구결과 이동통신서비스사업자와 이동통신단말기제조업자 중 자기가 속한 시장에 대한 시장지배력이 높은 사업자는 자신에게 유리한 전략으로 힘을 행사할 수 있으며, 양 사업자들이 각자의 시장에 대한 시장지배력이 비슷하게 높다면 양자간에 잠재적 갈등과 협력의 기회가 공존하고 있다는 점 등이 밝혀졌다. 또한, 본 연구의 결과는 이동통신단말기보조금에 대한 경로갈등과 유사한 다양한 제품과 서비스를 대상으로 발생될 수 있는 경로갈등의 해결을 위한 효과적인 준거기준을 제공할 수 있을 것으로 기대 된다.

• 한국시스템다이내믹스연구
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.93-112
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• 2001

Inter-Organizational Cooperation is the most common and important strategy in modern public and privet sectors managerial activities. In this paper the concepts of inter-organizational cooperation means not selfish cooperation as in the game circumstance and theory, but general collaborative action between organizations, they have share same goal. The achievement level of jointed-goal of inter-organization is depended upon the performance of cooperation, which resulted from the conditions and circumstances of cooperation. This paper analyses the effect of inter-organizational cooperation on achievement level of the jointed goal between two organizations with computer simulation model of the system dynamics approach. In the computer simulation model, three factors, goal perception, communication, and control, are considered as a key conditions of cooperation, which impact on the performance of cooperation. Simulation model was constructed with focus on the dynamic interactions between these three factors and the achievement level of jointed-goal. Consequently, the results found in this paper may provide further grounds for reducing the time delay that included in the conditions of cooperation.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제12권3호
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• pp.207-223
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• 2013

Revenue management (RM) has been widely used to model products characterized as perishable. Classical RM model assumed that price is the sole factor in the model. Thus price adjustment becomes a crucial and costly factor in business. In this paper, an optimal pricing model is developed based on minimization of soft customer cost, one kind of price adjustment cost and is solved by Lagrange multiplier method. It is formed by expected discounted revenue/bid price integrating quantity-based RM and pricing-based RM. Quantity-based RM consists of two capacity models, namely, booking limit and overbooking. Booking limit, built by assuming uncertain customer arrival, decides the optimal capacity allocation for two market segments. Overbooking determines the level of accepted order exceeding capacity to anticipate probability of cancellation. Furthermore, pricing-based RM models occupancy/demand rate influenced by internal and competitor price changes. In this paper, a mathematical model based on game theoretic approach is developed for two conditions of deterministic and stochastic demand. Based on the equilibrium point, the best strategy for both hotels can be determined.

• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제11권3호
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• pp.217-227
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• 2020

Purpose - Against the backdrop of the recent intense political conflict in Korea's political circles, it is to reveal from an economic point of view the hidden aspects behind the hostile conflict between the two political forces. Design/methodology/approach - This paper is not a normative study to find a solution to political conflict, but a positive study to reveal the mechanism of reciprocity that exists between the two parties of conflict in real politics. Therefore, the analysis is based on game theory methodology. Findings - It is shown that the ruling party should choose a level of preemptive response that is neither insufficient nor excessive if it aims to avoid radical anti-government struggles by opposition parties. We also find that even if the chances of success of the opposition's radical offensive struggle are low, the use of that strategy is not necessarily reduced. In addition, we have obtained comparative static results that do not deviate much from our intuition. What's interesting is that unlike our intuition that the choice of the method will be indifferent if the marginal effects of radical and normal methods of struggle are the same, the opposition party rather chooses the normal method of struggle more often. Research implications or Originality - In forming the analytical model, it reflected the support of the general public following the opposition's struggle against the ruling party in order to capture real politics well in the conflict between the two opposing parties.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권11호
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.2-12
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• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제19권4호
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• pp.37-59
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• 2018

This study investigates the effects of the distribution channel structure on quality decisions under duopoly competition. I considers a set-up in which two retailers compete on product quality and retail price. In the set-up, the integrated retailer has the power to determine the quality of its exclusive product, while the decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized retailer, the supplier determines product quality. I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized channel by one retailer and an integrated channel by the other retailer can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-channel-choice model. The two retailers select different levels of quality, and this quality competition benefits retailers by softening price competition. In a sequential-channel-choice model, I find that the leader can obtain a first-mover advantage. From the perspective of the supplier, which can decide the distribution channel structure and level of quality, both suppliers choose the decentralized channel in equilibrium.