• International journal of advanced smart convergence
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• 제10권4호
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• pp.172-182
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• 2021

We look at the business model development of a fan community platform 'Weverse' from two-sided platform (TSP) to multi-sided platform (MSP) and investigate its platform business model. From the Rocket Model's theoretical perspective, the results reveal that Weverse firstly focuses on inviting artists as many as possible starting from BTS, then attracts new artists' fans naturally. For success of this TSP, it forms MSP, 'Weverse Shop' to meet two sides' relevant needs timely and filtered. In third stage of connection, various partnerships are attempted in terms of open platform strategies. For instance, by combining 'VLive' and Weverse, Naver's fan platform business is transferred to Weverse. For core transaction through direct and indirect monetization, several cobranding activities are tried. Lastly, regarding optimization, newly born Weverse being launched in the first half of 2022 is supposed to create further synergies with Naver's R&D capabilities in data, AI, and other technologies like metaverse platform 'ZEPETO' which already sells clothing items of Weverse artists.

• STI Policy Review
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.57-74
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• 2014

This review organises the fragmented management literature on platform business according to a conceptual map and a meta-theoretical scheme. Since the early 2000s, numerous researchers have examined platform business and two-sided networks with platform business and strategy being an important business innovation model for many industries, creating value primarily by enabling direct interactions. Platforms such as Google or Amazon contain a common set of rules and components in most user transactions. Thirty-two core papers and books on Strategic Management Journal, Industrial Economics and Operation Management-related disciplines are reviewed, with further observations on how cumulative research streams on the platform are carried out independently from each academic perspective. The first of the two arguments in this paper is that because interactive relationships bridge the platform and stakeholders such as end-users and developers, it is crucial for platform companies to be aware of their relationship with stakeholders in order to support and sustainably provide content to their platform. The second is that integrative perspectives are essential due to the low number of interdisciplinary investigations conducted thus far. The paper's final section deals with implications for theory and practice, concluding that integrative studies and interactive relationship studies should be the main research streams in future platform research.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제35권4호
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• 한국IT서비스학회지
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• 제10권2호
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• pp.75-94
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• 2011

The industrial ecosystem around the Internet services has been evolving since the Internet was first introduced. The Net Neutrality issue best represents the process of the evolution and presents an inevitable challenge that the industry should overcome. This paper deals with this structural change with the Two-Sided Market framework and provides a System Dynamics(SD) model to evaluate the economic implications of the net neutrality policy. In particular, our approach analyzes the policy impacts when two competing platforms (network providers) play a role of the platform in a typical two-sided market, which connects Content Providers(CPs) with users. Previous studies show that the indirect network externality between these two markets makes the entire system tip to one platform. When the multi-homing in the CP market is allowed as in our model, however, their argument may lose its validity. To examine the system behavior, conducted here is SD simulations of our model. The simulation results show that co-existence of the competing platforms persists with the network effects over a certain threshold. The net neutrality policy seems to lower the threshold based on our experimental outcomes.

• 기술경영경제학회:학술대회논문집
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• 기술경영경제학회 2006년도 제28회 동계학술발표회 논문집
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• pp.78-102
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• 2006

Networks, services and industries have been converging with the advent of digital convergence by technology advancements of digitalization, broadband and interactivity in the areas of information-communication and broadcasting technologies. Especially, this convergence of technology and market has been blurring the boundary of telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, and the severe competition seems to be inevitable due to the lack of the differentiation in broadcasting media and contents. In this study, we regard the competition phenomenon in the digital convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting as the platform competition in two-sided markets which have been actively studied since 2000, and analyzed it using modified Hotelling's location model. According to the analysis of platform competition on the effects of the differentiation of platform (t) , killer component $(\mu)$ and component compatibility $(\theta)$ , it is shown that two differentiated platforms are simultaneously used in case of the decrease of substitution effects, and the profit of platform with killer contents is increased, but the profit of platforms with higher compatibility is decreased. The policy implication is that it is especially necessary to modify the policy and regulation on media contents considering the growing competition in media. On the other hand, differentiated and reasonable policy is required to make fair competition and active market environment.

• 한국산업정보학회논문지
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• 제27권4호
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• pp.127-136
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• 2022

지속적인 기술 발전으로 더욱 다양한 구조의 플랫폼이 등장하고 있다. 기존 연구에서는 기술과 혁신을 기반으로 한 새로운 구조가 양면 시장으로 영향을 미칠 것으로 예측하고 있다. 탈중앙화 신원 확인(DID) 플랫폼은 블록체인 기술을 기반으로 한 새로운 플랫폼으로, 본 연구에서는 양면 시장의 관점에서 그 중요성을 평가하였다. 분석 네트워크 프로세스(Analytic Network Process)를 이용하여, IT, 플랫폼, 블록체인 전문가를 대상으로 쌍대비교 설문을 진행하였고, 일관성 비율 값이 0.1 이하인 데이터를 선별하여 총 12개의 데이터를 대상으로 분석하였다. 연구결과는 서비스 품질, 정책 지원, 개방성, 불확실성 순으로 중요도를 보였다. 본 연구는 블록체인 및 DID 플랫폼 기반 비즈니스 기업에게 전략적 의사결정을 개발하는데 유용한 정보로 활용될 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

• 한국언론정보학보
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• 제64권
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• pp.5-30
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• 2013

이 글은 오늘날 인터넷을 비롯한 정보기술문화를 비판적으로 분석하기 위한 개념틀로 이중적 플랫폼을 제안한다. 인터페이스연구와 양면시장론에 기대어 인터넷을 이중적 플랫폼으로 접근함으로써 전면에는 이용자의 공개, 공유, 참여의 광장이 펼쳐지고 이면에는 그에 대한 추적, 감시, 통제의 시장이 형성되는 복합적 양상을 분석할 수 있다. 특히 전면의 광장과 이면의 시장이 어떻게 하나의 플랫폼에서 공존하며 모순적으로 상호작용하는가에 초점을 맞추면서 인터넷의 이중적 플랫폼을 광장시장의 인터페이스로 규정할 것이다. 그에 이어 월드와이드웹의 설계구조가 바뀌고 콘텐츠에서 데이터로 정보재의 주요 상품 형태가 변천하며 이용자 추적을 위한 웹벌레의 기능을 분석하면서 웹 전체가 어떻게 이중적 플랫폼으로 기능하는지 규명한다. 마지막으로 이중적 플랫폼 개념틀의 함의와 추후 심화된 분석을 위해 필요한 과제를 제시한다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제41권3호
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• pp.162-169
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• 2018

Net neutrality, which has not been a problem, has recently become a problem for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and their complaints have been paid by domestic platform companies, but overseas global IT companies such as Google and YouTube, generate huge revenues from domestic markets. In this situation, domestic IT companies claim that it is natural to impose more expensive charges or restrict speed on users who generate huge traffic. On the other side, however, the telecommunication network has become an essential public good that is essential to our everyday life, and because it has been given a monopoly position by a private company to efficiently respond to the explosive demand for telecommunication services, It is necessary to provide equal and universal service and fulfill public duty. In this paper, we deal with the network neutrality problem, focusing on the price elasticity between the CP (Contents Provider) and the ISP, rather than the user who is one side of the two-sided market for the already saturated satellites communication market. We present a game model that determines the optimal price for each platform by Nash equilibrium and analyze how the net neutrality affects CP according to the change of exogenous variables through the proposed game model.

• 벤처창업연구
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.161-176
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• 2013

본 연구는 국내 신용카드 시장에서 관찰되는 양면시장적 성격에 대해 고찰한다. 우선 기존 연구들을 참조하여 양면시장이 필수적으로 갖추어야 할 요건과 성격을 여섯 가지로 요약한 후 카드시장에서 이러한 특성들이 실제로 나타나는지에 대해 논의하였다. 다음으로 성숙한 국내 카드시장의 특성을 고려, 기존 연구에서 논의하는 일반적인 양면성 외에 추가적으로 발생할 수 있는 양면시장적 특성을 카드사들의 전략적 마케팅 제휴와 관련하여 제시하였다. 즉, 전략적 제휴에 의해 발생하는 제휴카드 회원그룹과 제휴카드 가맹점 그룹 간의 추가적인 양면성의 존재 가능성을 제시하고, 일반적인 양면시장의 특성이 이들 그룹 사이에도 나타날 수 있는지를 고찰하였다. 또한 이러한 추가적인 양면성을 실증적으로 측정하기 위한 두 개의 모형을 제시하고 각각의 측정방법에 대한 대안도 서술하였다. 이를 통해 본 연구는 국내 카드시장과 같이 성숙한 양면시장에서는 기존 연구에서 다루는 일반적인 양면성 이외에 추가적인 양면성이 존재할 수 있다는 새로운 관점을 제공한다.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• 제20권3_spc호
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• pp.201-217
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• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.