• International journal of advanced smart convergence
• /
• v.10 no.4
• /
• pp.172-182
• /
• 2021

We look at the business model development of a fan community platform 'Weverse' from two-sided platform (TSP) to multi-sided platform (MSP) and investigate its platform business model. From the Rocket Model's theoretical perspective, the results reveal that Weverse firstly focuses on inviting artists as many as possible starting from BTS, then attracts new artists' fans naturally. For success of this TSP, it forms MSP, 'Weverse Shop' to meet two sides' relevant needs timely and filtered. In third stage of connection, various partnerships are attempted in terms of open platform strategies. For instance, by combining 'VLive' and Weverse, Naver's fan platform business is transferred to Weverse. For core transaction through direct and indirect monetization, several cobranding activities are tried. Lastly, regarding optimization, newly born Weverse being launched in the first half of 2022 is supposed to create further synergies with Naver's R&D capabilities in data, AI, and other technologies like metaverse platform 'ZEPETO' which already sells clothing items of Weverse artists.

• STI Policy Review
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.57-74
• /
• 2014

This review organises the fragmented management literature on platform business according to a conceptual map and a meta-theoretical scheme. Since the early 2000s, numerous researchers have examined platform business and two-sided networks with platform business and strategy being an important business innovation model for many industries, creating value primarily by enabling direct interactions. Platforms such as Google or Amazon contain a common set of rules and components in most user transactions. Thirty-two core papers and books on Strategic Management Journal, Industrial Economics and Operation Management-related disciplines are reviewed, with further observations on how cumulative research streams on the platform are carried out independently from each academic perspective. The first of the two arguments in this paper is that because interactive relationships bridge the platform and stakeholders such as end-users and developers, it is crucial for platform companies to be aware of their relationship with stakeholders in order to support and sustainably provide content to their platform. The second is that integrative perspectives are essential due to the low number of interdisciplinary investigations conducted thus far. The paper's final section deals with implications for theory and practice, concluding that integrative studies and interactive relationship studies should be the main research streams in future platform research.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.35 no.4
• /
• pp.55-79
• /
• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
• /
• v.10 no.2
• /
• pp.75-94
• /
• 2011

The industrial ecosystem around the Internet services has been evolving since the Internet was first introduced. The Net Neutrality issue best represents the process of the evolution and presents an inevitable challenge that the industry should overcome. This paper deals with this structural change with the Two-Sided Market framework and provides a System Dynamics(SD) model to evaluate the economic implications of the net neutrality policy. In particular, our approach analyzes the policy impacts when two competing platforms (network providers) play a role of the platform in a typical two-sided market, which connects Content Providers(CPs) with users. Previous studies show that the indirect network externality between these two markets makes the entire system tip to one platform. When the multi-homing in the CP market is allowed as in our model, however, their argument may lose its validity. To examine the system behavior, conducted here is SD simulations of our model. The simulation results show that co-existence of the competing platforms persists with the network effects over a certain threshold. The net neutrality policy seems to lower the threshold based on our experimental outcomes.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
• /
• 2006.02a
• /
• pp.78-102
• /
• 2006

Networks, services and industries have been converging with the advent of digital convergence by technology advancements of digitalization, broadband and interactivity in the areas of information-communication and broadcasting technologies. Especially, this convergence of technology and market has been blurring the boundary of telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, and the severe competition seems to be inevitable due to the lack of the differentiation in broadcasting media and contents. In this study, we regard the competition phenomenon in the digital convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting as the platform competition in two-sided markets which have been actively studied since 2000, and analyzed it using modified Hotelling's location model. According to the analysis of platform competition on the effects of the differentiation of platform (t) , killer component $(\mu)$ and component compatibility $(\theta)$ , it is shown that two differentiated platforms are simultaneously used in case of the decrease of substitution effects, and the profit of platform with killer contents is increased, but the profit of platforms with higher compatibility is decreased. The policy implication is that it is especially necessary to modify the policy and regulation on media contents considering the growing competition in media. On the other hand, differentiated and reasonable policy is required to make fair competition and active market environment.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
• /
• v.27 no.4
• /
• pp.127-136
• /
• 2022

As technological development continues, platforms with more diverse structures are emerging. Existing research predicts that a new structure based on technology and innovation will affect the two-sided market. This study evaluated the decentralized identifier (DID) platform, a new platform based on blockchain technology, of the importance of this platform from the perspective of the two-sided market. Using the Analytic Network Process, IT, platform, and blockchain experts conducted a dual comparison survey. Data with a consistency ratio value of 0.1 or less were selected and analyzed for 12 data. The research results showed the importance of service quality, policy support, openness, and uncertainty. This study is expected to be used to support the development of strategic decision-making for blockchain and DID platform-based business companies.

• Korean journal of communication and information
• /
• v.64
• /
• pp.5-30
• /
• 2013

This paper conceptualizes the two-faced platform based on interface studies and two-sided market theory to critically analyze today's information technology culture such as the Internet. With this conceptual framework, the Internet can be investigated to have two faces, in which the square of user's openness, sharing, and participation is unfold on the front face, whereas the market of tracking, surveillance, and control of user's activities is formed on the other face. The two faces contradictorily coexist, resulting in technological and cultural dynamics on the Internet. Therefore, the Internet today as a two-faced platform can be described as a square-market interface. By analyzing on transformation of the web architecture, shift of informational commodity from content to data, and web bugs' user tracking across two faces, it examines how the world wide web itself can function as a two-faced platform. Lastly, implications and further works are suggested to improve the two-faced platform as a conceptual framework and to deeply analyze broader information technology culture based on it.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
• /
• v.41 no.3
• /
• pp.162-169
• /
• 2018

Net neutrality, which has not been a problem, has recently become a problem for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and their complaints have been paid by domestic platform companies, but overseas global IT companies such as Google and YouTube, generate huge revenues from domestic markets. In this situation, domestic IT companies claim that it is natural to impose more expensive charges or restrict speed on users who generate huge traffic. On the other side, however, the telecommunication network has become an essential public good that is essential to our everyday life, and because it has been given a monopoly position by a private company to efficiently respond to the explosive demand for telecommunication services, It is necessary to provide equal and universal service and fulfill public duty. In this paper, we deal with the network neutrality problem, focusing on the price elasticity between the CP (Contents Provider) and the ISP, rather than the user who is one side of the two-sided market for the already saturated satellites communication market. We present a game model that determines the optimal price for each platform by Nash equilibrium and analyze how the net neutrality affects CP according to the change of exogenous variables through the proposed game model.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
• /
• v.8 no.4
• /
• pp.161-176
• /
• 2013

This study discusses some features observed in Korean credit card industry, which is classified as a two-sided market. First, I summarize six characteristics or conditions that two-sided markets possess by reviewing related literatures, and consider if we can find out those peculiarities in Korean card industry. Second, this study casts light upon the unique issues which have not been handled in previous studies, that is another two-sidedness in mature two-sided markets. In the context of credit card industry, this additional two-sidedness is created by specific consumers group existing in entire consumer group in a card firm as a form of subset and specific partnering merchants group offering special benefits to their subset consumer group, or alliance card holders. This concept gives new idea that there could be multiple two-sidedness especially in mature two-sided markets, which will be significant to platforms' pricing strategies and expand the scope of related studies.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
• /
• v.20 no.3_spc
• /
• pp.201-217
• /
• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.