• 한국IT서비스학회지
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• 제10권2호
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• pp.75-94
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• 2011

The industrial ecosystem around the Internet services has been evolving since the Internet was first introduced. The Net Neutrality issue best represents the process of the evolution and presents an inevitable challenge that the industry should overcome. This paper deals with this structural change with the Two-Sided Market framework and provides a System Dynamics(SD) model to evaluate the economic implications of the net neutrality policy. In particular, our approach analyzes the policy impacts when two competing platforms (network providers) play a role of the platform in a typical two-sided market, which connects Content Providers(CPs) with users. Previous studies show that the indirect network externality between these two markets makes the entire system tip to one platform. When the multi-homing in the CP market is allowed as in our model, however, their argument may lose its validity. To examine the system behavior, conducted here is SD simulations of our model. The simulation results show that co-existence of the competing platforms persists with the network effects over a certain threshold. The net neutrality policy seems to lower the threshold based on our experimental outcomes.

• 인터넷정보학회논문지
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• 제18권4호
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• pp.109-119
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• 2017

본 연구는 온라인검색광고 기반의 사업모델을 가진 대표적인 포털사업자 네이버의 광고관리시스템이 제공하는 데이터를 이용하여 온라인검색광고시장이 양면시장이 아닐 수 있음을 실증분석하고 이를 근거로 한 적절한 동 시장의 시장획정 방안 제시를 목적으로 한다. 이 목적을 위해 두 가지 연구 질문에 대한 검토가 필요하다. 첫째, 온라인검색광고 사업모델과 학문적 의의가 큰 로체-티롤의 양면시장 정의 간에 일관성이 있는가, 둘째, 온라인검색광고시장에 간접네트워크외부효과가 존재하는가이다. 특히 후자의 경우 간접네트워크외부효과가 있다면 어느 정도인지 실증분석을 수행하여야 한다. 이에 대해 본 연구는 구글과 같은 온라인검색광고서비스가 단면시장일 수 있다는 Luchetta의 이론적 주장에 기반을 두고 이를 검증하기 위해 상관 및 회귀분석을 수행하였다. 온라인검색 광고비는 직접네트워크외부효과 독립변수인 광고주가 한 단위 증가할 때 약 50원 이상 증가하였다. 그러나 간접네트워크외부효과 측정을 위해 설정한 독립변수인 검색횟수와 종속변수인 온라인검색광고비 간에는 유의적인 상관 및 회귀결과가 나타나지 않았다. 이 결과에 따르면, 온라인검색광고시장에는 양면시장의 필요조건인 간접네트워크외부효과가 존재하지 않거나 유의적이지 않아 양면시장이라기 보다는 단면시장일 가능성이 높다. 이는 온라인검색광고시장에 전통적인 시장획정 방법을 적용할 수 있고, 본원적인 경쟁요소를 모색하는데 유리하며, 경쟁상황에 대한 설명력이 높아짐을 의미한다. 또한 양면시장에 대한 시각차를 보여 온 경제학자들과 규제실무자를 포함한 법학자들의 간극도 어느 정도 극복할 수 있다는 점에서 의의가 있다.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제38권2호
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• pp.159-178
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• 2013

We present a model, combining servitization decision and a conventional two-sided market approaches, to understand expected outcomes and current market situations. We suppose an individual manufacturer participates in multiple platforms and decides whether to initiate servitization by considering latent profitability and risk. The analytical results from the model show that increasing competition within servitized companies lead to a servitization equilibrium, wherein the ratio of servitized companies in a market is stable, due to a gradual decline in relative benefits compared to non-servitized companies. This holds even in the case that the number of customer is increasing along the diffusion of servitization, under some restricted conditions.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제31권4호
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• pp.105-123
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• 2006

Previous research on two-sided markets has, for the most part, concentrated on indirect network externalities between buyers alto sellers. This paper considers direct competition effect among sellers and among buyers as well as indirect network externalities. We develop an analytic model of C2C e-marketplaces and examine whether a monopolistic incumbent could successfully deter new entry into its market. We find that the effect of the number of sellers or buyers on the price of goods depends on whether sellers have decided to sell the goods using an auction or fixed pricing rule and on the characteristics of the goods. We argue that when the effect of the number of sellers on the price of goods is significantly larger than that of buyers, there is a high possibility of entry. In particular, we show that entry becomes more difficult to deter as fixed-price format is adopted more frequently or the proportion of collectables is relatively low.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제35권4호
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제34권1호
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• pp.85-100
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• 2009

An online marketplace, such as eBay, is an example of two-sided markets. In online marketplaces, there are transactions between sellers and buyers and direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. Previous research on two-sided market has not handle these competition effects and mostly focused on indirect network externalities between sellers and buyers. We analyze the fee structure of an online marketplace considering direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. We find that when fees for sellers and buyers can be imposed, an auction or fixed-pricing rule can be chosen according to the characteristics of a product traded. But when only fees for sellers can be imposed, an auction can be taken as a trading mechanism solely.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 2006년도 추계학술대회
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• pp.437-452
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• 2006

양면시장(two-sided market)에 대한 기존의 문헌들이 주로 구매자그룹과 판매자 그룹 사이의 간접적인 네트워크 효과만을 다루었다. 본 논문에서는 추가적으로 구매자간 그리고 판매자간 경쟁효과를 고려하였고 독점적인 이마켓플레이스가 시장을 선점하고 있는 상황에서의 신규기업의 진입가능성을 분석하였다. 참가자의 수가 거래가격에 미치는 효과는 거래가격의 결정방식이나 거래물품의 특성 등에 따라서 달라지게 되고 이에 따라서 신규기업의 진입가능성도 영향을 받게 된다. 판매자의 수가 가격에 미치는 영향이 구매자의 수가 가격에 미치는 영향보다 상당히 크다면 동태적으로 안정적인 균형이 나타나게 되어 추가적인 진입가능성이 높아지게 되고 반대의 경우에는 불안정한 균형이 나타나게 되어 이러한 가능성이 낮아지게 된다. 특히, 본 논문에서는 경매중심의 거래방식을 사용하거나 수집품의 거래비중이 높은 경우 신규진입이 어려우며 따라서 독점이 유지될 가능성이 높아지게 됨을 보였다.

• 기술경영경제학회:학술대회논문집
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• 기술경영경제학회 2006년도 제28회 동계학술발표회 논문집
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• pp.78-102
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• 2006

Networks, services and industries have been converging with the advent of digital convergence by technology advancements of digitalization, broadband and interactivity in the areas of information-communication and broadcasting technologies. Especially, this convergence of technology and market has been blurring the boundary of telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, and the severe competition seems to be inevitable due to the lack of the differentiation in broadcasting media and contents. In this study, we regard the competition phenomenon in the digital convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting as the platform competition in two-sided markets which have been actively studied since 2000, and analyzed it using modified Hotelling's location model. According to the analysis of platform competition on the effects of the differentiation of platform (t) , killer component $(\mu)$ and component compatibility $(\theta)$ , it is shown that two differentiated platforms are simultaneously used in case of the decrease of substitution effects, and the profit of platform with killer contents is increased, but the profit of platforms with higher compatibility is decreased. The policy implication is that it is especially necessary to modify the policy and regulation on media contents considering the growing competition in media. On the other hand, differentiated and reasonable policy is required to make fair competition and active market environment.

• 한국언론정보학보
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• 제64권
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• pp.5-30
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• 2013

이 글은 오늘날 인터넷을 비롯한 정보기술문화를 비판적으로 분석하기 위한 개념틀로 이중적 플랫폼을 제안한다. 인터페이스연구와 양면시장론에 기대어 인터넷을 이중적 플랫폼으로 접근함으로써 전면에는 이용자의 공개, 공유, 참여의 광장이 펼쳐지고 이면에는 그에 대한 추적, 감시, 통제의 시장이 형성되는 복합적 양상을 분석할 수 있다. 특히 전면의 광장과 이면의 시장이 어떻게 하나의 플랫폼에서 공존하며 모순적으로 상호작용하는가에 초점을 맞추면서 인터넷의 이중적 플랫폼을 광장시장의 인터페이스로 규정할 것이다. 그에 이어 월드와이드웹의 설계구조가 바뀌고 콘텐츠에서 데이터로 정보재의 주요 상품 형태가 변천하며 이용자 추적을 위한 웹벌레의 기능을 분석하면서 웹 전체가 어떻게 이중적 플랫폼으로 기능하는지 규명한다. 마지막으로 이중적 플랫폼 개념틀의 함의와 추후 심화된 분석을 위해 필요한 과제를 제시한다.