Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
/
v.5
no.4
/
pp.35-49
/
2010
The purpose of this study is to help the venture business innovate the purchasing process. This study reviewed the types of transaction governance structure, and researched the change of transaction governance structure, while using information technology. According to transaction cost theory, the transaction governance structure can be moved from hierarchy to market. It can be moved to the middle, because of economies of scale, incentive for supplier, and increasing search cost. And it can be moved from market exchange to relational exchange, using electronic marketplace. In order to innovate the purchasing process, the venture business can select the transaction governance structure that fits the its purchasing contexts.
This paper examines an explanatory power of primary alliance motivation theories, such as 'Transaction-Cost Economics (TCE)' and 'Resource-Based View (RBV)', on the technological alliance partner selection criteria, governance and performance. Adopting perspectives of integration provided by TCE and RBV, this work examines the impact of both theories on the alliance processes such as alliance partner selection, governance and performance. Empirical findings show that both TCE and RBV are effective in explaining the choice of technological alliance partners. In addition, TCE appears to be more effective in providing explanation of technological alliance governance structure. Also, both TCE and RBV are effective in evaluating the technological alliance performance phase, though RBV appears to be slightly more effective.
The concern of external environment is growing up in the field of channel distribution. In the former channel distribution, the channel distribution environment is little bit unmoveable owing to a powerful manufacture control against poor distributor. Therefore intra-efficiency is channel member's core interest. The structure of channel governance, however, come to be changable because of the mature distributor power against manufacturer such as a Price Break, JIT of channel governance, and a serial of change. Accordingly, it is acceptable that the interest of external-environment of channel members' is more and more enlarged, and external-environment change in the channel distribution make the serious problems in intraorganizational system. Thus, it is meaningful that this study try to discover the consumer power as external environment factor and to find the best strategy to overcome this consumer power. Resource dependence theory, Transaction cost theory, Political Economic Approach, and Working partnership Approach are the theory foundation of the reasearch. Apparel franchise is a sample to analyse the hypothesis and correlation and multi-regression are a chief tools to estimate the hypothesis. Thus, the above results imply that a flexible governance is appropriate to consumer power, conflict is not intervening value between consumer power and channel governance, and the channel member's satisfaction can be confirmed in the flexible governance better than control governance.
Plural governance system in which firms use vertical integration and market governance simultaneously are widely used across various marketing context. Typical examples of plural governance include franchise systems, in which firms own and operate some unit themselves while licensing the operation of some of their units to franchisees. Despite many scholars have attempted to explore the structure of plural governance over decades, there are few insights into its determinants. In this study, we examine the relationship between the proportion of outlets franchised and several franchisor's characteristics based on the perspectives of transaction cost analysis, resource scarcy theory and agency theory. Using franchisor data in Korean Franchise Disclosure Document over the 2006-2009 period, we test the effect of franchisor size, system growth rate, franchise fee, initial investment, and risk sharing on the proportion of outlets franchised. Except for the effect of system growth rate, the results of a series of multiple regression analysis supported the negative effects of franchisor size, franchise fee, initial investment and risk sharing on the proportion of outlets franchised.
Park, J.S.;Park, J.Y.;Choi, S.M.;Oh, J.T.;Kim, K.Y.
Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
/
v.33
no.6
/
pp.139-153
/
2018
The explosive interest in block chain, which was triggered by Bitcoin in 2009, is leading to substantial investment and the development of block chain technology. There is no dispute among experts that block chain will be the next generation of innovation. However, despite the high expectations for block chains, the related technology still has certain limitations. In addition to improving issues such as a low transaction throughput, inefficient agreement algorithms, and an inflexible governance structure, it is necessary to solve various problems for commercialization and full-scale spreading owing to the trilemma problem among the scalability, security, and decentralization. Under this situation, identification of the technology characteristics according to the generation is helpful for the development of the core technology requirements and commercialization blueprint in establishing an R&D direction. Therefore, in this article, the development of blockchain technology is divided into generations and analyzed in terms of the operational structure, consensus algorithm, governance, scalability, and security.
This study aims to examine how institutions has been formed to deepen interdependence and to keep check in trade on the border regions of East Sea Rim between the macro structure and micro behaviors. The transitional nations such as China, Russia, and North Korea adjacent to the East Sea Rim exhibits unique characteristics in terms of transaction governance structure. While the regional economy in northeast China is still overwhelmed by the stated-owned enterprises(SOEs), it strongly encourages the private economic trade to form institutional economy through the border trade port and peddler trade market. Thus trade is shaped by the mixed governance. In far east Russia, whereas the SOEs are in charge of exporting oil, gas etc., private firms and small scale traders are importing household items, so that it can also be called as the mixed governance, while informal social networks simultaneously work. In North Korea, for the trade, since the firms are mainly required to have the permits from the different levels of government, it is regarded as the hierarchical governance. The institutional economics seems to well explain the changing agencies and their influence on the trade among the regions in the East Sea Rim.
This study has aimed to compare an emission trading system (ETS) in the EU and Japan that introduced the scheme prior to Korea and provided the latter with a benchmarking model. Especially, the EU has a reputation for its well-organized and evolving system, and Japan has also successfully established the system despite its similar condition with Korea, such as an industrial structure and the degree of energy dependence. However, there are noticeable differences between the EU and Japan in their ETS. Whereas Japan has focused on securing certifications in CDM as the implementation of Kyoto protocol, EU has shown a tendency to transform the trading market from a parallel structure of EUA and CER transaction to only the EUA transaction after ending of 1st commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Since the differences were mainly caused by not only in a design of the system but also in internal governance and their national circumstance, it is meaningful to analyse the Korean case with a similar framework. This study may contribute to designing an appropriate system for emission trading in Korea through the comparison of the EU and Japanese case.
Governance can be defined as a concept that encompasses a series of processes including partner selection as well as control and coordination of collaboration to achieve common goals. The study examined efforts to mitigate the risks of opportunistic behaviors into partner selection, partner relationship, control mechanism, and conflict management. For cases that have achieved commercialization outputs with the participation of SMEs, data was collected and analyzed such as interviews with project managers and case records for seven months from October 2016. According to the analysis result, as the complexity increases, such as multilateral cooperation for the development of finished products, cooperation with a trusted partner rather than a partner who can perform a task well was preferred, and the process control was put ahead of the output control. Regarding the partner relationship, the relationship between the owner and the agent differed according to the point of view, and there was a lack of clear allocation of authority and responsibility as well as a reward for the result. In terms of the conflict management, most emphasis was on resolving conflicts or difficulties, and no attempt was made to utilize the positive aspects of the conflict. The structure of most industry-university-institute cooperation organizations is simply composed of the host and participating organizations, and the management regulations should be amended for companies, that put actual funds and use the outputs, to have the authority and responsibility as the owners, and be allowed to use the governance elements appropriately to take the lead as consumers.
This paper undertakes a conceptual review of transaction cost to broaden the understanding of the transaction cost analysis (TCA) approach. More than 40 years have passed since Coase's fundamental insight that transaction, coordination, and contracting costs must be considered explicitly in explaining the extent of vertical integration. Coase (1937) forced economists to identify previously neglected constraints on the trading process to foster efficient intrafirm, rather than interfirm, transactions. The transaction cost approach to economic organization study regards transactions as the basic units of analysis and holds that understanding transaction cost economy is central to organizational study. The approach applies to determining efficient boundaries, as between firms and markets, and to internal transaction organization, including employment relations design. TCA, developed principally by Oliver Williamson (1975,1979,1981a) blends institutional economics, organizational theory, and contract law. Further progress in transaction costs research awaits the identification of critical dimensions in which transaction costs differ and an examination of the economizing properties of alternative institutional modes for organizing transactions. The crucial investment distinction is: To what degree are transaction-specific (non-marketable) expenses incurred? Unspecialized items pose few hazards, since buyers can turn toalternative sources, and suppliers can sell output intended for one order to other buyers. Non-marketability problems arise when specific parties' identities have important cost-bearing consequences. Transactions of this kind are labeled idiosyncratic. The summarized results of the review are as follows. First, firms' distribution decisions often prompt examination of the make-or-buy question: Should a marketing activity be performed within the organization by company employees or contracted to an external agent? Second, manufacturers introducing an industrial product to a foreign market face a difficult decision. Should the product be marketed primarily by captive agents (the company sales force and distribution division) or independent intermediaries (outside sales agents and distribution)? Third, the authors develop a theoretical extension to the basic transaction cost model by combining insights from various theories with the TCA approach. Fourth, other such extensions are likely required for the general model to be applied to different channel situations. It is naive to assume the basic model appliesacross markedly different channel contexts without modifications and extensions. Although this study contributes to scholastic research, it is limited by several factors. First, the theoretical perspective of TCA has attracted considerable recent interest in the area of marketing channels. The analysis aims to match the properties of efficient governance structures with the attributes of the transaction. Second, empirical evidence about TCA's basic propositions is sketchy. Apart from Anderson's (1985) study of the vertical integration of the selling function and John's (1984) study of opportunism by franchised dealers, virtually no marketing studies involving the constructs implicated in the analysis have been reported. We hope, therefore, that further research will clarify distinctions between the different aspects of specific assets. Another important line of future research is the integration of efficiency-oriented TCA with organizational approaches that emphasize specific assets' conceptual definition and industry structure. Finally, research of transaction costs, uncertainty, opportunism, and switching costs is critical to future study.
After relationship marketing emerged as a new approach in the marketing field in the 1980s, it has been widely studied in the United States, Europe and Asia. Rapid environmental changes and global competition has made it inevitable for companies to consider their relationships with the environment more closely. Under these circumstances, relationship marketing has held a position as a pivotal paradigm in the field of strategy as well as in marketing. In addition, relationship marketing has overcome the limitations of a traditional marketing research while providing richer implications in company's marketing activities. The paradigm shift to relationship marketing has brought fundamental changes in a marketing point of view. First, in philosophical aspects, unlike past research which focused solely on customer satisfaction, organizational relationship parameters which focuses on trust and commitment has become key elements of successful relationship marketing while shifts in thoughts naturally take place from adaptive marketing to strategic marketing. Second, in structural aspects, the relational mechanism of governance such as network structure with a variety of relational partners has emerged as a new marketing organization from the previous simple structure focusing on the micro-economic, marketbased trading between seller and customer. Third, in behavioral aspects, it proposed the strategic course of the action of gaining an advantage over the competition on the individual firm level by focusing on building long-term relationships and considering partnership with the components in the entire marketing system, rather than with one-time transaction-centric action between a seller and a customer. Fourth, in the aspects of marketing performance, marketing performance was sought through the long-term and cooperative relationship with various stakeholders, including customers in the marketing system, focusing on the overall competitive advantage based on relationship rather than individual performance of individual companies' marketing activities, such as market share and customer satisfaction. However, studies of relationship marketing were mostly centered in interorganizational relationships focusing on the relational structure and properties of commercial sector in the marketing system. Paradoxically, the circumstance of the consumer's side that must be considered is evolving again in relationship marketing. In structural aspects, a community, as the new relationship governance structure in the digital environment, and in behavioral aspects, the changing role of consumer participation demanding big changes in the digital environment engaged in the marketing system. The possibility of building a relationship marketing community for common value creation is presented in terms of organization of consumers with the focus on changing marketing environment and marketing system according to the new realities of the 21st century- the popularity of digital environments and the diffusion of customer participation. Therefore, future research of relationship marketing must seek for a truly integrated model including all of the existing structure and properties of the research oriented relationship from both the commercial and consumer sector.
본 웹사이트에 게시된 이메일 주소가 전자우편 수집 프로그램이나
그 밖의 기술적 장치를 이용하여 무단으로 수집되는 것을 거부하며,
이를 위반시 정보통신망법에 의해 형사 처벌됨을 유념하시기 바랍니다.
[게시일 2004년 10월 1일]
이용약관
제 1 장 총칙
제 1 조 (목적)
이 이용약관은 KoreaScience 홈페이지(이하 “당 사이트”)에서 제공하는 인터넷 서비스(이하 '서비스')의 가입조건 및 이용에 관한 제반 사항과 기타 필요한 사항을 구체적으로 규정함을 목적으로 합니다.
제 2 조 (용어의 정의)
① "이용자"라 함은 당 사이트에 접속하여 이 약관에 따라 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스를 받는 회원 및 비회원을
말합니다.
② "회원"이라 함은 서비스를 이용하기 위하여 당 사이트에 개인정보를 제공하여 아이디(ID)와 비밀번호를 부여
받은 자를 말합니다.
③ "회원 아이디(ID)"라 함은 회원의 식별 및 서비스 이용을 위하여 자신이 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을
말합니다.
④ "비밀번호(패스워드)"라 함은 회원이 자신의 비밀보호를 위하여 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을 말합니다.
제 3 조 (이용약관의 효력 및 변경)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트에 게시하거나 기타의 방법으로 회원에게 공지함으로써 효력이 발생합니다.
② 당 사이트는 이 약관을 개정할 경우에 적용일자 및 개정사유를 명시하여 현행 약관과 함께 당 사이트의
초기화면에 그 적용일자 7일 이전부터 적용일자 전일까지 공지합니다. 다만, 회원에게 불리하게 약관내용을
변경하는 경우에는 최소한 30일 이상의 사전 유예기간을 두고 공지합니다. 이 경우 당 사이트는 개정 전
내용과 개정 후 내용을 명확하게 비교하여 이용자가 알기 쉽도록 표시합니다.
제 4 조(약관 외 준칙)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스에 관한 이용안내와 함께 적용됩니다.
② 이 약관에 명시되지 아니한 사항은 관계법령의 규정이 적용됩니다.
제 2 장 이용계약의 체결
제 5 조 (이용계약의 성립 등)
① 이용계약은 이용고객이 당 사이트가 정한 약관에 「동의합니다」를 선택하고, 당 사이트가 정한
온라인신청양식을 작성하여 서비스 이용을 신청한 후, 당 사이트가 이를 승낙함으로써 성립합니다.
② 제1항의 승낙은 당 사이트가 제공하는 과학기술정보검색, 맞춤정보, 서지정보 등 다른 서비스의 이용승낙을
포함합니다.
제 6 조 (회원가입)
서비스를 이용하고자 하는 고객은 당 사이트에서 정한 회원가입양식에 개인정보를 기재하여 가입을 하여야 합니다.
제 7 조 (개인정보의 보호 및 사용)
당 사이트는 관계법령이 정하는 바에 따라 회원 등록정보를 포함한 회원의 개인정보를 보호하기 위해 노력합니다. 회원 개인정보의 보호 및 사용에 대해서는 관련법령 및 당 사이트의 개인정보 보호정책이 적용됩니다.
제 8 조 (이용 신청의 승낙과 제한)
① 당 사이트는 제6조의 규정에 의한 이용신청고객에 대하여 서비스 이용을 승낙합니다.
② 당 사이트는 아래사항에 해당하는 경우에 대해서 승낙하지 아니 합니다.
- 이용계약 신청서의 내용을 허위로 기재한 경우
- 기타 규정한 제반사항을 위반하며 신청하는 경우
제 9 조 (회원 ID 부여 및 변경 등)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객에 대하여 약관에 정하는 바에 따라 자신이 선정한 회원 ID를 부여합니다.
② 회원 ID는 원칙적으로 변경이 불가하며 부득이한 사유로 인하여 변경 하고자 하는 경우에는 해당 ID를
해지하고 재가입해야 합니다.
③ 기타 회원 개인정보 관리 및 변경 등에 관한 사항은 서비스별 안내에 정하는 바에 의합니다.
제 3 장 계약 당사자의 의무
제 10 조 (KISTI의 의무)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객이 희망한 서비스 제공 개시일에 특별한 사정이 없는 한 서비스를 이용할 수 있도록
하여야 합니다.
② 당 사이트는 개인정보 보호를 위해 보안시스템을 구축하며 개인정보 보호정책을 공시하고 준수합니다.
③ 당 사이트는 회원으로부터 제기되는 의견이나 불만이 정당하다고 객관적으로 인정될 경우에는 적절한 절차를
거쳐 즉시 처리하여야 합니다. 다만, 즉시 처리가 곤란한 경우는 회원에게 그 사유와 처리일정을 통보하여야
합니다.
제 11 조 (회원의 의무)
① 이용자는 회원가입 신청 또는 회원정보 변경 시 실명으로 모든 사항을 사실에 근거하여 작성하여야 하며,
허위 또는 타인의 정보를 등록할 경우 일체의 권리를 주장할 수 없습니다.
② 당 사이트가 관계법령 및 개인정보 보호정책에 의거하여 그 책임을 지는 경우를 제외하고 회원에게 부여된
ID의 비밀번호 관리소홀, 부정사용에 의하여 발생하는 모든 결과에 대한 책임은 회원에게 있습니다.
③ 회원은 당 사이트 및 제 3자의 지적 재산권을 침해해서는 안 됩니다.
제 4 장 서비스의 이용
제 12 조 (서비스 이용 시간)
① 서비스 이용은 당 사이트의 업무상 또는 기술상 특별한 지장이 없는 한 연중무휴, 1일 24시간 운영을
원칙으로 합니다. 단, 당 사이트는 시스템 정기점검, 증설 및 교체를 위해 당 사이트가 정한 날이나 시간에
서비스를 일시 중단할 수 있으며, 예정되어 있는 작업으로 인한 서비스 일시중단은 당 사이트 홈페이지를
통해 사전에 공지합니다.
② 당 사이트는 서비스를 특정범위로 분할하여 각 범위별로 이용가능시간을 별도로 지정할 수 있습니다. 다만
이 경우 그 내용을 공지합니다.
제 13 조 (홈페이지 저작권)
① NDSL에서 제공하는 모든 저작물의 저작권은 원저작자에게 있으며, KISTI는 복제/배포/전송권을 확보하고
있습니다.
② NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 상업적 및 기타 영리목적으로 복제/배포/전송할 경우 사전에 KISTI의 허락을
받아야 합니다.
③ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 보도, 비평, 교육, 연구 등을 위하여 정당한 범위 안에서 공정한 관행에
합치되게 인용할 수 있습니다.
④ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 무단 복제, 전송, 배포 기타 저작권법에 위반되는 방법으로 이용할 경우
저작권법 제136조에 따라 5년 이하의 징역 또는 5천만 원 이하의 벌금에 처해질 수 있습니다.
제 14 조 (유료서비스)
① 당 사이트 및 협력기관이 정한 유료서비스(원문복사 등)는 별도로 정해진 바에 따르며, 변경사항은 시행 전에
당 사이트 홈페이지를 통하여 회원에게 공지합니다.
② 유료서비스를 이용하려는 회원은 정해진 요금체계에 따라 요금을 납부해야 합니다.
제 5 장 계약 해지 및 이용 제한
제 15 조 (계약 해지)
회원이 이용계약을 해지하고자 하는 때에는 [가입해지] 메뉴를 이용해 직접 해지해야 합니다.
제 16 조 (서비스 이용제한)
① 당 사이트는 회원이 서비스 이용내용에 있어서 본 약관 제 11조 내용을 위반하거나, 다음 각 호에 해당하는
경우 서비스 이용을 제한할 수 있습니다.
- 2년 이상 서비스를 이용한 적이 없는 경우
- 기타 정상적인 서비스 운영에 방해가 될 경우
② 상기 이용제한 규정에 따라 서비스를 이용하는 회원에게 서비스 이용에 대하여 별도 공지 없이 서비스 이용의
일시정지, 이용계약 해지 할 수 있습니다.
제 17 조 (전자우편주소 수집 금지)
회원은 전자우편주소 추출기 등을 이용하여 전자우편주소를 수집 또는 제3자에게 제공할 수 없습니다.
제 6 장 손해배상 및 기타사항
제 18 조 (손해배상)
당 사이트는 무료로 제공되는 서비스와 관련하여 회원에게 어떠한 손해가 발생하더라도 당 사이트가 고의 또는 과실로 인한 손해발생을 제외하고는 이에 대하여 책임을 부담하지 아니합니다.
제 19 조 (관할 법원)
서비스 이용으로 발생한 분쟁에 대해 소송이 제기되는 경우 민사 소송법상의 관할 법원에 제기합니다.
[부 칙]
1. (시행일) 이 약관은 2016년 9월 5일부터 적용되며, 종전 약관은 본 약관으로 대체되며, 개정된 약관의 적용일 이전 가입자도 개정된 약관의 적용을 받습니다.