• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.329-333
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• 2003

This study presents supplier buyer models representing the interactions between supplier and buyer under a long-term replenishment contract in a supply chain system. We established the models according to the economic power of each party. Analysis based on Stackelberg game theoretic approach is tried for each model. We develop methods for each agent to follow to complete a contract for the best interest of each participant.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.413-417
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• 2007

본 논문에서는 응용서비스 제공자가 망사업자의 망을 이용하여 응용서비스를 제공하고 망사업자에게 사용대가를 지불하는 경우를 다루었다. 우리는 Stackelberg 게임을 이용하여 두 사업자간의 계약(contract)설계 문제를 정형화하였고 이 게임의 균형점 (equilbrium)이 유일하다는 것을 보였고 또 이 균형점이 망사업자의 위험선호도에 따라서 어떻게 바뀌는지를 고찰하였다.

• Journal of information and communication convergence engineering
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.148-151
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• 2009

We consider the problem of optimizing the performance of a system with resources shared by non-cooperative users. The worst-cast ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost, called Price of Anarchy, is investigated. It measures the performance degradation due to the users' selfish behavior. As the objective function of the optimization problem, we are concerned in a load balancing measure, which is different from that used in the previous works. Also we consider the Stackelberg scheduling which can assign a fraction of the users to resources while the remaining users are free to act in a selfish manner.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.9
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• pp.4166-4182
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• 2018

We consider the Device-to-Device (D2D) communications in cellular networks where each cellular user (CU) shares the same resource with multiple D2D users (DUs). In this paper, we aim to maximize the energy efficiency (EE) of the D2D networks, subject to an interference constraint required by the CU. Since the cellular and D2D communications belong to different networks, we consider to incentivize base station (BS) while assisting the DUs. To this end, we propose a Stackelberg game based interference pricing framework for the considered D2D communications in cellular networks. Unlike most of the existing methods, we use interference pricing framework to jointly address the EE resource allocation problem and the interference management in our networks rather than only improve the EE of the DUs or protect cellular networks. In particular, BS and all the users do not need all channel state information, which is more realistic in practice. In addition, two different pricing strategies are also proposed. Based on the two strategies, we analyze the equilibrium of the game. Moreover, in the first strategy, the upper and lower boundaries of the interference price are obtained. The closed-form expression is gained with a backward induction for the second strategy. Both offer valuable insights to the considered scenarios. Finally, compared with the existing work, the EE of the D2D communications is significantly improved. The advantageous performance of our scheme are demonstrated by the simulation results.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.589-599
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• 2016

Most existing resource management problem models arise from the original desire of allocating resources in either a user-centric or network-centric manner. The difference between their objectives is obvious: user-centric methods attempt to optimize the utility of individual users, whereas network-centric models intend to optimize the collective utilities of the entire network. In this paper, from the above two aspects, we analyze the robust power control problem in device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks, where two types of channel uncertainty set (e.g., ellipsoidal and column-wise) are considered. In the user-centric method, we formulate the problem into the form of a Stackelberg game, where the energy efficiency (EE) of each user is the ingredient of utility function. In order to protect the cellular user equipment's (CUE) uplink transmission, we introduce a price based cost function into the objectives of D2D user equipment (DUE). The existence and uniqueness of the game with the influence of channel uncertainty and price are discussed. In the network-centric method, we aim to maximize the collective EE of CUEs and DUEs. We show that by the appropriate mathematical transformation, the network-centric D2D power control problem has the identical local solution to that of a special case of the user-centric problem, where price plays a key role. Numerical results show the performance of the robust power control algorithms in the user-centric and network-centric models.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.167-176
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• 2019

Recently, as the types of services that can be enjoyed in mobile telecommunication networks such as social networks and video streaming are increasing, mobile users(MUs) can access mobile contents easily by consuming mobile data. However, under a mobile telecommunication environment, MUs have to pay a high data fee to a network service provider(SP) in order to enjoy contents. The 'data sponsor' technique, introduced as a way to solve this problem, has attracted attention as a breakthrough method for enhancing contents accessibility of MUs. In this paper, we propose an algorithm that determines the optimal discount rate through the Stackelberg game in the data sponsor environment. We also propose an algorithm to design edge caching, which caches highly popular content for MUs on edge server, through many-to-many matching game. Simulation results clearly indicate that the profit for CP's content consumption is improved by about 6~11%, and the profit of CP according to the ratio of edge caching is improved by about 12% than the other existing schemes under data sponsor environment.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.61 no.2
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• pp.187-193
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• 2012

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is as useful tool for investigating a participant's strategic generation quantity in a competitive electricity market. Cournot model may give a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy when transmission constraints are considered. A mixed strategy is difficult to compute, complicated to understand conceptually, and hard to implement in an electricity market practically. This paper presents that a mixed strategy does not appear in Stackelberg leader-follower model even under a transmission congestion. A solution method is proposed for the leader-follower model under a nondifferentiable space of a strategy variable. Based on the pure strategy NE with a transmission line congested, the merit of leader-follower model is shown from a social welfare point of view.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Broadcast Engineers Conference
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• 2019.11a
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• pp.91-92
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• 2019

이 논문은 에너지인터넷의 실시간 가격 수요 반응 시스템에서 금전적 이익 극대화를 위해 두 명의 플레이어가 있는 Stackelberg 게임 기반 진화 게임을 연구한다. 우리는 두 명의 플레이어인 발전자와 에너지 사용자의 통일된 이익을 극대화하는 대신 발전자와 에너지 사용자의 이익을 극대화하는 에너지 전략을 적용한다. 실시간 가격 수요 반응 시스템에서 적용한 에너지 전략을 시뮬레이션하였고 시뮬레이션 결과, 적용된 에너지 전략이 기존의 방식에 비해 발전자의 수익을 45 %까지 효과적으로 개선하고 에너지 사용자의 전기 요금을 평균 15.6 % 줄일 수 있음을 보여준다. 또한, 제안한 에너지 전략이 수요반응의 목표 중 하나인 피크 대 평균 비율 감소의 안정화에 기여할 수 있음을 확인했다.

• 한국경영정보학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.402-407
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• 2007

웹2.0이라는 개념과 트랜드는, 개방성, 사용자 참여, 집단 지성, 인간중심의 IT 서비스 등을 키워드로 하는, 플랫폼 기반 비즈니스 모델을 통칭한다. 전세계적 블로그 열풍이나, Googlization으로 불리기도하는 주요 웹포탈의 성장은 이러한 현상을 뒷받침하는 증거이며, 미래 인터넷 시장을 개척하는 엔진으로 자리잡고 있다. 그런데 웹2.0을 기술적으로(descriptive) 소개하거나 관련된 요소기술에 대한 문헌은 많음에도 불구하고, 이러한 현상을 경영/경제학적 시각에서 체계적으로 분석한 연구는 의외로 많지 않다. 본 논문에서는 기존의 웹(웹1.0)과 웹2.0 서비스 모형을 경영 경제학적 관점에서 구조화하고, 이들 서비스 모형을 Stakelberg 게임의 관점에서 분석한다. 특히 본 연구에서는 웹2.0의 다양한 국면 중에서 프로슈밍(prosuming)에 초점을 맞춘다. 분석 결과, 웹2.0에서 사용자 후생이 웹1.0에 비해 크게 증가한다는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 또한 사용자 스스로 맞춤화된 정보를 창출하는 노력과 한계편익간의 비율을 나타내는 ${\delta}_c$('고객화 요소'로 부름) 분포의 범위(파라미터 ${\delta}$)가 사회후생에 중요한 역할을 함을 발견하였다. 이는 고객화 요구의 다양성이 커짐에 따라 사용자 후생을 비롯한 사회후생도 증진됨을 의미한다.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.40 no.1
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• pp.61-71
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• 2018

In this study, we developed hybrid control algorithms in smart base stations (SBSs) along with devised communication, caching, and computing techniques. In the proposed scheme, SBSs are equipped with computing power and data storage to collectively offload the computation from mobile user equipment and to cache the data from clouds. To combine in a refined manner the communication, caching, and computing algorithms, game theory is adopted to characterize competitive and cooperative interactions. The main contribution of our proposed scheme is to illuminate the ultimate synergy behind a fully integrated approach, while providing excellent adaptability and flexibility to satisfy the different performance requirements. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can outperform existing schemes by approximately 5% to 15% in terms of bandwidth utilization, access delay, and system throughput.