• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38A no.11
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• pp.944-954
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• 2013

Cognitive radio technology gives secondary users chances that they can use specific spectrum of the primary user when the primary user doesn't use it. This paper proposes the algorithm that maximizes the benefit of the primary user considering spectrum price and auction period by using the auction game theory. According to the ratio of spectrum that secondary users bid, primary user allocates spectrum to secondary users. In the process of repeated auction, the primary user gets to find the optimal price of spectrum. Using the price and the proposed utility function of primary user, we derive the optimal auction period. At the same time, the primary user finally determines the price of spectrum appropriate for the optimal period.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.368-374
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• 2009

This paper focuses on a distributed multiple spectrum pricing scheme to maximize system capacity in next generation multiaccess systems, where multimode user equipments (MUEs) can connect simultaneously to multiple base stations (BSs) with multiple radio access technologies (RATs). The multi-price based scheme provides a distributed decision making for an optimal solution where radio resource allocations are determined by each MUE, unlike most centralized mechanisms where BS controls the whole radio resource. By the proposed optimal solution, MUEs can decide their share of spectrum bands and power allocation according to the spectrum price of each RAT, and at the same time the multiaccess system can achieve maximized total throughput. Numerical analysis shows that the proposed scheme achieves the maximal capacity by distributed resource allocation for the multiaccess system.

• Journal of Satellite, Information and Communications
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.42-46
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• 2012

This paper analyses technical and economical conditions which activate the use of mobile communication spectrum not to limit the growth of mobile broadband service because of mobile big data traffic and proposes the method which activate the use of mobile communication spectrum. To activate new mobile communication spectrum the expenditure and income of investment should be balanced. The activation of new mobile communication spectrum to process mobile big data traffic depends on technical and economical conditions, internal and external factors of service provider. The investment expenditure is relate to CAPEX, OPEX which is internal factors of service provider and to spectrum price which is external factor of service. The investment income is relate to tariff system which is internal factors of service provider and to spectrum neutrality which is external factor of service provider. The activation of new mobile communication spectrum can be implemented when the investment expenditure and investment income meet the balance including the spectrum price in the investment expenditure and the tariff system which is able to extend network and the income based on traffic increase by external contents in the investment income.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.6 no.12
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• pp.3133-3151
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• 2012

The optimal price strategy selection of two bounded rational cognitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a duopoly spectrum sharing market is investigated. The bounded rational operators dynamically compete to sell the leased spectrum to secondary users in order to maximize their profits. Meanwhile, the secondary users' heterogeneous preferences to rate and price are taken into consideration. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) is employed to model the dynamic price strategy selection of the MVNOs taking into account the response of the secondary users. The behavior dynamics and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the operators are derived via replicated dynamics. Furthermore, a reward and punishment mechanism is developed to optimize the performance of the operators. Numerical results show that the proposed evolutionary algorithm is convergent to the ESS, and the incentive mechanism increases the profits of the operators. It may provide some insight about the optimal price strategy selection for MVNOs in the next generation cognitive wireless networks.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.6
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• pp.627-638
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• 2014

In this paper, we study the joint price and power allocation in spectrum sharing macro-femtocell networks. The proposed game theoretic framework is based on bi-level Stackelberg game where macro base station (MBS) works as a leader and underlaid femto base stations (FBSs) work as followers. MBS has fixed data rate and imposes interference price on FBSs for maintaining its data rate and earns revenue while FBSs jointly adjust their power for maximizing their data rates and utility functions. Since the interference from FBSs to macro user equipment is kept under a given threshold and FBSs compete against each other for power allocation, there is a need to determine a power allocation strategy which converges to Stackelberg equilibrium. We consider two cases for MBS power allocation, i.e., fixed and dynamic power. MBS can adjust its power in case of dynamic power allocation according to its minimum data rate requirement and number of FBSs willing to share the spectrum. For both cases we consider uniform and non-uniform pricing where MBS charges same price to all FBSs for uniform pricing and different price to each FBS for non-uniform pricing according to its induced interference. We obtain unique closed form solution for each case if the co-interference at FBSs is assumed fixed. And an iterative algorithm which converges rapidly is also proposed to take into account the effect of co-tier interference on interference price and power allocation strategy. The results are explained with numerical simulation examples which validate the effectiveness of our proposed solutions.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2013.05a
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• pp.474-477
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• 2013

As the market-based spectrum policy is introduced, an interest in the economic value of the frequency is increasing. Research and practical applications concerning the methodology for the estimation of the economic value of the frequency and its determinants are actively engaged, which are used for setting a reserve price and bid price of spectrum auction and a spectrum clearance cost. In this study, by the analysis of the spectrum valuation methodology, we derive the changes in the factors affecting the valuation and propose to apply improved. In the model frequency value is consist of technical value, commercial value and strategic value, we find the dynamics of fluctuation factors and suggest how to apply them to spectrum policy.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.38 no.5
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• pp.100-113
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• 2023

This study was aimed to derive implications in terms of competition to establish a reasonable spectrum policy for fifth-generation (5G) spectrum allocation through an in-depth analysis of C-band spectrum auctions. As a result of examining auctions in five countries, namely, Belgium, Sweden, Canada, Brazil, and Hong Kong, we identified various characteristics. First, the minimum bandwidth that is essential for service competition is guaranteed. Second, in Brazil, the network construction cost of mobile network operators is regarded as a part of the spectrum price. Third, a joint allocation of spectrum is permitted in Sweden, and spectrum sharing after allocation for 5G services is allowed in Canada. Finally, the reserved spectrum is provided for new service providers in Belgium and Canada. Our findings may provide insights for establishing policies of 5G spectrum allocation and competition in the telecommunications service market in Korea.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.34-49
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• 2015

Market means of spectrum trading have been utilized as a vital method of spectrum sharing and access in future cognitive radio system. In this paper, we consider the spectrum trading with multiple primary carrier providers (PCP) leasing the spectrum to multiple secondary carrier providers (SCP) for a short period of time. Several factors including the price of the resource, duration of leasing, and the spectrum quality guides the proposed model. We formulate three trading policies based on the game theory for dynamic spectrum access in a LTE based cognitive radio system (CRS). In the first, we consider utility function based resource sharing (UFRS) without any knowledge of past transaction. In the second policy, each SCP deals with PCP using a non-cooperative resource sharing (NCRS) method which employs optimal strategy based on reinforcement learning. In variation of second policy, third policy adopts a Nash bargaining while incorporating a recommendation entity in resource sharing (RERS). The simulation results suggest overall increase in throughput while maintaining higher spectrum efficiency and fairness.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.122-133
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• 2009

As wireless spectrum resources become more scarce while some portions of frequency bands suffer from low utilization, the design of cognitive radio (CR) has recently been urged, which allows opportunistic usage of licensed bands for secondary users without interference with primary users. Spectrum sensing is fundamental for a secondary user to find a specific available spectrum hole. Cooperative spectrum sensing is more accurate and more widely used since it obtains helpful reports from nodes in different locations. However, if some nodes are compromised and report false sensing data to the fusion center on purpose, the accuracy of decisions made by the fusion center can be heavily impaired. Weighted sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT), based on a credit evaluation system to restrict damage caused by malicious nodes, was proposed to address such a spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack at the price of introducing four times more sampling numbers. In this paper, we propose two new schemes, named enhanced weighted sequential probability ratio test (EWSPRT) and enhanced weighted sequential zero/one test (EWSZOT), which are robust against SSDF attack. By incorporating a new weight module and a new test module, both schemes have much less sampling numbers than WSPRT. Simulation results show that when holding comparable error rates, the numbers of EWSPRT and EWSZOT are 40% and 75% lower than WSPRT, respectively. We also provide theoretical analysis models to support the performance improvement estimates of the new schemes.