• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.107 no.1
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• pp.96-107
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• 2018

This study analyzed the linkage between the Forestry sector Official Development Assistance (ODA) Project in South Korea and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of United Nations (UN), Suggested direction of ODA project focusing on the implementation of the SDGs. Forestry sector ODA project data in South Korea have collected from Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) statistical inquiry system developed by The Export-Import Bank of Korea. According to the analysis result, Forestry sector ODA project in South Korea have been actively implemented in the fields of forestry development, forestry policy and administration. In both fields, Korea Forest Service and Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) carried out the most projects. The Forestry sector ODA project data in South Korea are classified technical development, capacity building, construction of infrastructure and afforestation based on their objectives and contents. SDGs emphasizes the importance of national implementation assessment and this study analyze linkage between ODA activity content in each classification item and 2016 Korea Forest Service Performance Management Plan indicator. Analyzed the 2016 Korea Forest Service Performance Management Plan indicator and SDGs target and SDGs indicator were identified. finally, SDGs goals were recognized. In conclusion, Forestry sector ODA project in South Korea are associated with the SDGs Goal 1 (No Poverty), Goal 2 (Zero Hunger), Goal 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), Goal 13 (Climate Action), Goal 15 (Life on Land) and Goal 17 (Partnership for The Goals). Therefore, With the launch of the SDGs, This study analyzed the linkage among the Forestry sector ODA Project in South Korea, the 2016 Korea Forest Service Performance Management Plan and the SDGs. it presented the limitations of Forestry sector ODA Project in South Korea and made proposals for the implementation of the SDGs.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.155-177
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• 1991

The promotion of economic exchange and cooperation between North and South Korea is significant in two ways. First, the pursuit of economic interest can lead gradually to the unification of the national economies. Second, economic relations can serve as the first stride toward political reunification. There are, however, many difficulties in conceiving a strategy for economic cooperation between North and South Korea because of their differences in ideology and socio-economic system. Under these circumstances, a bid by either the North or the South to consider its specific ideology or socio-economic system absolute and to impose them on the other side would inevitably lead to confrontation and collision and deepen the division of the country. Therefore, steps to expand and develop economic and technological cooperation and comprehensive exchanges between the North and the South, with due regard to the development of bilateral relations, are in full accord with the interests of the both sides. It is clear that North Korea's changing attitude toward its environmental conditions is neither a policy of opening nor an ideological shift toward pragmatism, as has occurred in the Eastern European countries. Instead, it is a temporary tactic for breaking out of the economic stagnation caused by its rigid economic structure. In this light, we must.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.167-184
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• 2008

The economic cooperation between the South and North Koreas is a very important issue for the unification and economic development of both Koreas. In order to reach a successful economic cooperation, there is a need to coordinate the differences of the two countries before unification. The economic cooperation and the cooperation in other sectors will be followed by the entire unification. It is necessary to prepare a mechanism that could peacefully solve the conflicts and disputes that could arise during the actual process of cooperation, which will secure stable investments and trades. The study on the possibility of introducing the arbitration system as a conflict solving mechanism between the two Koreas is a very important subject, and the basis of this study is on the examination of the arbitration laws of North Korea. Therefore, the study on the efficiency of the North Korean arbitration laws on foreign economy is studying the possibility of a systematical solution to economic conflicts between the South and North Koreas. The problems and possible solutions of the North Korean foreign economy arbitration laws are summarized as follows. First, juridical cooperation system for both South and North courts of justice needs to be set up to smoothly carry out the main procedures. Mutual correspondence and telecommunication needs to be guaranteed, also remittance and the movement of goods shall precede. Second, the free liquidation of businesses by unit and the individual and independent management of wealth of the North Korean economic bodies, organizations and businesses shall precede to independently liquidate wealth and thus make arbitration possible. Third, amendments in the North Korea's foreign economy arbitration law shall be made to some parts of regulations on arbitration agreements and specific contents of written arbitration agreements to avoid conflicts regarding arbitration agreement. Fourth, the members of the North Korean arbitration committee shall impartially manage the committee only without taking the role of arbitrator, and the clause that allows the North Korean committee to nominate the arbitrator shall be erased. In case an agreement regarding the number of arbitrators is not reached, the three arbitrators general rule shall be applied. In case of requests from any of the parties, a third country arbitrator nomination shall be guaranteed. Also, the requested arbitrator by the party shall be nominated with the cooperation of the court. Fifth, the trial in case of non-appearance or written trial shall be added to the North Korean law in to prevent intended negligence or evasion. Sixth, regulations regarding the court's investigation of evidence shall be added to the North Korean law to make fair arbitration possible in case that government power is needed in order to investigate evidence. Seventh, provisions regarding majority decision shall be added in the North Korean law in the impossibility of unanimous decisions, and the certified system in the arbitration committee official text shall be erased to prevent arrogation and assure the power of the decision made by the arbitration government. Eighth, as "the wrong decision approved" reason for cancellation of arbitration in the North Korean law includes the content of the decision made by the arbitrator could lead to uselessness of arbitration, amendment will be necessary to limit it to legitimacy of the arbitration agreement and wrong procedures. It is hoped that this thesis will be of important use in understanding the issues on the workability and the solutions to the South and North Koreas' arbitration that could be presented during the negotiations for the countries' economic cooperation.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.38 no.2 s.171
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• pp.197-206
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• 2005

North Korea is plentiful in the mineral resources as magnesite, gold, zinc, iron, rare metal, and coal resources compared to South Korea and has 6 industrial zones which are located nearby to the mineralized areas. The industrial zones are provided with a sound infrastructures and accumulation of advanced technology. As a huge mineral and energy consuming country, South Korea imports mineral and coal resources equivalent to almost 8 trillion won annually. Inter-Korean cooperation for development of mineral resources in North Korea will be improved by the practical use of the North Korea's plentiful mineral resources, infiastructures related to development and refinement, and basic geo-technology, which would be considered toward combining with South Korean capital and Russian geo-technologies.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.125-174
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the status of naval arms race in Northeast Asia. To this end, the scope of the research was limited to national security strategies, maritime strategies and naval strengthening of the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The major powers' active maritime strategies and naval arms race give some strategic implications to the Republic of Korea Navy as follows. First, China and Japan, unlike the past, are actively using submarines in offshore waters including the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the ROK Navy must successfully promote the Jangbogo-III-class submarine, which is currently constructed, and get a nuclear-powered submarine and P-8 MPA capable of long-range and long-time operations to enhance ASW capability. Second, North Korea's current building submarines capable of loading SLBMs and SLBMs are a new threat to the ROK Navy. The current building KAMD, which focuses on terminal phase defense, cannot effectively respond to North Korea's SLBMs and should be converted to a multi-layered defense system including SM-3 at a mid-course phase. Third, as China militarizes the South China Sea, the instability of the South China Sea is growing. Therefore, the ROK Navy should strengthen its maritime cooperation with the regional countries such as Japan and ASEAN navies to protect SLOC. In conclusion, the ROK Navy needs to build a strong naval power to keep in mind that the 21st century naval rivalry in Northeast Asia is accelerating. The navy must do one's best to protect national strategic and vital interests by strengthening cooperation with regional countries. South Korea is also accelerating its defense reforms in accordance with the pattern of future warfare and the ROK Navy do one's best to have a balanced naval capability capable of actively operating in the offshore waters.

• Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases
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• v.72 no.4
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• pp.374-380
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• 2012

Background: Delivery of Bacille Calmette-Gur$\acute{e}$in (BCG) Tokyo vaccine, with the multipuncture device, has been much preferred over BCG Pasteur, with the intradermal method, possibly due to the easier manner of administration, a desire to avoid any trouble with scars, as well as side effects and higher profits to providers in South Korea. Methods: To determine BCG scar status in 0~6 year old children vaccinated with two BCG vaccines (Pasteur BCG vaccine with intradermal method and BCG Tokyo vaccine with percutaneous method), the data from the national BCG scar survey in 2006 was analyzed. Results: Based on the national survey, the high proportion that were vaccinated with BCG Tokyo vaccines with the multipuncture method (64.5%) was noted in 0~6 year old Korean children. From inspection of scar formation, as an indicator of vaccination, the median number of the visible pin scars from the percutaneous method was 16 (interquartile range, 12~18) in the Korean children, and pin scars decreased as the age of the children increased (p<0.001). Conclusion: The findings in this survey clearly showed a growing preference of parents for the BCG Tokyo vaccines by the multipuncture method in South Korea.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.3-34
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• 2019

The resumption of economic cooperation between South and the North Korea will be a new growth engine for our economy. Many Korean companies are preparing to invest in North Korea in accordance with the progress of inter-Korean relations. However, there are many risks inherent in inter-Korean economic cooperation, as experienced in previous cases. Specifically, one should be prepared for unfair measures such as the expropriation of investment assets of South Korean enterprises by North Korea authorities. Therefore, it is essential to review the protection measures of investment in North Korea and to review the investment dispute settlement system. The South and the North have an agreement to establish the inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Committee to resolve the disputes that may arise if one party's investments are lost due to inappropriate or unfair measures due to the other party's authority. However, the Investment Agreement, which governs the Inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Committee, contains a number of declarative statements that are somewhat ineffective. Even today, nearly 20 years after the adoption of the Agreement, the specific detailed procedures have shown no real progress, such as in the enactment of arbitration rules. Therefore, at present, it is difficult to expect a system that can effectively address the damage of our corporations which have invested in North Korea. When the assets freeze after the suspension of Kumgang tourism and the closure of the Kaeseung Industrial Complex by North Korea, the activation of the inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Committee is the most important prerequisite for economic cooperation with North Korea. For this purpose, the resolution of disputes through the Inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Committee has to be made more concrete, with the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system enhanced by means of various efforts.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'