• Title/Summary/Keyword: South Korea-US Alliance

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A study on improvement of policy of artificial intelligence for national defense considering the US third offset strategy (미국의 제3차 상쇄전략을 고려한 국방 인공지능 정책 발전방안)

  • Se Hoon Lee;Seunghoon Lee
    • Industry Promotion Research
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.35-45
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    • 2023
  • This paper addressed the analysis of the trend and direction of the US defense strategy based on their third offset strategy and presented the practical policy implication of ensuring the security of South Korea appropriately in the future national defense environment. The countermeasures for the development ability of advanced weapon systems and secure core technologies for Korea were presented in consideration of the US third offset strategy for the future national defense environment. First, to carry out the innovation of national defense in Korea based on artificial intelligence(AI), the long-term basis strategy for the operation of the unmanned robot and autonomous weapon system should be suggested. Second, the platform for AI has to be developed to obtain the development of algorithms and computing abilities for securing the collection/storage/management of national defense data. Lastly, advanced components and core technologies are identified, which the Korean government can join to develop with the US on a basis of the Korea-US alliance, and the technical cooperation with the US should be stronger.

A Study on Implications of the naval Strategy in West Germany and Future Direction of Korean Navy (냉전기 서독해군 전략의 시사점과 향후 대한민국 해군의 방향성에 관한 연구)

  • Shin, Hong-Jung
    • Strategy21
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    • s.46
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    • pp.159-204
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    • 2020
  • This study is written to bring the proposal forward for the direction of south korean naval force. The political situation and the circumstance of the world, especially in the area of Pacific Ocean, are changing very rapidly. North Korea has been always the conventional existing intimidator for South Korea since the 6·25-War. Additionally, the strengthening movements of the national defense, which is easily noticed from China and Russia, is also an other part of intimidating countries against South Korea. Those three mentioned countries are continually developing the asymmetrical warfare systems, for example a strategic nuclear weapon. Since the Obama Administration, the Asia-Pacific Rebalancing-Strategy has been changed as an East Asian foreign policy. Nowadays, Trump Administration renamed the 'United States Pacific-Command' to 'United States Indo-Pacific Command'. The purpose of this is not only letting India to participate in american alliance, but also reducing an economic burden, which is often mentioned in USA. West Germany was located in the very similar geopolitical position during the Cold War just like South Korea these days. And that's why the strategy of West German Navy is worthy of notice for south korean naval force to decide its suitable strategy. Most of all, the two most important things to refer to this study are the plan to expand naval air force and the realistic political stand for us to take it. In conclusion, I laid an emphasis on maintenance of 'green-water-navy'. instead of selecting the strategy as a 'blue-water-navy'. The reason I would like to say, is that south korean navy is not available to hold the unnecessary war potential, just like Aircraft-Carrier. However, this is not meaning to let the expansion of naval force carelessly. We must search the best solution in order to maintain the firm peace within the situation. To fulfill this concept, it is mostly very important to maintain the stream of laying down a keel of destroyers, submarines and air-defense-missile, as well as the hight-tech software system, taking a survey of 4th industrial revolution. Research and development for the best solution of future aircraft by south korean navy is likewise necessary. Besides, we must also set the international diplomatic flexibly. As well as maintaining the relationship with US Forces, it is also very important to improve the relationship with other potential allied nation.

Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an (천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망)

  • Kim, Sung-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

Dynamics of Honeymoon and Statics of Structure: Changes and Continuity of Foreign Policy in the Moon Jae-In Administration (하니문의 동학(動學)과 구조의 정학(靜學): 문재인 정부의 외교정책, 변화와 연속성)

  • Choi, Jinwoo
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.24 no.2
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    • pp.5-38
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    • 2018
  • A seismic change is under way in diplomatic topography surrounding the Korean Peninsula. A new dynamic is being generated that could lead to a breakthrough in the nuclear stalemate and to an end of hostility between the two Koreas. Moon Administration's bold and creative foreign policy, which is alleged to place South Korea in the "driver's seat", is probably responsible for what is happening on the Korean Peninsula. However, on the other hand, Moon Administration's foreign policy shows a lot of continuity with foreign policy of previous conservative governments. In particular, the Moon government's emphasis on the vitality of the ROK-US alliance and its commitment to close coordination with the US in dealing with nuclear issues of North Korea is the hallmark of the continuity in South Korea's foreign policy. Emphasizing and sharing the notion of the continuities in foreign policy could contribute to social integration by garnering bi-partisan support. It could also spawn sense of stability, predictability, and confidence to diplomatic counterparts in other countries. And it could help avoid the negative effects of expectation-reality gap in the event that the outcome of all the diplomatic endeavor falls short of expectation held by citizens.

A Study on the Balance of Power and Changes in Military Strength in Northeast Asia: Prospect of the Northeast Asian Security Environment in 2030 Based on the Balance of Power Theory (동북아시아의 세력균형과 군사력 수준 변화 연구: 세력균형이론에 기초한 2030년경의 동북아시아 안보환경 전망)

  • Kim, Myung-soo
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.3 no.1
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    • pp.73-114
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    • 2021
  • This study examines the distribution of power in Northeast Asia based on the balance of power theory, a representative theory of realism, assuming military capabilities as the core power of states. The results of previous studies on the balance of power and military forces are reviewed and used to analyze changes in the strength of the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea through 2020 to predict the security environment in 2030. In the balance of power theory, if the balance of power between a nation or a group of powers collapses, the possibility of war is high, and to survive in the international community with high uncertainty and distrust, the theory predicts that states must increase their powers in a self-help world and strengthen cooperation and alliance. Countries in Northeast Asia are also continuing to strengthen their military capabilities, and countries neighboring China are paying keen attention and remaining vigilant due to the rapid changes in the international security environment after the rapid rise of China. To mark the future 100th anniversary of the Chinese armed forces in the 2030s, China aims to realize 'defense and military modernization' and build a 'world-class military force' by the nation's 100th anniversary in the 2050s. The US is busy checking China's rise by strengthening international cooperation and alliances. The security environment and power dynamics in Northeast Asia are slowly changing as the US and China continue to compete for global hegemony. The changes and implications of the distribution of power in Northeast Asia after 2030 are examined based on the balance of power theory.

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An Analysis of Terrorism against Korea to Overseas and its Implications - Focusing on the companies advancing to overseas - (한국을 대상으로 한 국제테러리즘의 분석과 시사점 - 해외진출기업을 중심으로 -)

  • Chang, Suk-Heon;Lee, Dae-Sung
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.28
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    • pp.153-179
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    • 2011
  • Korea has been a victim of State supporting terrorism by North Korea even before international society realize the terrorism threats because of 9.11 in US. However, state supporting terrorism against South Korea by North Korea went along with East/West Cold War System by US and the Soviet Union. It is because socialism that Kim Il-sung who established a separate government in North Korea with the political, economic, social and military support of the Soviet Union selected as his political ideology justifies terrorism as the tool to complete the proletariat revolution. North Korea's state supporting terrorism is being operated systematically and efficiently by military of North Korea. It gives big worries to international society not only by performing terrorism against Korea but also by dispatching terrorists and exporting terrorism strategies to the third world countries. In this situation, terrorism against Korea has met a new transition point at 9${\cdot}$11 in US. As South Korea is confronting North Korea and the war has not ended but suspended, the alliance between US and Korea is more important than anything else. Because of this Korea decided to support the anti-terrorism wars against Afghanistan and Iraq of US and other western countries and send military force there. The preface of the anti-terrorism war has begun as such. On October 7, 2001, US and UK started to attack Afghanistan and Taleban government in Afghanistan was dethroned on December 7, 2001. US and western countries started a war against Iraq on March 20, 2003. On April 9, 2003 Baghdad, the capital of Iraq fell, and Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Awja government was expelled. During the process, the terrorism threat against South Korea has expanded to Arab terrorists and terrorism organizations as well as North Korea. Consequently, although Korean government, scholars and working level public servants made discussions and tried to seek countermeasures, the damages are extending. Accordingly, terrorism against Korean companies in overseas after 9${\cdot}$11 were analyzed focusing on Nation, Region, Victimology, and Weapons used for the attacks. Especially, the trend of terrorism against the Korean companies in overseas was discussed by classifying them chronologically such as initiation and termination of anti-terrorism wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, and from the execution of Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Awja to December 2010. Through this, possible terrorism incidents after the execution of Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, on May 2, 2011 were projected and proposals were made for the countermeasures.

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USN's Efforts to Rebuild its Combat Power in an Era of Great Power Competition (강대국 간의 경쟁시대와 미 해군의 증강 노력)

  • Jung, Ho-Sub
    • Strategy21
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    • s.44
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    • pp.5-27
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF A SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINE -RISKS AND REWARDS FOR THE US-ROK ALLIANCE- (한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보를 위한 도전과 과제 -한미동맹 측면에서의 전략적 효용성을 중심으로-)

  • Yu, Jihoon;French, Erick
    • Strategy21
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    • s.42
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    • pp.114-153
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    • 2017
  • 고도화 및 가시화되고 있는 북한의 '잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile)'위협에 대응하기 위한 효과적인 전략수단으로써 핵추진잠수함의 필요성에 대한 국민적 관심이 고조되고 있다. 핵추진잠수함의 전략적 가치에 대한 논의가 활발히 진행되고 있는 가운데, 주변국과의 갈등과 국제사회의 비핵화 규범의 미 준수 논란 등 핵추진잠수함 확보과정에서 야기될 수 있는 대·내외의 정치·외교적 파장에 대한 우려의 목소리 또한 높아지고 있다. 그러나, 핵추진잠수함의 필요성 및 확보와 관련한 지금까지의 대부분의 논의들은 한국의 '내부적 논의(Just our own scenario)'에 그치는 한계를 보이고 있다. 전략무기체계로써의 상징성과 그에 따르는 대외적 민감성을 고려 시 일방적이고 독자적인 핵추진잠수함 확보노력은 과정상의 시행착오와 불확실성을 더욱 가중시켜 정책적 실패로 귀결될 수 있는 위험성을 내포하고 있다. 특히, 한반도 평화와 아태지역의 안전보장이라는 공동의 전략적 목표를 공유하고 있는 동맹국인 미국의 공감대와 지지가 뒷받침되지 않은 독자적인 핵추진잠수함 확보노력은 큰 난항이 예상되며 자칫 서로간의 '전략적 신뢰(Strategic Trust)'를 무너뜨려 '한미동맹의 결속력(Alliance Cohesion)'을 약화시키는 요인으로 작용할 수 있다. 미국의 동의와 지지에 기반한 핵추진잠수함 확보를 위해서는 한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보가 동맹의 전략목표 및 미국의 전략적 이해관계에 미칠 수 있는 긍정적, 부정적 효과에 대한 충분한 검토와 논의가 선행되어야 한다. 한미동맹의 공동의 전략목표와 미국의 전략적 이익에 상충하는 한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보시도는 성공 가능성이 낮기 때문이다. 본 연구에서는 현실화되고 있는 북한의 핵위협에 대응하고 지역안전보장에 기여할 수 있는 미국과의 연합방위력 증강차원에서의 한국의 핵추진잠수함의 전략적 효용성을 분석하였다. 더불어, 한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보과정에서 야기될 수 있는 대·내외의 기술적, 정치·외교적 사안들을 살펴본 후 한미동맹 차원에서의 정책적 해결방안을 제시하였다. 연구목적을 위해 유사한 역사적 사례연구를 통해 교훈을 도출하였으며, 미국 오바마 1기 행정부에서 미국의 아태지역 및 대북정책을 주도한 전 미국 국무부부장관 제임스 스타인버그(James Steinberg) 및 여러 미국 내 한반도 전문가들의 의견을 수렴하였다. 본 연구가 한국의 핵잠수함 확보를 위한 한미간 발전적 논의의 시발점이 되기를 기대한다.

Direction of Arms Control to Establish Foundation for Peaceful Reunification in Korean Peninsula (한반도 평화통일 기반구축을 위한 군비통제 추진방향)

  • Kim, Jae Chul
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.15 no.6_1
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    • pp.79-92
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    • 2015
  • It is required to expand area of inter-Korean economic cooperation, being limited to non-military field, to military field and then, to positively promote arms control in order to establish foundation for peaceful reunification in Korean peninsula. Reasons why arms control has not been promoted between South and North Korea in the meantime were such original factors as follows; (1) limit of confidence building between the South and the North, (2) functional limit of arms control itself, (3) institutional structural limit between the South and the North, (4) environmental limit at home and abroad. It is necessary to get out from existing frame and to seek a new paradigm in order to overcome above factors and to realize arms control between the South and the North. First, it is required to have prior political dialog at the South-North high-level talks in order to promote arms control and to exercise 'strategic flexibility' during negotiation and promotion process. For this, 'flexible reciprocity' has to be adopted in compliance with situation and conditions. Second, it is necessary to get out from existing principle of 'confidence building in advance and arms reduction later' but to seek the 'simultaneous driving principle of confidence building and arms reduction' as an eclectic approach. Namely, based on reasonable sufficiency, it is required to promote military confidence building and limited arms reduction in parallel, which is a lower level of arms control. Third, as an advisory body of Prime Minister's Office, it is necessary to install an organization exclusively responsible for arms control and to positively handle arms control issue from the standpoint of national policy strategy. If the South-North high-level talks take place, it is necessary to organize and operate 'South-North Joint Arms Control Promotion Board (tentative name)'. Fourth, it is required to exercise more active diplomatic competence in order to create national consensus on necessity of arms control for peaceful reunification and to form more favorable international environment. Especially, it is necessary to think about how to solve nuclear issue of North Korea together in collaboration with international society and how to maintain balance between ROK-US alliance and Sino-Korean cooperation relations.