• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.3A no.3
• /
• pp.168-176
• /
• 2003

The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) has installed an 80 MY A Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) at its 154㎸ 'Kang-Jin Substation in South Korea. The device, manufactured by Siemens & Hyusung, has been operational since October 2002. The Korea Electric Power Research Institute (KEPRI), a division of KEPCO was tasked to study operational strategies that could be employed for the UPFC and surrounding reactive support devices concerning problems of low voltages and overloads in the Mokpo & Gwangju areas. Particular apprehension surrounded the possibility of delay in the installation of a new 345㎸ transmission line from 2005 to beyond 2010. The studies were to specifically determine whether these problems could be eliminated by application of a UPFC. The analysis included determining the UPFC operating point under various conditions, investigations of the coordination between the UPFC and a HYDC line terminating in this area, and the design of a supplementary damping controller for the UFPC. This paper summarizes the results of those studies, demonstrating the dynamic characteristics of the operation of this UPFC operation in the Korean power system.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 1992.07a
• /
• pp.122-125
• /
• 1992

Political situations of Korean Peninsula has been changing dramatically in recent years. Interconnected power system operation between South and North Korea should be taken into considerations. This paper discusses several expected operational problems in interconnected systems through literature study. Typical references in automatic generation control area are listed and recommended to read through.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 1997.11a
• /
• pp.177-181
• /
• 1997

Many countries are trying to develope the sustainable energy and environmental protection through a more concrete international cooperation. In this paper, the necessity and technical & economical feasibility on the interconnection of power systems in the South Korea, North Korea and North East Asia Region are emphasized with reference to the interconnection between the integrated power system according to the reunification of Germany and the Western European Power System. The Germany has a similar experience of separation and disconnection of their power system what happened in the Korean peninsula. Particularly the Power Economics And Clean Environment Network that could contribute to the PEACE promotion. Through the PEACE NETWORK PROJECT, the interconnection of power systems in North-Eastern Asia should be discussed in serious.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.11A no.4
• /
• pp.9-14
• /
• 2001

This paper reports a set of digital time-domain simulation studies conducted on 154 kV wound Potential Transformer(PT) int he 154 kV Gas Insulated Substation(GIS). The Electro-Magnetic Transient Program(EMTP) is used to develop the PT model and conduct the transient studies. The accuracy of the PT model is verified through comparison of the EMTP simulation results with those obtained from the field test results. The investigations shows that the developed model can accurately predict PT transient resonance, especially, the phenomenon of ferroresonance. The model is developed not only to determine impact of transients on PT response but also to design ferroresonance suppressor devices of PT. And it can also be used to predict PT transient response on power system monitoring and protection scheme.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
• /
• v.2 no.2
• /
• pp.101-108
• /
• 2013

GPS is the most widely-used Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) system. Since GPS is an important PNT infrastructure, the vulnerability of GPS to signal jamming has received significant attention. Especially, South Korea has experienced intentional high-power jamming from North Korea for the past three years, and thus realized the necessity of a complementary PNT system. South Korea recently decided to deploy a high-power terrestrial navigation system, eLoran, as a complementary PNT system. According to the plan, the initial operational capability of the Korean eLoran system is expected by 2016, and the full operational capability is expected by 2018. As a necessary research tool to support the Korean eLoran program, an eLoran performance simulation tool for Korea is under development. In this paper, the received signal strength, which is necessary to simulate eLoran performance, from the suggested Korean eLoran transmitters is simulated with the consideration of effective ground conductivities over Korea. Then, eLoran signal-to-noise ratios are also simulated based on atmospheric noise data over Korea. This basic simulation tool will be expanded to estimate the navigation performance (e.g., accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability) of the Korean eLoran system.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.232-260
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2001.11b
• /
• pp.414-417
• /
• 2001

This paper presents the results of power flow of North-South Korea system with interconnected cases which were proposed by various present studies PSS/E and PowerWorld Simulator were used to analyze the inter connected system with several interconnected lines alternatives. The results would be very useful to select the best alternative for interconnection with considering several evaluation terms.

• Transactions of the Korean hydrogen and new energy society
• /
• v.29 no.6
• /
• pp.606-619
• /
• 2018

This study focuses on the performance of hydrogen energy based hybrid system in terms of system reliability of electricity generation. With this aim to evaluate the off-grid system of photovoltaic (PV), wind turbine, electrolyzer, fuelcell, $H_2$ tank and storage batteries, 14 different sites in South Korea are simulated using HOMER. Performance analysis includes simulation on the different sites, verification of operational behaviors on regional and seasonal basis, and comparison among a control group. The result shows that the generation performance of hydrogen powered fuelcell is greatly affected by geographical change rather than seasonal effect. In addition, as the latitude of the hybrid systems location decrease, renewable power output and penetration ratio (%) increase under constant electrical load. Therefore, the hydrogen based hybrid system creates the stability of electricity generation, which best suits in the southern part of South Korea.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.2 no.3
• /
• pp.294-299
• /
• 2007

This paper presents a special protection scheme, which was established in the KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation) system, against a critically low voltage profile in a part of the system after a double-circuit tower outage. Without establishing the scheme, the outage triggers the operation of a zone 3 relay and trips the component. This sequence of events possibly leads to a blackout of the local system. The scheme consists of an inter-substation communication network using PITR (Protective Integrated Transmitter and Receiver) for acquisition of the substations' data, and under-voltage load shedding devices. This paper describes the procedure for determining the load shedding in the scheme and the experiences of the implementation.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.57-84
• /
• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.