• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.144-161
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• 2016

A unanimous Award has been issued on 12 July 2016 by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China. The current security issues in the regional sea shall be carefully reflected to anticipate whether the Award could resolve the existing political conflict or rather will grow military tension in the region. The Award clearly directs the scope of delimiting maritime jurisdiction to coastal States in the Southern China sea, so it seems to help facilitating finding resolutions of regional disputes on maritime boundaries. On the other hand, there are several limitations in reality to implementation of the decisions included in the Award. USA could use the decisions to restrict military activities and exercise of unilateral maritime jurisdiction by China in the region, while China shall encounter guilt to illegitimacy of its activities as well as shaking the legal foundation of its policy in the region. Then the resolution of this dispute through application of international law would rather cause more political confusion. The intension of bringing the case to an international court were to resolve political difficulties. If, however, the political difficulties are not properly reflected in the legal decisions, such decision would possibly raise more political risks.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.31-52
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• 2012

Although political uncertainty exists between China and Taiwan, the two countries have been expanding their economic exchange since the 1980s. That economic exchange is not limited to trade, and its investment segment is constantly expanding. The investment was one-sided by Taiwan in the past, but since a change in policy by the Taiwan government in 2009, Chinese capital is able to flow into Taiwan for direct investment. These kinds of policy changes related to investment between the two countries require follow-up actions such as profit protection for investors, elimination of investment limitations, simplification of investment procedures, and establishment of an investment dispute resolution system. The main topic of this study is the resolution mechanism for investment disputes between China and Taiwan. At present, an individual investment dispute between two countries is settled according to each country's own regulations for dispute resolution. However, these two countries have not prepared dispute resolution regulations related to cases of investment disputes between Chinese or Taiwanese investors and the Chinese or Taiwanese government, or between the Chinese government and the Taiwanese government. Moreover, they do not have any agreements related to investment disputes. Therefore, in this paper, I enumerate the regulations related to investment dispute resolution between China and Taiwan, and then I point out the problems and suggest solutions for improvement. Also, through this study, I would like to contribute to establishing and implementing an investment dispute resolution mechanism between South Korea and North Korea.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제51권6호
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• pp.1696-1707
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• 2019

This paper conducts a qualitative policy analysis of current challenges to safety culture and security culture in Southeast Asia and emerging best practices in Northeast Asia that are aimed at strengthening both cultures. It analyses lessons, including strengths and limitations, that can be derived from Northeast Asian states, given the long history of nuclear energy in South Korea, China and Japan. It identifies and examines best practices from Northeast Asia's Nuclear Security Centres of Excellence in terms of boosting nuclear security culture and their relevance for Southeast Asia. The paper accentuates the important role of the State in adopting policy and regulatory frameworks and in institutionalising nuclear education and training programmes to deepen the safety-security cultures. Best practices in and challenges to developing a nuclear safety culture and a security culture in East Asia are examined using three frameworks of analysis (i) a comprehensive nuclear policy framework; (ii) a proactive and independent regulatory body; and (iii) holistic nuclear education and training programmes. The paper argues that Southeast Asian states interested in harnessing nuclear energy and/or utilising radioactive sources for non-power applications must develop a comprehensive policy framework on developing safety and security cultures, a proactive regulatory body, and holistic nuclear training programmes that cover both technical and human factors. Such measures are crucial in order to mitigate human errors that may lead to radiological accidents and nuclear security crises. Key lessons from Japan, South Korea and China such as best practices and challenges can inform policy recommendations for Southeast Asia in enhancing safety-security cultures.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제18권3호
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• pp.105-112
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• 2018

한국과 베트남은 1992년 수교 이후 정치, 경제, 문화적으로 폭넓은 교류협력을 이어왔다. 2018년 3월, 문재인 대통령은 신남방정책의 핵심 파트너인 베트남을 공식 방문하여 교역확대와 한반도 평화정착을 위한 포괄적 협력방안을 논의했다. 2018년 4월에 열린 한(韓) 베트남 국방장관 회담에서는 해양안보, 방산협력, UN PKO 활동, 유해발굴, 인도적 지원 등 국방 방산 전분야 협력증진을 골자로 하는 '국방협력에 관한 공동비전 성명'을 체결했다. 현재 베트남은 남중국해를 둘러싸고 중국과 도서영유권 분쟁을 겪고 있으며 이에 대응하기 위해 군 현대화와 군비증강에 박차를 가하고 있다. 특히 해상전력을 강화하기 위해 미국과 러시아, 인도, 프랑스 등과 이념을 초월하여 대외군사협력을 강화하고 있다. 이러한 배경에서 한(韓) 베트남 교류협력은 기존의 경제 문화적 교류를 넘어 군사협력으로 범위를 확대해나갈 필요성이 있다고 판단된다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 수교 26주년을 맞은 한(韓) 베트남 관계를 재조명하고 'Next China'로 성장한 베트남과의 군사협력 발전방안을 모색하고자 한다. 이를 위해 베트남의 안보환경과 군사전략을 분석하고, 방산분야를 중심으로 한 군사협력 추진전략을 제시하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• 디지털콘텐츠학회 논문지
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• 제19권6호
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• pp.1145-1150
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• 2018

시진핑은 '아시아 운명공동체' 구축을 위한 새로운 외교발전을 제시하면서 이를 실현하기 위해 일대일로(一帶一路) 정책을 채택 하였다. 5통(通)의 핵심이념 정책구통(政策溝通), 시설련통(設施聯通), 무역창통(貿易暢通), 자금융통(資金融通), 민심상통(民心相通)을 바탕으로 일대일로를 통해 주변 국가들과 전 방위적인 협력과 상호이익관계를 구축하고 있다. 이에 본고는 중국의 일대일로 정책과 한국의 유라시아 이니셔티브를 방한관광 콘텐츠개발 전략에 어떻게 활용할 것인가에 대한 제안을 몇 가지 제시하고자 한 것이다. 첫째, 한국기업의 가교역할이 관광콘텐츠 개발로 이어질 수 있도록 해야 한다. 둘째, 중국인 개별관광객을 위한 관광콘텐츠 개발 활성화가 또 다른 관광콘텐츠로 이어질 수 있도록 해야 한다. 셋째, 중국의 현지기업들과 공동수주 방안을 모색해서 관광콘텐츠로 이어질 수 있도록 한다. 넷째, 한국에서 생활한 근로자나 유학생들의 적극적인 활용을 모색한다. 다섯째, 북한과의 협력적인 관계를 바탕으로 관광콘텐츠 개발을 도모한다.

• 비교교육연구
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.97-121
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• 2017

오늘날 교사 양성 질 관리 기제인 교원양성기관평가가 정착되면서 그 본질적 기능에 대한 의구심도 증폭되고 있다. 특히, 교사 공급 과잉이 발생하는 국가의 경우, 평가 자체의 적합성은 물론, 평가 결과의 활용이 예비교사 교육의 질 관리에 기여하지 못한다는 비판도 제기된다. 이러한 문제인식에서 본 연구는 중등교사가 과잉 공급되고 있는 한국과 중국의 사범대학을 대상으로 한 평가의 특징을 평가의 주체, 목적, 주기, 지표, 방법, 결과 활용이라는 여섯 가지 준거에 따라 비교분석할 목적으로 수행되었다. 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 한국과 중국의 사범대학 평가는 교원양성기관 교육 수준의 질 향상을 공식적 목적으로 표방하고 있지만 실제 평가 추진의 내용 및 결과 활용은 본질적 목적에서 벗어나 형식적으로 운영되고 있다는 공통적 문제가 발견되었다. 둘째, 평가 주체나 지표, 결과 활용 등에 있어서는 정부 주도의 관리 감독이나 양성 자원 통제 등에 치우쳐 있고 교사 직전교육의 질을 높이기 위한 사범대학의 질 제고는 뒷전이라는 상황은 교사 과잉 공급과 밀접하게 연관되어 있다는 점을 확인하였다. 이상 연구결과를 토대로 양 국가의 사범대학 평가가 본질을 회복하고 진정한 의미의 질 관리 기제로 개선되기 위해 필요한 정책적 제언을 제시하였다.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
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• 제28권4호
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• pp.121-131
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• 2023

중국의 동북3성(헤이룽장성, 요녕성, 지린성)은 우리나라 신북방정책의 유라시아 복합 물류망 구축을 위한 횡단열차 건설 및 북한과의 무역이 가능한 지역으로, 지리적, 지정학적 및 지경학적 중요성이 크다. 운송학적 관점에서 동북3성은 황해권 국가인 한국-중국-북한 간 해상운송이 가능한 지역이며, 복합운송의 형태로 동북3성을 거쳐 유라시아 및 유럽까지 물품 운송이 가능하다. 본 연구는 신북방정책 연계 중국 동북3성과의 협력 및 우호관계 증진을 통한 물류 거점 지역 확보 필요성을 언급하고자 한다. 특히, 본 연구는 중국 동북3성과의 교역 현황 및 해상물동량을 분석하고, 해상운송 활성화 및 물류거점 확보를 위한 정책적 제언을 하고자 한다. 정책적 제언으로 물류 허브 구축을 위한 항만 공동운영, 항만 인프라 공동건설, 해운사 공동운영을 제안하고자 하며, 문화적 협력 및 콘텐츠 개발을 통한 인적교류 확대로 한국-중국 간의 해상운송여객사업 활성화 방안을 제시하고자 한다.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제30권1호
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• pp.89-107
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• 2008

Marine environment is subject serious destruction because of frequent accidents during exploration of marine resources and overseas transport. Also, as many industrial enterprises discharge high volume of wastes and contamination, marine pollution has become a serious threat to people (especially in China). China is quickly becoming a world economic leader of the 21st century. Rapid industrialization and social changes have raised the standard of living of millions of the Chinese, mainly in the areas of East and South East coast. The process of industrialization, however, is often followed by deterioration of the marine environment and rarely turned around until a country has increased its standard of living. Solving these array of problems will take decades and currently the government is addressing minor specific issues only. Fortunately, the Chinese government has enacted a number of marine pollution control laws. On 25 December 1999, the 13th Session of the Ninth Standing Commettee of the National People's Congress passed the amended the Marine Environment Protection Law of the People's Republic of China. This Law establishes rights and responsibilities of the relevant departments concerning marine environment management and provides for two new chapters on "Marine Environment Supervision" and "Marine Ecological Protection", along with "Supervision of Pollution Prevention for Marine Construction Projects", "Marine Ecological Protection" and "Marine Environment Pollution Prevention for Marine Construction Projects". Also, the Law was amended with provisions for integrated pollution discharge control system and oil spillage emergency response plan and enhanced legal responsibilities. Chinese government recognizes that international and national experience can be useful for China to prevent further ecological degradation of the marine environment.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제31권2호
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• pp.237-269
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• 2016

Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) is the only intergovernmental space cooperation organization in Asia. Since its establishment to date, eight countries have signed the convention and become member states. South Korea participated actively in the preparatory phase of creating the organization, and one conference organized by AP-MCSTA which is the predecessor of APSCO was held in South Korea. However, after the APSCO Convention was opened for signature in 2005 to date, South Korea does not ratify the Convention and become a member. The rapid development of space commercialization and privatization, as well as the fastest growing commercial space market in Asia, provides opportunities for Asian countries to cooperate with each other in relevant space fields. And to participate in the existing cooperation framework (e.g., the APSCO) by the Asian space countries (e.g., South Korea) could be a proper choice. Even if the essential cooperation in particular space fields is challenging, joint space programs among different Asian countries for dealing with the common events can be initiated at the first steps. Since APSCO has learned the successful legal arrangements from ESA, the legal measures established by its Convention are believed to be qualified to ensure the achievement of benefits of different member states. For example, the regulation of the "fair return" principle confirms that the return of interests from the relevant programs is in proportion to the member's investment in the programs. Moreover, the distinguish of basic and optional activities intends to authorize the freedom of the members to choose programs to participate. And for the voting procedure, the acceptance of the "consensus" by the Council is in favor of protecting the member's interest when making decisions. However, political factors that are potential to block the participation of South Korea in APSCO are difficult to be ignored. A recent event is an announcement of deploying THAAD by South Korea, which causes tension between South Korea and China. The cooperation between these two states in space activities will be influenced. A long-standing barrier is that China acts as a non-member of the main international export control mechanism, i.e., the MTCR. The U.S takes this fact as the main reason to prevent South Korea to cooperate with China in developing space programs. Although the political factors that will block the participation of South Korea in APSCO are not easy to removed shortly, legal measures can be taken to reduce the political influence. More specifically, APSCO is recommended to ensure the achievement of commercial interests of different cooperation programs by regulating precisely the implementation of the "fair return" principle. Furthermore, APSCO is also suggested to contribute to managing the common regional events by sharing satellite data. And it is anticipated that these measures can effectively response the requirements of the rapid development of space commercialization and the increasing common needs of Asia, thereby to provide a platform for the further cooperation. In addition, in order to directly reduce the political influence, two legal measures are necessary to be taken: Firstly, to clarify the rights and responsibilities of the host state (i.e., China) as providing assistance, coordination and services to the management of the Organization to release the worries of the other member states that the host state will control the Organization's activities. And secondly, to illustrate that the cooperation in APSCO is for the non-military purpose (a narrow sense of "peaceful purpose") to reduce the political concerns. Regional cooperation in Asia regarding space affairs is considered to be a general trend in the future, so if the participation of South Korea in APSCO can be finally proved to be feasible, there will be an opportunity to discuss the creation of a comprehensive institutionalized framework for space cooperation in Asia.