• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.335-344
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• 2016

It is known that power analysis is one of the most powerful attack in side channel analysis. Among power analysis single trace attack is widely studied recently since it uses one power consumption trace to recover secret key of public cryptosystem. Recently Sim et al. proposed new exponentiation algorithm for RSA cryptosystem with higher attack complexity to prevent single trace attack. In this paper we analyze the vulnerability of exponentiation algorithm described by Sim et al. Sim et al. applied message blinding and random exponentiation splitting method on $2^t-ary$ for higher attack complexity. However we can reveal private key using information exposed during pre-computation generation. Also we describe modified algorithm that provides higher attack complexity on collision attack. Proposed algorithm minimized the reuse of value that are used during exponentiation to provide security under single collision attack.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.919-928
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• 2023

Deep learning technology is used in various fields such as self-driving cars, image creation, and virtual voice implementation, and deep learning accelerators have been developed for high-speed operation in hardware devices. However, several side channel attacks that recover secret information inside the accelerator using side-channel information generated when the deep learning accelerator operates have been recently researched. In this paper, we implemented a DNN(Deep Neural Network)-based MNIST digit classifier on a microprocessor and attempted a correlation power analysis attack to confirm that the weights of deep learning accelerator could be sufficiently recovered. In addition, to counter these power analysis attacks, we proposed a Node-CUT shuffling method that applies the principle of misalignment at the time of power measurement. It was confirmed through experiments that the proposed countermeasure can effectively defend against side-channel attacks, and that the additional calculation amount is reduced by more than 1/3 compared to using the Fisher-Yates shuffling method.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.362-369
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• 2010

While the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is getting more popular in securing numerous systems, implementations without consideration for side-channel attacks are susceptible to critical information leakage. This paper proposes new power attack countermeasures for ECC over Koblitz curves. Based on some special properties of Koblitz curves, the proposed methods randomize the involved elliptic curve points in a highly regular manner so the resulting scalar multiplication algorithms can defeat the simple power analysis attack and the differential power analysis attack simultaneously. Compared with the previous countermeasures, the new methods are also noticeable in terms of computational cost.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.17-28
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• 2024

As listed as one of the most important requirements for Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process by National Institute of Standards and Technology, the resistance to various side-channel attacks is considered very critical in deploying cryptosystems in practice. In fact, cryptosystems can easily be broken by side-channel attacks, even though they are considered to be secure in the mathematical point of view. The timing attack(TA) and the simple power analysis attack(SPA) are such side-channel attack methods which can reveal sensitive information by analyzing the timing behavior or the power consumption pattern of cryptographic operations. Thus, appropriate measures against such attacks must carefully be considered in the early stage of cryptosystem's implementation process. The Montgomery multiplier is a commonly used and classical gadget in implementing big-number-based cryptosystems including RSA and ECC. And, as recently proposed as an alternative of building blocks for implementing post quantum cryptography such as lattice-based cryptography, the big-number multiplier including the Montgomery multiplier still plays a role in modern cryptography. However, in spite of its effectiveness and wide-adoption, the multiplier is known to be vulnerable to TA and SPA. And this paper proposes a new countermeasure for the Montgomery multiplier against TA and SPA. Briefly speaking, the new measure first represents a multiplication operand without 0 digits, so the resulting multiplication operation behaves in a very regular manner. Also, the new algorithm removes the extra final reduction (which is intrinsic to the modular multiplication) to make the resulting multiplier more timing-independent. Consequently, the resulting multiplier operates in constant time so that it totally removes any TA and SPA vulnerabilities. Since the proposed method can process multi bits at a time, implementers can also trade-off the performance with the resource usage to get desirable implementation characteristics.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.39-47
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• 2008

Among previous Side Channel Analysis (SCA) methods, Differential Power Analysis (DPA) based on the statistical characteristics of collected signals has been known as an efficient attack for uncovering secret key of cryptosystems. However, the attack performance of this method is affected very much by the temporal misalignment and noise of collected side channel signals. In this paper, we propose a new method to surmount the noise problem in DPA. The performance of the proposed method is then evaluated while analyzing the power consumption signals of Micro-controller chips during a DES operation. Its performance is then compared to that of the original DPA in the time and frequency domains. When we compare the experimental results with respect to the needed number of traces to uncover the secret key, our proposed method shows the performance enhancement 33% in the time domain and 50% in the frequency domain.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.29 no.5
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• pp.619-632
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• 2007

Side channel attacks are a very serious menace to embedded devices with cryptographic applications. To counteract such attacks many randomization techniques have been proposed. One efficient technique in elliptic curve cryptosystems randomizes addition chains with binary signed digit (BSD) representations of the secret key. However, when such countermeasures have been used alone, most of them have been broken by various simple power analysis attacks. In this paper, we consider combinations which can enhance the security of countermeasures using BSD representations by adding additional countermeasures. First, we propose several ways the improved countermeasures based on BSD representations can be attacked. In an actual statistical power analysis attack, the number of samples plays an important role. Therefore, we estimate the number of samples needed in the proposed attack.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.21 no.5
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• pp.14-21
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• 2020

In order to provide confidential services between two communicating parties, block data encryption using a symmetric secret key is applied. A power analysis attack on a cryptosystem is a side channel-analysis method that can extract a secret key by measuring the power consumption traces of the crypto device. In this paper, we propose an attack model that can recover the secret key using a power analysis attack based on a deep learning convolutional neural network (CNN) algorithm. Considering that the CNN algorithm is suitable for image analysis, we particularly adopt the recurrence plot (RP) signal processing method, which transforms the one-dimensional power trace into two-dimensional data. As a result of executing the proposed CNN attack model on an XMEGA128 experimental board that implemented the AES-128 encryption algorithm, we recovered the secret key with 22.23% accuracy using raw power consumption traces, and obtained 97.93% accuracy using power traces on which we applied the RP processing method.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.1079-1087
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• 2018

Binary scalar multiplication which is the main operation of elliptic curve cryptography is vulnerable to the side-channel analysis. Especially, it is vulnerable to the side-channel analysis which uses power consumption and electromagnetic emission patterns. Thus, various countermeasures have been studied. However, they have focused on eliminating patterns of data dependent branches, statistical characteristic according to intermediate values, or the interrelationships between data. No countermeasure have been taken into account for the secure design of the key bit check phase, although the secret scalar bits are directly loaded during that phase. Therefore, in this paper, we demonstrate that we can extract secret scalar bits with 100% success rate using a single power or a single electromagnetic trace by performing key bit-dependent attack on hardware implementation of binary scalar multiplication algorithm. Experiments are focused on the $Montgomery-L{\acute{o}}pez-Dahab$ ladder algorithm protected by scalar randomization. Our attack does not require sophisticated pre-processing and can defeat existing countermeasures using a single-trace. As a result, we propose a countermeasure and suggest that it should be applied.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.27 no.6A
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• pp.540-548
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• 2002

Attacks have been proposed that use side information as timing measurements, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions and faulty hardware. Elimination side-channel information or prevention it from being used to attack a secure system is an tractive ares of research. In this paper, differential power analysis techniques to attack the DES are experimented and analyzed. And we propose the prevention of DPA attack by software implementation technique.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.363-374
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• 2023

A white-box environment refers to a situation where the internal information of an algorithm is disclosed. The AES white-box encryption was first announced in 2002, and in 2016, a side-channel analysis for white-box encryption called Differential Computation Analysis (DCA) was proposed. DCA analysis is a powerful side-channel attack technique that uses the memory information of white-box encryption as side-channel information to find the key. Although various countermeasure studies against DCA have been published domestically and internationally, there were no evaluated or analyzed results from experiments applying the hiding technique using dummy operations to DCA analysis. Therefore, in this paper, we insert LU T-shaped dummy operations into the WBC-AES algorithm proposed by S. Chow in 2002 and quantitatively evaluate the degree of change in DCA analysis response depending on the size of the dummy. Compared to the DCA analysis proposed in 2016, which recovers a total of 16 bytes of the key, the countermeasure proposed in this paper was unable to recover up to 11 bytes of the key as the size of the dummy decreased, resulting in a maximum decrease in attack performance of about 68.8%, which is about 31.2% lower than the existing attack performance. The countermeasure proposed in this paper confirms that the attack performance significantly decreases as smaller dummy sizes are inserted and can be applied in various fields.