• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2013.05a
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• pp.219-222
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• 2013

The Side Channel attack methods proposed by P.Kocher are mainly used for cryptanalysis different cipher algorithms even though they are claimed to be strongly secured. Those kinds of attacks depend on environment implementation especially on the hardware implementation of the algorithm to the crypto module. side-channel attacks are a type of attack introduced by P.Kocher and is applicable according to each environment or method that is designed. This kind of attack can analyze and also extract important information by reading the binary code data via measurement of changes in electricity(voltage) consumption, running time, error output and sounds. Thus, in this paper, we discuss recent SPA and DPA attacks as well as recent countermeasure techniques.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.39-49
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• 2020

In this paper, we show that the Chinese standard block cipher SM4 is vulnerable to the side channel attacks and present a countermeasure to resist them. We firstly validate that the secret key of SM4 can be recovered by differential power analysis(DPA) and correlation power analysis(CPA) attacks. Therefore we analyze the vulnerable element caused by power attack and propose a first order masking-based countermeasure to defeat DPA and CPA attacks. Although the proposed countermeasure unfortunately is still vulnerable to the profiling power attacks such as deep learning-based multi layer perceptron(MLP), it can sufficiently overcome the non-profiling attacks such as DPA and CPA.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.107-112
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• 2020

Ultra-lightweight password CHAM is an algorithm with efficient addition, rotation and XOR operations on resource constrained devices. CHAM shows high computational performance, especially on IoT platforms. However, lightweight block encryption algorithms used on the Internet of Things may be vulnerable to side channel analysis. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability to side channel attack by attempting a first power analysis attack against CHAM. In addition, a safe algorithm was proposed and implemented by applying a masking technique to safely defend the attack. This implementation implements an efficient and secure CHAM block cipher using the instruction set of an 8-bit AVR processor.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.53 no.9
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• pp.2847-2858
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• 2021

When a nuclear reactor with rectangular fuel assemblies runs for a long time, impurities and debris may be taken into coolant channels, which may cause flow blockage, and the blocked fuel assemblies might be destroyed. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to perform a thermal-hydraulic analysis of a rectangular fuel assembly by STAR-CCM+, under the condition of one subchannel with 80% blockage ratio. A rectangular fuel assembly of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 10 MW material test reactor (MTR) is chosen. In view of the gasket material taken into the coolant channel is close to the single side of the coolant channel, in the flow blockage accident of the Oak Ridge Research Reactor (ORRR), a new blockage category called single side blockage is attempted. The blockage positions include inlet, middle and outlet, and the blockage is set as a cuboid. It is found by simulations that the blockage redistributes the mass flow rate, and large vortices appear locally. The peak temperature of the cladding is maximum, when the blockage is located at the single side of the coolant channel inlet, and no boiling occurs in all blockage cases. Moreover, as the height of the blockage increases, the damage caused by the blockage increases slightly.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.709-718
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• 2019

A lightweight block cipher CHAM designed for suitability in resource-constrained environment has reasonable security level and high computational performance. Since this cipher may contain intrinsic weakness on side channel attack, it should adopt a countermeasure such as masking method. In this paper, we implement the masked CHAM cipher on 32-bit microprosessor Cortex-M3 platform to resist against side channel attack and analyze their computational performance. Based on the shortcoming of having many round functions, we apply reduced masking method to the implementation of CHAM cipher. As a result, we show that the CHAM-128/128 algorithm applied reduced masking technique requires additional operations about four times.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.6098-6122
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• 2018

Cache-based side-channel attacks have achieved more attention along with the development of cloud computing technologies. However, current host-based mitigation methods either provide bad compatibility with current cloud infrastructure, or turn out too application-specific. Besides, they are defending blindly without any knowledge of on-going attacks. In this work, we present CacheSCDefender, a framework that provides a (Virtual Machine Monitor) VMM-based comprehensive defense framework against all levels of cache attacks. In designing CacheSCDefender, we make three key contributions: (1) an attack-aware framework combining our novel dynamic remapping and traditional cache cleansing, which provides a comprehensive defense against all three cases of cache attacks that we identify in this paper; (2) a new defense method called dynamic remapping which is a developed version of random permutation and is able to deal with two cases of cache attacks; (3) formalization and quantification of security improvement and performance overhead of our defense, which can be applicable to other defense methods. We show that CacheSCDefender is practical for deployment in normal virtualized environment, while providing favorable security guarantee for virtual machines.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.55-63
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• 2007

This paper has investigated the susceptibility of an FPGA implementation of a block cipher against side channel analysis attacks. We have performed DPA attacks and DEMA attacks (in the nea. and far field) on an FPGA implementation of ARIA which has been implemented into two architectures of S-box. Although the number of needed traces for a successful attack is increased when compared with existing results on smart cards, we have shown that ARIA without countermeasures is indeed very susceptible to side channel analysis attacks regardless of an architecture of S-box.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.31-39
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• 2008

The development of next-generation resident registration cards, financial IC cards and administrative agency IC cards based on a smart card is currently coming out in Korea. However, the low-price IC cards without countermeasures against side channel analysis attacks are expected to be used fer cost reduction. This paper has investigated the side channel resistance of financial IC cards that are currently in use and have performed DPA attacks on the financial IC cards. We have been able to perform successful DPA attacks on these cards by using only 100 power measurement traces. From our experiment results, we have been able to extract the master key used for encryption of a count PIN number.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.109-115
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• 2010

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is well known as one of efficient physical side-channel attack methods using leakage power consumption traces. However, since the power traces usually include the components irrelevant to the encryption, the efficiency of the DPA attack may be degraded. To enhance the performance of DPA, we introduce a pre-processing technique which extracts the encryption-related parts from the measured power consumption signals. Experimental results show that the DPA attack with the use of the proposed pre-processing method detects correct cipher keys with much smaller number of signals compared to that of the conventional DPA attack.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.738-754
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• 2024

Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a cryptanalytic technique that exploits physical leakages, such as power consumption or electromagnetic emanations, from cryptographic devices to extract secret keys used in cryptographic algorithms. Recent studies have shown that training SCA models with semi-supervised learning can effectively overcome the problem of few labeled power traces. However, the process of training SCA models using semi-supervised learning generates many pseudo-labels. The performance of the SCA model can be reduced by some of these pseudo-labels. To solve this issue, we propose the HWFilter method to improve semi-supervised SCA. This method uses a Hamming Weight Pseudo-label Filter (HWPF) to filter the pseudo-labels generated by the semi-supervised SCA model, which enhances the model's performance. Furthermore, we introduce a normal distribution method for constructing the HWPF. In the normal distribution method, the Hamming weights (HWs) of power traces can be obtained from the normal distribution of power points. These HWs are filtered and combined into a HWPF. The HWFilter was tested using the ASCADv1 database and the AES_HD dataset. The experimental results demonstrate that the HWFilter method can significantly enhance the performance of semi-supervised SCA models. In the ASCADv1 database, the model with HWFilter requires only 33 power traces to recover the key. In the AES_HD dataset, the model with HWFilter outperforms the current best semi-supervised SCA model by 12%.