• ETRI Journal
• /
• 제36권5호
• /
• pp.856-864
• /
• 2014

Usually, key-establishment protocols are suggested in a security model. However, there exist several different security models in the literature defined by their respective security notions. In this paper, we study the relations between the security models of key establishment. For the chosen security models, we first show that some proven key-establishment protocols are not secure in the more restricted security models. We then suggest two compilers by which we can convert a key-establishment protocol that is secure in a specific security model into a key-establishment protocol that is still secure in a more restricted security model.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
• /
• 제14권1호
• /
• pp.104-110
• /
• 2012

Group key agreement protocols allow a group of users, communicating over a public network, to establish a shared secret key to achieve a cryptographic goal. Protocols based on certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) are preferred since CL-PKC does not need certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and does not suffer from key escrow of identity-based cryptography. Most previous certificateless group key agreement protocols deploy signature schemes to achieve authentication and do not have constant rounds. No security model has been presented for group key agreement protocols based on CL-PKC. This paper presents a security model for a certificateless group key agreement protocol and proposes a constant-round group key agreement protocol based on CL-PKC. The proposed protocol does not involve any signature scheme, which increases the efficiency of the protocol. It is formally proven that the proposed protocol provides strong AKE-security and tolerates up to $n$-2 malicious insiders for weak MA-security. The protocol also resists key control attack under a weak corruption model.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• 제5권3호
• /
• pp.607-625
• /
• 2011

Two-party key exchange protocol is a mechanism in which two parties communicate with each other over an insecure channel and output the same session key. A key exchange protocol that is secure against an active adversary who can control and modify the exchanged messages is called authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security definition for public key infrastructure (PKI) based two-pass protocol, which we call the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model, and some researchers have provided eCK-secure AKE protocols in recent years. However, almost all protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on a special implementation technique so-called the NAXOS trick. In this paper, we present a PKI-based two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in the eCK security model. The security of the proposed protocol is proven without random oracles (under three assumptions), and does not rely on implementation techniques such as the NAXOS trick.

• 한국정보통신학회논문지
• /
• 제20권6호
• /
• pp.1109-1122
• /
• 2016

무인증서 공개키 암호(Certificateless Public Key Encryption scheme)는 사용자 ID를 공개키로 사용함으로써 공개키 암호 시스템의 인증서 관리 문제를 해결하고 ID기반 암호 기법의 키 위탁(key escrow) 문제를 해결할 수 있는 기술이다. 이에 대한 연구가 활발히 진행되었음에도 불구하고, 기존의 여러 무인증서 암호 기법들은 사용자가 선택한 비밀값과 복호화 키 노출 공격에 대한 안전성을 고려하지 않고 설계되었다. 비밀값과 복호화 키 노출 공격이란 한 번이라도 공개키가 교체된 이후 이전에 사용했던 비밀값과 복호화 키가 노출된다면 그로부터 ID에 대응하는 부분 개인키를 획득해 현재의 정당한 복호화 키를 연산할 수 있는 공격이다. 본 논문에서는 키 노출 공격에 대해 안전한 새로운 안전성 모델을 제안하고, 해당 안전성 모델에서 기존의 무인증서 공개키 암호 기법들이 안전하지 않음을 보인다. 또한, 제안한 모델에서 안전한 새로운 무인증서 공개키 암호 기법을 제시하고, DBDH(Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) 가정을 기반으로 안전성을 증명한다.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
• /
• 제21권9호
• /
• pp.1-10
• /
• 2021

The Internet of things (IoT) is the main advancement in data processing and communication technologies. In IoT, intelligent devices play an exciting role in wireless communication. Although, sensor nodes are low-cost devices for communication and data gathering. However, sensor nodes are more vulnerable to different security threats because these nodes have continuous access to the internet. Therefore, the multiparty security credential-based key generation mechanism provides effective security against several attacks. The key generation-based methods are implemented at sensor nodes, edge nodes, and also at server nodes for secure communication. The main challenging issue in a collaborative key generation scheme is the extensive multiplication. When the number of parties increased the multiplications are more complex. Thus, the computational cost of batch key and multiparty key-based schemes is high. This paper presents a Secure Multipart Key Distribution scheme (SMKD) that provides secure communication among the nodes by generating a multiparty secure key for communication. In this paper, we provide node authentication and session key generation mechanism among mobile nodes, head nodes, and trusted servers. We analyzed the achievements of the SMKD scheme against SPPDA, PPDAS, and PFDA schemes. Thus, the simulation environment is established by employing an NS 2. Simulation results prove that the performance of SMKD is better in terms of communication cost, computational cost, and energy consumption.

• IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing
• /
• 제2권1호
• /
• pp.36-43
• /
• 2013

This paper provides an overview of the security in the System Architecture Evolution (SAE) / Long-Term Evolution (LTE) system. Security is an integral part of SAE/LTE with improvements over the Third Generation (3G) system. This paper reviews the SAE/LTE system architecture, and discusses the security requirements, algorithms, Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), Security Mode Command (SMC), key hierarchy and security for mobility.

• 정보보호학회논문지
• /
• 제14권6호
• /
• pp.69-78
• /
• 2004

수년간 두 명의 사용자 혹은 세 명의 사용자 사이의 키교환 프로토콜을 위한 안전성 모델이 정의 되어왔다. 또한 최근에는 그룹키 관리 기법에 대한 안전성 모델에 관한 연구가 진행되고 있다. 그 결과 분산 방식의 그룹키 교환 기법을 위한 안전성 모델과 증명 가능한 프로토콜들이 다양하게 제시되고 있다. 그러나 중앙 분배 방식의 그룹키 분배 기법에 대해서는 구체적인 안전성 모델이나 증명 가능한 프로토콜에 대해 거의 언급되지 않았다. 본 논문에서는 중앙 분배 방식의 그룹키 분배 기법을 위한 안전성 요구 조건과 안전성 모델에 대해 설명한다: 이 모델은 강력한 사용자 공모 공격(strong user corruption attack) 능력을 지니고 있는 공격자에 의해 제어되는 채널에서 정의된다. 본 논문에서는 이 안전성 모델에 기반하여 기존의 중앙 분배 방식의 그룹키 기법을 안전성이 증명 가능한 기법으로 전환할 수 있는 변환 모듈을 제시하고자 한다.

• 정보보호학회논문지
• /
• 제28권5호
• /
• pp.1059-1070
• /
• 2018

블록암호 Zorro는 AES와 비슷한 연산과정을 거치나 S-box 개수를 줄여 부채널 공격에 대비한 마스킹을 구현 비용을 줄일 수 있게 설계되었다. 하지만 마스터키를 라운드키로 그대로 사용하기 때문에 연관키 차분공격 관점에서 취약하다. 본 논문에서는 Zorro의 연관키 차분특성을 이용해 키 복구 공격을 보인다. 또한 안전성이 증명된 12가지의 PGV 모델을 Zorro를 기반으로 할 때 블록암호의 연관키 차분 특성이 해시함수 충돌쌍 공격에 어떻게 활용될 수 있는지 설명하고 실제 충돌쌍을 제시한다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• 제6권8호
• /
• pp.1982-1997
• /
• 2012

Authenticated multiple key agreement protocols not only allow participants to agree the multiple session keys within one run of the protocol but also ensure the authenticity of the other party. In 2011, Dehkordi et al. proposed an identity-based authenticated multiple key agreement protocol. In this paper, we demonstrate that Dehkordi et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to impersonation attacks. Furthermore, we have found that their protocol cannot provide perfect forward security or mutual security. Then we propose an identity-based authenticated multiple key agreement protocol which removes the weaknesses of the Dehkordi et al.'s protocol. Compared with the multiple key agreement protocols in the literature, the proposed protocol is more efficient and holds stronger security.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• 제6권2호
• /
• pp.751-765
• /
• 2012

Key establishment protocols are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public insecure networks. Security must be given the topmost priority in the design of a key establishment protocol. In this work, we provide a security analysis on two recent key establishment protocols: Harn and Lin's group key transfer protocol and Dutta and Barua's group key agreement protocol. Our analysis shows that both the Harn-Lin protocol and the Dutta-Barua protocol have a flaw in their design and can be easily attacked. The attack we mount on the Harn-Lin protocol is a replay attack whereby a malicious user can obtain the long-term secrets of any other users. The Dutta-Barua protocol is vulnerable to an unknown key-share attack. For each of the two protocols, we present how to eliminate their security vulnerabilities. We also improve Dutta and Barua's proof of security to make it valid against unknown key share attacks.