• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.307-325
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• 2007

Examining the standards of review adopted by the dispute settlement body of the WTO in its decision on safeguard measures, the Appellate Body offers no coherent guidance or theory as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures adopted by the domestic authorities. It faults the lack of reasoned and adequate explanation in the national authorities' decision to impose safeguard measures, yet its own explanation of the permissible role for safeguard measure could hardly be less instructive. The Appellate Body has consistently emphasized fidelity to text in its decision but that approach can not work properly when the text is fundamentally deficient from the viewpoints that neither Article XIX nor the safeguard Agreement establish a coherent foundation for safeguard measures due to their vague and abstract provision. Without any coherent theory on guidance as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures, it would be absurd to expect WTO members to produce a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how their safeguard measures are in compliance with the WTO roles. In the absence of a thorough renegotiation for the proper operation of the WTO safeguard system, which seems quite unlikely for the foreseeable future, perhaps the unique method out of the current predicament is for the Appellate Body to lead a movement in establishing a sensible common law of safeguards, drawing on extra-textual guidance including the standards of review about their proper role in the WTO safeguard mechanism.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.22
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• pp.255-285
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• 2004

After more than 15 years of negotiations, China was finally able to achieve the WTO membership, opening up new trade opportunities for China as well as existing WTO members. China accepted a special safeguard mechanism as one of its WTO- plus commitments. And in response, Korea has since introduced China special safeguard rules, which in simple terms, allows an invocation of safeguard measures against Chinese product imports under more lapse conditions than would normally be allowed under the existing general safeguard rules. China also introduced new safeguard rules in November 2001 in an effort to increase transparency in its operation of safeguard measures. However, the current article contends that the new rules pose a serious threat to free trade in the form of the retaliation provision, which enables China to take unilateral retaliatory actions against safeguard measures on Chinese product imports, It indicates that the provision could be operated in an arbitrary manner as the US Super 301, and lead to infringements of WTO disciplines. This paper indicates that the foregoing elements could lead to mort trade disputes between Korea China regarding safeguard measures and subsequent retaliations on the hills of the so called the Garlic War. The current article goes on to offer policy recommendations toward deterring such disputes. First, it recommends a more active invocation of Korea's own retaliatory provision against China's unilateral actions at least to gain negotiating leverage. Second, it sites problems involving China's still conspicuous state-trading practices, and proposes to raise issues again China to induce more faithful implementation of WTO disciplines Final, it stresses the importance of preventing disputes before they arise, and suggests several specific preventive measures.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.41
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• pp.237-266
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• 2009

KORUS-FTA are consist of articles 8. In order to the subjects are, application of a safeguard measures, conditions and limitations, provisional measures, compensation, global safeguard actions, definitions, antidumping and countervailing duties, committee on trade remedies. In especially, regarding application of a safeguard measures under KORUS-FTA, if as a result of the reduction or elimination of a customs duty under this agreement, an originating good of the other party is being imported into the territory of a party in such increased quantities, in absolute terms or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions that the imports of such originating good from the other party constitute a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive good, the party may: suspend the further reduction of any rate of customs duty on the good provided for under this agreement; increase the rate of customs duty on the good to a level not to exceed the lesser of: the most-favored-nation (MFN) applied rate of duty on the good in effect at the time the action is taken; and the MFN applied rate of duty on the good in effect on the day immediately preceding the date this Agreement enters into force; or in the case of a customs duty applied to a good on a seasonal basis, increase the rate of duty to a level that, for each season, does not exceed the lesser of: the MFN applied rate of duty on the good in effect for the corresponding season immediately preceding the date of application of the safeguard measure; and the MFN applied rate of duty on the good in effect for the corresponding season immediately preceding the date this agreement enters into force.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.271-298
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• 2011

This paper seeks the proper and efficient operation of Korea's safeguard mechanism by examining the judicial interpretation and application of the safeguard measures under the WTO Safeguard Agreement. The judicial examination is focused on the terms of "unforeseen development" in GAIT XIX, "evaluation of all relevant factors", and "clear justification of measure" in Safeguard Agreement. Such an intensive examination. of the judicial interpretation is used for the comparative analysis of the Korea's domestic provisions to find out problems in operation and the interpretative and legislative responses to them. It is found that the Korea's adaptation of the Safeguard Agreement into the domestic provisions and the operation of such provisions in the practical field have generally been consistent with the WTO's basic principles and provisions. Korea's safeguard mechanisms should stably be operated for securing the proper protection of domestic industry under certain emerging circumstances. For such policy objective to be ensured, it is legislatively required to make additional provisions in line with the appellate body's consistent interpretations of the debating issues including the term of unforeseen development.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.177-191
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• 2019

Global trade protectionism has increased further and U.S. priorities and protectionism have strengthened since Trump took office in 2017. Trump administration is actively implementing tariff measures based on U.S. domestic trade laws rather than the WTO rules and regulations. In particular, the American government has recently been imposing high tariffs due to national security and imposing economic sanctions on other countries' imports. According to the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232, the American government imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to WTO member countries such as China, India, and EU etc. on march 15, 2018. Thus, this study aims to investigate whether the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232 is consistent with GATT/WTO rules by comparing the legal basis of US / China / WTO regulations related to Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, and gives some suggestions for responding to the Section 232 measure. As the Section 232 measure exceeded the scope of GATT's Security Exceptions regulation and is very likely to be understood as a safeguard measure. If so, the American government is deemed to be in breach of WTO's regulations, such as the most-favored-nation treatment obligations and the duty reduction obligations. In addition, American government is deemed to be failed to meet the conditions of initiation of safeguard measure and violated the procedural requirements such as notification and consultation. In order to respond to these U.S. protection trade measures, all affected countries should actively use the WTO multilateral system to prevent unfair measures. Also, it is necessary to revise the standard jurisdiction of the dispute settlement body and to explore the balance of the WTO Exception clause so that it can be applied strictly. Finally, it would be necessary for Chinese exporters to take a counter-strategy under such trade pressure.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.209-227
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• 2006

This paper analyse current interpretation of the "causal link" that in particular, focuses principally on the so-called "non-attribution" requirement of Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement. The safeguard measures are justified as a temporary economic adjustment to harm that is caused by an increase in imports. The problem with this justification is that there are other kinds of economic forces that may injure domestic industries, such as changes in consumer tastes, government spending or a lack thereof, and economic downturns. These problems do not justify government-imposed remedies. When factors therefore other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports. The Appellate Body stressed that a contribution of third-party imports to the existence of serious injury must be sufficiently clear as to establish the existence of the causal link required, it found that Article 4.2(b) does not suggest that increased imports be the sole cause of the serious injury, or that other factors causing injury must be excluded from the determination of serious injury. The interest in separation is to ensure that a measure is not applied to remedy harm not caused by imports, but this basic point assumes that the harm is distinguishable in the first place. It also assumes that the safeguard is designed to respond to harm caused by imports. In fact safeguards were never intended to respond to this kind of unfair trade, but rather to provide whatever emergency relief might assist an ailing domestic industry if imports happened to be a part of that injury. The Appellate Body's insistence in breaking cause and effect down to minutia in the non-attribution analysis seems to be so overly intricate that it conflicts with it's broader focus on evaluating factors that effect harm on the industry as a whole.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.417-444
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• 2009

In October 2005, the Russian government started an investigation if safeguard measures against the importation of Korean sodium cyanide products could be taken. With Russia being a non-WTO member country, the Korean side found themselves in different situation from previous negotiation cases with developed or WTO member countries. Although several elements of trade negotiation theories such as goal setting, bargaining power, and relationship could apply, new constraints of limited information access and uncertainty of administrative procedures should be overcome. Combination of the governmental negotiation, assistance of the Russian consumer group, and the application of related laws led the Russian authority to dismiss the case. I suggest that there be some built-in channels for gathering information of non-WTO member countries.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.40 no.3
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• pp.183-190
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• 2008

Pyroprocessing is the optimal means of treating spent metal fuels from metal fast fuel reactors and is proposed as a potential option for GNEP in order to meet the requirements of the next generation fuel cycle. Currently, efforts for research and development are being made not only in the U.S., but also in Asian countries. Electrorefining, cathode processing by distillation, injection casting for fuel fabrication, and waste treatment must be verified by the use of genuine materials, and the engineering scale model of each device must be developed for commercial deployment. Pyroprocessing can be effectively extended to treat oxide fuels by applying an electrochemical reduction, for which various kinds of oxides are examined. A typical morphology change was observed following the electrochemical reduction, while the product composition was estimated through the process flow diagram. The products include much stronger radiation emitter than pure typical LWR Pu or weapon-grade Pu. Nevertheless, institutional measures are unavoidable to ensure proliferation-proof plant operations. The safeguard concept of a pyroprocessing plant was compared with that of a PUREX plant. The pyroprocessing is better adapted for a collocation system positioned with some reactors and a single processing facility rather than for a centralized reprocessing unit with a large scale throughput.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.5
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• pp.161-170
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• 2008

Despite the recent growth in size and frequency of damages caused by illegal information breaches, current business counter-measures and precautionary systems are greatly limited. Some major companies have developed Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) to safeguard their vital information; however, such measures are largely based on the ISO27001 and lacks in many aspects to grasp the holistic corporate security level and reinforce precautionary measures. The information protection level evaluation model introduced in this paper is a pragmatic evaluative tool that can be utilized to devise effective corporate information security precautionary measures and countermeasures, based on the BSC (Balanced ScoreCard) method for an actual and realistic corporate information security level evaluation possible.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.239-247
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• 2015

Cryptography aims at transmitting secure data over an unsecure network in coded version so that only the intended recipient can analyze it. Communication through messages, emails, or various other modes requires high security so as to maintain the confidentiality of the content. This paper deals with IDEA's shortcoming of generating weak keys. If these keys are used for encryption and decryption may result in the easy prediction of ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext. For applying genetic approach, which is well-known optimization technique, to the weak keys, we obtained a definite solution to convert the weaker keys to stronger ones. The chances of generating a weak key in IDEA are very rare, but if it is produced, it could lead to a huge risk of attacks being made on the key, as well as on the information. Hence, measures have been taken to safeguard the key and to ensure the privacy of information.