• 한국디지털정책학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 2006.06a
• /
• pp.113-123
• /
• 2006

The purpose of this paper is twofold; 1) to evaluate the efforts of participatory government in regulatory reform, 2) to propose the strategies and tasks for future regulatory reform in Korea. An ex-post evaluation model for regulatory performance is applied to process, output, and outcome of the regulatory reform. The results of the evaluation show that there is still room for improvement in many aspects of regulatory reform. While there has been substantial advance in regulatory quality and management, carefully planned strategies are essential for Korean regulatory reform to move to the next stage of regulatory reform. Thus, based on the evaluation, future strategies and tasks for regulatory reform are presented as short-term tasks, mid to long range tasks, and continuous tasks.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.177-207
• /
• 2009

This paper deals with the future role of Korean National Assembly in regulatory policy making, Implementation, and evaluation. For this purpose, the author developed the logic for NA's intervention to the regulatory policy making by the executive branch and presidency. Five models of regulatory initiative between National Assembly and the executive branch are also developed by the author. Lastly, new organizational alternatives for the National Assembly to initiate, to participate and to evaluate national regulatory reform policies.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.39 no.4
• /
• pp.51-68
• /
• 2017

This paper adapts the World Bank Regulatory Quality Index (RQI), which is produced annually to provide a better understanding of the effects of regulatory reforms, instead of the Production Market Regulation (PMR) indicators, which are published every five years. We find that 9.9 to 36.0 billion USD worth of regulatory cost could be reduced if the regulatory quality in Korea improves to the level of the OECD average considering that the total burden of regulation in Korea is estimated to range from 2.2 to 357.4 billion USD. The estimated reduction in the regulatory cost accounts for roughly 0.76 to 2.47% of Korea's GDP in 2013, underscoring the importance of regulatory reforms for the Korean economy. This paper introduces a new method with which to examine the distribution of regulatory costs across different industries and firm sizes. This alternative method is largely consistent with the conclusions reached by other studies, specifically that small firms typically bear a disproportionate regulatory burden.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.41 no.1
• /
• pp.187-213
• /
• 2016

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Partnership Agreement introduce "regulatory coherence." Regulatory coherence refers to "the use of good regulatory practices in the process of planning, designing, issuing, implementing and reviewing regulatory measures in order to facilitate achievement of domestic policy objectives, and in efforts across governments to enhance regulatory cooperation in order to further those objectives and promote international trade and investment, economic growth and employment." This paper traces ideas dealing with regulatory reform and regulatory transparency as discussed in OECD, APEC and selected WTO agreements, examines the text of the regulatory coherence chapter of TPP and TTIP, then examines the regulatory reform system of Korea to see whether Korea satisfies the conditions set forth in the regulatory coherence chapter of TPP. The paper concludes that the Korean regulatory reform system mostly satisfies the requirements of the TPP chapter on regulatory coherence, but some additional procedural reforms are needed for laws proposed by National Assemblymen, and regional laws proposed by regional governments. Finally, the paper notes that the Korean government has been mis-translating regulatory coherence as regulatory convergence, which is a separate idea, and the government should correct its error as soon as possible.

• Korean Journal of Remote Sensing
• /
• v.35 no.2
• /
• pp.241-250
• /
• 2019

The current U.S. remote sensing act was made in 1992 and has been criticized for being outdated and inappropriate in view of the modern technological development. In order to enhance the American competitiveness and leadership in the world, President Trump announced Space Policy Directive (SPD) - 2 on May 24, which is designed to modernize the regulations related to commercial space activities including private remote sensing system operations. It should be noted that the regulatory reform efforts are made within broader terms of the National Security Strategy on Dec. 17, 2017, pursuing the enhancement of national security and economic prosperity as well. A legislative support in Congress has also been added to the Administration's efforts. The proposed regulatory reform on the licensing of commercial remote sensing system operations outlines the features of lessening administrative burden on applicants by simplifying the overall application process and of limiting the operations only when there is an impact upon the national security with clear and convincing evidence. But, due to a different regulatory system of each country, such a movement to expand an individual's freedom to explore and utilize outer space may result in an international dispute or a violation of international obligations, so there should be a merit in paying attention to the U.S. commercial remote sensing regulatory reform, and it is desirable to establish international norms as flexible and appropriate to the level of space technology and space industry.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aeronautical & Space Sciences
• /
• v.46 no.12
• /
• pp.1056-1069
• /
• 2018

In order to promote the commercial space activities of the private sector, the Trump Administration announced the commercial space regulatory reforms by issuing the Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2) on May 24, 2018, followed by the SPD-3 dealing with a separate issue of the space traffic management on June 18. Both executive orders, based on the recommendations prepared by the National Space Council (NSC) reconstituted in June 2017 and signed by the President, involve regulatory reform policy related to launch services, commercial remote sensing, establishment of one-stop shop office in Commerce Department, radio frequency spectrum, export control, and space traffic management, providing a strong guidance to the Federal Government. The commercial space regulatory reform policy can be seen in broader terms of the National Security Strategy earlier announced on Dec. 18, 2017, and as such, it pursues the economic growth of the U.S. and the national security as well. The U.S. law and policy prioritizing its national interests by promoting commercial space activities may lead to concerns and debate on the potential breach of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Hence, it is worth noting the legal implications as derived from the U.S. space policy and domestic legislation, thereby accelerating international discussion to build on international norms as appropriate to the pr ogress of space technology and space commercialization.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.45 no.1
• /
• pp.69-86
• /
• 2023

Regulatory sentiment refers to the market's subjective evaluation of regulatory reform and is one of the most widely adopted indicators to those charged with implementing and diagnosing regulatory policies. The use of regulatory sentiment in advanced analysis has become universal, albeit it is often limited due to difficulties in articulating consistent and objective quantitative indicators that can meticulously reflect market sentiment overall. Thus, despite ample effort by scholars to read the economic impact of regulatory sentiment in the real economy, causal links are difficult to spot. To fill this gap in the literature, this study analyzes a regulatory sentiment index and economic performance indicators through a text analysis approach and by inspecting diverse tones in media articles. Using different stages of tests, the paper identifies a causal relationship between regulatory sentiment and actual economic activities as measured by private consumption, facility investment, construction investment, gross domestic investment, and employment. Additionally, as a result of analyzing one-unit impulse of regulatory perception, the initial impact on economic growth and private investment was found to be negligible; this was followed by a positive (+) response, after which it converged to zero. Construction investment showed a positive (+) response initially, which then rapidly changed to a negative (-) response and then converged to zero. Gross domestic investment as the initial effect was negligible after showing a positive (+) reaction. Unfortunately, the facility investment outcome was found to be insignificant in the impulse response test. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that it is necessary and important to increase the sensitivity to regulations to promote the economic effectiveness of regulatory reforms. Thus, instead of dealing with policies with the vague goal of merely improving regulatory sentiment, using regulatory sentiment as an indicator of major policies could be an effective approach.

• World Technopolis Review
• /
• v.4 no.2
• /
• pp.46-61
• /
• 2015

There is an implicit assumption in most regional innovation policy studies that once a policy has been made the policy will be implemented. This assumption is not valid for regional innovation policies formulated in many countries. This assumption rests upon certain political and organization conditions. It is frequently said that regional innovation system in Korea is one of the successful cases because of properly established institution for the implementation of innovation policies. The components of institution for innovation are defined in this article. For the analysis of institution for regional innovation system in Korea, three aspects such as organization, policies & programs, and governance structure were taken into account. Institution for regional innovation system in Korea is analyzed with three aspects: (1) organization for policy implementation, (2) innovation policy, and (3) governance structure. Firstly, organizations for innovation in Korea are composed of three categories such as organizations for policy formulation, organizations for policy implementation and agencies for coordination. Secondly, there are two categories of policies for innovation: (1) policies for the enhancement of national competitiveness and policies for the regional innovation capacity building, and (2) policies for fostering manpower and policy for regulatory reform. Thirdly, innovation governance in Korea is composed of three layer structure: (1) top level governance which is composed of two committee, three ministries and two agencies, (2) local level governance such as one innovation related offices and one center for regulatory reform, and (3) one category of agency for coordination as a regional platform.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
• /
• v.15 no.2
• /
• pp.145-158
• /
• 2015

There are a lot of game regulations in Korea. Each scholar has invested a game regulation. But there is no research about all the game regulations. All regulations in government should be registered in Regulatory Reform Committee. So, this study researched the all game regulation in Regulatory Reform Committee and found the present state and character of game regulation in Korea. The registered game regulations are only 22. But actually, there are 44 regulations in game field. And according to legal context, there are over 60 regulations in game field. And a lot of game regulations focus on the game addiction and gambling. The differences of regulation would influence the policy trust and government trust. This result would contribute to reform the regulation of game in Korea.

• STI Policy Review
• /
• v.4 no.1
• /
• pp.119-134
• /
• 2013

The Fukushima nuclear incident of 2011 served as an external shock that prompted Japan to reform its nuclear energy sector. The collusive relationship between the regulators within the Japanese government and the regulated power industry, as well as the lack of institutional independence of the regulatory agency, had derailed Japanese efforts to reform the sector for decades. The Fukushima crisis exposed these deeply-entrenched flaws in the system, causing public distrust and anger toward the government and the nuclear power sector. This paper discusses the institutional reform measures the Japanese government introduced in the wake of the Fukushima crisis to recover public confidence and revamp the sector to prevent future disasters. The paper also discusses the challenges the Japanese government faces on its road to a successful implementation of nuclear sector reforms.