• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

This paper is to analyse the development of the U.S.-China relationship and pending issues and implications. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the relationship between the US and China in the early and hostile confrontation period; the relationship of US-Chinese approach/normalization period and the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s; the relationship by mid-2010 since the opening of the G2 era; the US-China relations and major pending issues and implications in the era of Trump-Xi Jinping; and conclusion. The rapid growth of China over the past three decades has changed the existing US-centered international order and has triggered competition between the two countries. The United States and China have become the only countries that regularly hold strategic and economic dialogue, and the topic has also developed into a country that discusses not only bilateral relations but also global issues. The issues of US-China cooperation and conflicts encompass global issues as well as bilateral relations issues. For example, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear issue and the THAAD, the economic and financial order, and the Taiwan issue. It is not a matter of another country, but a problem that directly or indirectly leads to Korea's diplomacy, security and economy. In order to prevent 'Korea passing' in the US-China relationship, we need a hedging strategy that maintains and strengthens the strong ROK-US security cooperation and harmonious promotion of ROK-China economic cooperation.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.205-216
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• 2005

The ever-expanding Chinese economy has affected the Korean economy in many respects. So many companies, including most of major groups, has increased their economic collaborative businesses in China. Due to the sandwich situation of the economic competitiveness, many Korean companies has been seeking for the lower production costs in China, while other high-tech companies also for the prospective markets in China. Nonetheless all the Korean FDIs in China have been seriously connected with its global supply chain management. In order to promote this kind of collaboration across the border, the 4PL kind of tasks are needed. The study suggests these tasks in terms of 3 categories of Pre-Feasibility/ Business Planning, Cultural Localization, and Networking Economies/ Relationship Management. Most of all, the collaboration across the border may promote the final vision of the FTA in the Far-east Asian countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.108-152
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• 2017

This paper aims to analyze hegemonic competition and the role of naval power. To this end the paper is composed of four chapters titled introduction, the role of naval power in the hegemonic competition, the role of naval power in the East Asia, and the lessons and implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the modern era, the hegemonic competition in the East Asian region has been the intrusion and struggle process between the world system and the East Asian regional system, and the ocean between these two systems has become the goal and means of supremacy(hegemony). Currently, the hegemonic competition between the US and China consists of systemic competition at the global level and marine competition at the regional level. When South Korea is forced to make strategic choices in the course of the US-China hegemonic competition, naval power will be the first factor to be considered. The ROK is asymmetrically maintaining a deep dependency relationship with the United States in terms of security and China in relation to the economy. And while the ROK's national economic power is acquired from the ocean, the ROK's military power is imbalanced because it is centered on the ground forces. These international relations and asymmetric-unbalanced resources distribution will not be able to effectively cope with the hegemonic competition between the US and China in the future, and will limit Korea's strategic choice. Since naval power and forces are the prerequisites for the hegemonic competition or the maintenance of supremacy we must construct balanced naval forces(naval power) that are not subordinate to the ground forces at the national strategic level for the future of the country.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.205-228
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• 2024

The ASEAN and ROK have played a crucial role in fostering regional peace and economic development. Nevertheless, the recent strategic competition between the US and China has turned the region into a contested arena. The relationship faces challenges due to the ROK's growing alignment with the US, prompting a rising interest in minilateralism as an alternative collaboration model. This paper scrutinizes the impact of ROK's foreign policy behavior, with a focus on minilateralism as a preferred cooperation model with ASEAN. The study centers on BIMP-EAGA, investigating its effectiveness in sustaining collaboration amid geopolitical rivalry. The paper concludes that BIMP-EAGA, as a manifestation of minilateralism, serves as an alternative platform for ROK and ASEAN cooperation. However, the study reveals that the implementation of BIMP-EAGA falls short of expectations. This paper emphasizes the need for greater subregional focus and comprehensive coverage of BIMP-EAGA to truly reflect the shared interests of ASEAN member states.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.180-214
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• 2015

The Republic of Korea navy challenged from the unexpected surprise attacks by the North Korea navy, albeit, the developments of up-to-date naval forces' technology, and the ceaseless efforts for war preparedness. My study divided into two categories. Qualitative methods used for literature review of international relations theory related to the war onset and for investigating events occurred on the Peninsula and its surrounding seas from 1968 to 2007. Quantitative method used such as the analyses of national power index of the two Koreas, the United States, and China, the uses of equation model to calculate power index of alliance, COPDAB(Conflict and Peace Data Bank) index analysis. Like Choi's study on East Asia maritime conflict, as a conclusion, considering both AT theory and maritime national power as a tool for predicting maritime conflict in the Peninsula proved significant. Based on the study, ROK navy need to prepare for the maritime conflict because the results showed North Korea would initiate maritime disputes sooner or later using fatal asymmetric forces and methods. As a policy suggestion, we are required to maintain a concrete ROK-US alliance ties and to construct naval forces due to the deterring functions of maritime national power.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Journal of Mushroom
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.37-40
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• 2015

Genetic relationship analysis by PCR reactions with 25 primers could produce relevant classifications of the 21 P. pulmonarius (Fr) Quel. isolates collected from 2005. They were classified by two groups with similarity coefficient 0.37. All of the P. pulmonarius cultivars belonged to group 2. New cultivar 'Hwasan' presented high similarity coefficient to parental strains, and that of 'Hosan' and 'Kangsan' cultivars was very high owing to shared crossing parents, and that of two strains from China was high, as well.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.26 no.5
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• pp.39-57
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• 2005

Participants in this study of adolescents residing in differing ecological environments were 200 Korean-Chinese middle school students of Yanji, China, and 200 Korean middle school students of Gyeongbuk Province, ROK. Instruments were the Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment(Armsden & Greenberg, 1987), Social Competence Inventory(Doh & Falbo, 1999), and Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents(Harter, 1988). For Korean-Chinese adolescents, attachment with mothers directly influenced peer relationships and school adjustment; indirect influence was mediated by self-concept. For Korean adolescents, attachment influenced peer relationships and school adjustment only indirectly by self-concepts. These findings contrast with those of Choi & Lee(2005) suggesting that the socio-emotional outcome of attachment should be understood in relation to socio-cultural context as well as developmental stage.