• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.143-176
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• 2012

We are witnessing the growing maritime tension on the East Asian sea these days. Each naval powers in the region are competing each other to acquire more advanced naval capabilities. Based upon the rapid economic development, China is actively beefing up its naval capabilities and expand its boundary of naval activities all over the East Asian region. Chinese Navy already unveiled its expansive naval strategy replacing the traditional concept of 'Near-Sea Defense' with the new concept of 'Far-Sea Defense' strategy. In response to potential rival's naval build up, the U.S. is redeploying its naval forces focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. enhances its joint naval exercises with the countries in the region, such as Japan, India, Australia and so on. In addition, Washington is devising new naval strategy under the concept of 'Air-Sea Battle' to deter Peking's so-called 'Anti-Access/ Area Denial(A2AD)' strategy. As a close ally of the U.S., Japan also disclosed its clear intention to strengthen the Maritime Self Defense Force(MSDF)'s capabilities by introducing the new concept of 'Dynamic Defense Force' in 2011. Under the new concept, JMSDF is pursuing the additional acquisition of submarines, quasi-aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped destroyers, etc. Under the new president's strong leadership, Russia is also invigorating the naval build-up. Especially, Russia is fortifying the Pacific Fleet's naval assets by deploying new-type of naval ships such as the Mistral which was imported from France. In the midst of competitive naval build-up among the major naval powers in the region, we are observing the growing maritime conflicts on the East China Sea as well as South China Sea. Those naval conflicts can pose severe threats to our national interests. Maritime conflicts on the East or South China Sea can imperil our sea lanes which will be indispensible for national economic development. Neighboring countries' maritime conflicts also will cast an uncertainty on the path to mobilize international cooperation to resolve the North Korean issues. We should contribute to ease the maritime tension in the region by various ways. First, we should actively galvanize the bilateral maritime dialogue among the major naval powers in the region. Second, we also should take the lead to form a multilateral maritime cooperation mechanism in the region. Above all, we should set the aim to be a peaceful maritime power who can contribute to a building of stable maritime order in the region with a considerable naval power.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.35-42
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• 2017

본 연구에서는 중국의 해양정책과 전략을 구현하고 특히, 동아시아 국가들이 주장하는 해양 주권과 관할권이 중첩된 해역에서 주변국과의 해양 갈등.분쟁 시 자국의 항공력을 투사하기 위하여 중국방공식별구역(CADIZ)을 설정하고 운영하고 있는 중국의 의도를 분석한다. 또한 이러한 중국의 의도에 선제적으로 대응하고 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)을 실효적으로 관리하기 위해 군사력 증강, 제주 항공기지 건설, 현(現) KADIZ 확장 등 다양한 측면에서 우리의 대응방안을 제시하고자 한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.150-179
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• 2015

This thesis analyzes Somali piracy as a non-traditional threat to the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and international countermeasures to the piracy. In an era of globally interdependent economies, the protection of sea lines and freedom of navigation are prerequisites for the development of states. Since the post-Cold War began in the early 1990s, ocean piracy has emerged as a significant threat to international trade. For instance, in the Malacca Strait which carries 30 percent of the world's trade volume, losses from failed shipping, insurance, plus other subsequent damages were enormous. Until the mid-2000s, navies and coast guards from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, together with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), conducted anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca. The combined efforts of these three maritime states, through information sharing and with reinforced assets including warships and patrol aircrafts, have successfully made a dent to lower incidents of piracy. Likewise, the United Nations' authorization of multinational forces to operate in Somali waters has pushed interdiction efforts including patrol and escort flotilla support. This along with self-reinforced security measures has successfully helped lower piracy from 75 incidents in 2012 to 15 in 2013. As illustrated, Somali piracy is a direct security threat to the international community and the SLOC which calls for global peacekeeping as a countermeasure. Reconstructing the economy and society to support public safety and stability should be the priority solution. Emphasis should be placed on restoring public peace and jurisdiction for control of piracy as a primary countermeasure.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.154-195
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• 2017

This paper is to analyse conflict between the US and China over the South China Sea and Korea's responses. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the current status of South China Sea sovereignty disputes; changes in US and Chinese maritime security strategies and the strategic values of the South China Sea; key issues and future prospects for US-China conflicts in the South China Sea; South Korea's security and diplomatic responses; and conclusion. The recent East Asian maritime security issue has evolved into a global issue of supremacy between the US and China, beyond conflicts over territorial disputes and demarcation among the countries in the region. China is pursuing offensive ocean policy to expand economic growth. The core of the maritime order that the United States intends to pursue is the freedom of navigation in the oceans and the maintenance of maritime access. China is making artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the sovereignty of these islands, building strategic bases in East Asia, and securing routes. The United States has developed several "Freedom of Navigation Operations" to neutralize the declaration of the territorial sea surrounding Chinese artificial islands. We can not be free from marine conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is expected that the strategic competition and conflict between the two countries will intensify due to China's failure to make concessions of core interests and adherence to the US compliance with international norms. In the midst of conflict over the South China Sea, we need a harmonious balance between our alliance security and economic diplomacy. We must continue our efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance but not to make China an enemy. Considering the significant impacts of the oceans on the survival and prosperity of the nation, we must continue to develop our interest in the oceans, appropriate investments and tactical strategies.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제15권2호
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• pp.147-159
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• 1989

This paper presents a formalized methodology for conducting cost-effectiveness analysis on the ROK Navy's maritime patrol aircraft. The methodology involves a Delphi method application for determining the group of appraisal variables as well as their weight values in the area of aircraft effectiveness analysis, Life-cycle costing was employed to produce cost in terms of present worth values of all costs that occur over the common 20-year life cycle. A wide range of experts was selected so that their opinions could be effectively collected and synthesized to form the framework of the effectiveness model. Such a model development strategy provides easy acceptance of the analysis result and assure fairness of the analysis.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.163-192
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• 2015

This study is intended for the Maritime Boundaries(Baseline) of the Unified Korea. According to the international law, North-Korea is recognized as a nation. Then with unification, the state succession will be a very important issue. Thus we should seek for the expected problems and counter-measures, by analyzing of the State-succession. There is a conflict of the positive or negative reaction about the state succession. However, in general, 'the principle of continuity' has been applied for at the national border treaty, regardless of the type of State succession. This can be found on Article 11 & 12 of the 「1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties」, Article 62, paragraph 2 of the 「1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties」, and a series of international case law. Currently it is being understood as customary international law. In summary, although South and North Korea, China, Russia and Japan are not the parties of 「1978 Vienna Convention」, the unified Korea will necessarily have a duty to succeed national boundaries(also, maritime baseline) of North Korea. Specifically, we have an objective and rigorous review of the treaty of maritime baseline that is signed between North Korea and neighboring countries, such as 「National Border Treaty Regime between North Korea and China」 and 「Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic people's Republic of Korea on the Demarcation of the Soviet-Korea National Border」. Also, we analyzed 'Historical Bays' and 'Straight Baseline' system. By this, we are able to occupy a favorable position when renegotiating with neighboring countries, at the point of unification.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.1-8
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• 2016

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the development of North Korea's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM), and its influence on South Korea's maritime strategy. While research studies on North Korea's ballistic-missile capabilities and South Korea's ballistic-missile defense systems are proliferating, less analytical attention has been given to the way that the strengthening of North Korea's ballistic-missile capacities presents a critical threat to the ROK's navy and lines of communication. The authors of this paper identify the continuing development of unique ASBM capabilities by China and Iran, and determine that such processes are mutually interactive and in accordance with threat perceptions; furthermore, North Korea can enact the same process by learning lessons from these nations. The findings of this paper provide an implication for the formulation of South Korea's maritime strategy and the related assets in consideration of the ASBM as a future threat.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

• 해양안보
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.125-149
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• 2021

후쿠시마 원전 사고가 일어난 지 10년이 지난 지금까지도 일본은 매일 생성되는 원전 오염수 문제를 해결하지 못하고 있다. 그들은 오염수 저장탱크가 한계에 다다를 것으로 예상되자, 안전성에 관한 한국의 우려에도 일방적으로 원전 오염수를 해양에 방출하기로 했다. 문제는 한국의 대응에도 불구하고, 여전히 일본이 『유엔해양법협약』상 의무를 성실히 이행하지 않은 채 해양 방출을 준비하고 있다는 데 있다. 원전 오염수의 방사성물질로 인한 해양오염은 물론, 한국의 해양주권 침탈까지도 우려되는 상황이다. 특히 한번 환경이 오염되기 시작하면 본래의 상태로 되돌리기 어렵기에, 당장 안전성이 보장되지 않는 한 원전 오염수의 해양 방출은 반드시 막아야 한다. 본 논문은 일본과 한국이 원전 오염수 해양 방출 사안으로 빚은 갈등을 해결하기 위한 한국의 대응 전략을 제안한다. 한국은 일본과의 협력, 잠정조치, 주변국과의 공조를 통해 다양한 측면에서 일본의 원전 오염수 해양 방출에 대응해야 할 것이다.