• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.11b
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• pp.378-380
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• 2002

It is required to develop a rational transmission pricing methodology to ensure the fair participation of the player in the market. Because of economic efficiency, marginal pricing method has been studied to be applied to transmission pricing methodology. In application of marginal pricing method to transmission pricing, revenue reconciliation must be needed to recover Transco's revenue requirements. This paper presents a reconciliation method based on line's value to transmission service user.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.93-124
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• 2011

The introduction of competition in the generation of electricity has raised the fundamental question of whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the capacity needed to maintain system reliability. Capacity mechanisms are adopted around the world to guarantee appropriate level of investment in electricity generation capacity. In this study, we discuss these approaches and analyze the capacity pricing mechanisms from the adequacy perspective. We conclude that the design of capacity mechanism is very important to decrease electricity spot price and increase total electric capacity. Specifically, the constant of capacity pricing mechanism made a difference to the performance of electricity market. However, the slope of capacity price mechanism is better than the constant of that in improving performance of electricity market.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.257-274
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• 2012

Since service competition among global supply chains became intensified, market-oriented system, instead of the existing cost-based system, for port service pricing has been strongly recommended in order to enhance their long-term viability and competitiveness. The Owen value of cooperative game frameworks allows us to apply a market-oriented pricing theory for the port pricing in the case of Gwangyang port to verify its usefulness. The analytical results of this paper suggested some solutions in the problem of berth-based cost allocation by a characteristic function and also showed the proper relative weights of factors to derive the quay use index by Budescu(1993). We also suggested a favorable port pricing system to major shipping firms as well as a discount port pricing system for their strategic alliance. To put it differently, the results of this study enable the port managers to make out some strategic port pricing system like the reasonable discount in port charge for the larger ship owners using the ports frequently.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.49-54
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• 2009

One of the major challenges confronting a multiservice electric utility is the establishment of the right prices for its services. The key objectives of particular pricing schemes are reasonableness of company earnings, economic efficiency, the responsiveness of supply and of the allocation of sources to the desires of consumers, and maintenance of some degree of competition. This paper proposes a value-based pricing mechanism amenable to the current deregulation situation in electricity market allowing service differentiation. The proposed pricing mechanism can be implemented in a nodal auction model, and can also be applied to direct load control.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.2
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• pp.111-120
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• 2004

This paper presents an application of Unified Modeling Language(UML) software technique for developing transmission pricing evaluation package. Also, this paper describes a transmission pricing algorithm applicable to a large-scale power system. The usage-based transmission pricing mechanism is very complex since it requires power flow analysis, fault current analysis, sensitivity evaluation of a transmission line, penalty factors calculation, transmission asset databases, and cost allocation rules, etc. For the efficient and flexible development of the transmission pricing package, a UML. approach is applied, which is composed of a use-case diagram, interaction diagram, class diagram, and package diagram using Rational Rose Unified Process(RUP). The designed transmission pricing package can be efficiently modified and reused as the market environments evolves since it is designed by Object-Oriented Programming(OOP).

• Food Science and Industry
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• v.50 no.4
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• pp.2-11
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• 2017

The external factors of global flavor market include the world economy, population growth, urbanization, consumer spending, raw material availability, pricing, and regulatory issues. And the internal factors as product pricing and technology development may lie the flavor house's competitiveness and cost considerations. In developing countries, rising preference for packaged food and beverages and increasing personal expenditures will drive demand for flavor market. Increasing consumer demand for natural products, driven in part by health concerns and a desire for transparency in labeling will impact the demand. The increasing demand for salt and sugar reduction will boost demand for flavors to maintain the overall taste. The use of quality and innovative flavors in the beverages and the multifunctional flavors has a positive influence on the global market. The global flavor industry has the presence of several drivers and positive trends, with its future expected to be promising.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Journal of the Korean Statistical Society
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• v.36 no.2
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• pp.237-256
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• 2007

This paper studies the problem of option pricing in an incomplete market. The market incompleteness comes from the discontinuity of the underlying asset price process which is, in particular, assumed to be a compound Poisson process. To find a reasonable price for a European contingent claim, we first find the unique minimal martingale measure and get a price by taking an expectation of the payoff under this measure. To get a closed-form price, we use an asymptotic expansion. In case where the minimal martingale measure is a signed measure, we use a sequence of martingale measures (probability measures) that converges to the equivalent martingale measure in the limit to compute the price. Again, we get a closed form of asymptotic option price. It is the Black-Scholes price and a correction term, when the distribution of the return process has nonzero skewness up to the first order.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.8 no.6
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• pp.65-74
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• 2008

The aim is to get comprehensive view point for the price of apartment. Apartment construction cost is the sun of land cost and building cost. Land price reflects the value of location where building stands. When the gap between price and affordability is narrow enough, effective demand promote apartment construction. The today's trends of rising price, which began in apartment housing, spreads to real estates market and finally overall consumer price. Problem is that price is decided only by supplier's interest. Equilibrium-pricing is common process in housing market. However it is important to review hedonic price and the factor of housing services and focused on the affordability of demanders. AHP analysis was used to study real needs and preference of demanders and dealt with 200 interviewees with brief checklists. We found that social factor is more important than building cost or site development. Especially location of apartment is most important to affect environment quality and accessibility to facilities.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.60 no.2
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• pp.266-272
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• 2011

Real Time Pricing(RTP) is used not only to stabilize the price volatility in electricity market, but to hedge the price risk for Load Serving Entity(LSE). This paper presents an efficient method to reduce the risk of the price volatility in real-time electricity market. For designing the RTP, load patterns of customer are calculated by applying the demand elasticity and customer's utility is also analyzed to compute the RTP revenue through the risk-attribute of the LSE. In the end, the distribution of the LSE's profits can be evaluated to lead the optimal RTP value, depending on the level of customer's participation. Results from the case study based on PJM data are reported to illustrate the proposed method.