• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 1996.10b
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• pp.1296-1299
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• 1996

This paper proposes a design automation method for the flight control system of an aircraft based on optimization. The control system design problem which has many specifications is formulated as multi-objective optimization problem. The solution of this optimization problem should be considered in terms of Pareto-optimality. In this paper, we use an evolutionary algorithm providing numerous Pareto-optimal solutions. These solutions are given to a control system designer and the most suitable solution is selected. This method decreases tasks required to determine the control parameters satisfying all specifications. The design automation of a flight control system is illustrated through an example.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.17-30
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• 2021

At present, multiple input multiple output radars offer accurate target detection and better target parameter estimation with higher resolution in high-speed wireless communication systems. This study focuses primarily on power allocation to improve the performance of radars owing to the sparsity of targets in the spatial velocity domain. First, the radars are clustered using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. Next, cooperative and noncooperative clusters are extracted based on the distance measured using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. The power is allocated to cooperative clusters using the Pareto optimality particle swarm optimization algorithm. In addition, the Nash equilibrium particle swarm optimization algorithm is used for allocating power in the noncooperative clusters. The process of allocating power to cooperative and noncooperative clusters reduces the overall transmission power of the radars. In the experimental section, the proposed method obtained the power consumption of 0.014 to 0.0119 at K = 2, M = 3 and K = 2, M = 3, which is better compared to the existing methodologies-generalized Nash game and cooperative and noncooperative game theory.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.55-75
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• 1986

This article is to analyse the economic efficiency of capital market, which plays a role of resource allocation in terms of financial claims such as stock and bond. It provides various contributions to the welfare theoretical aspects of modern capital market theory. The key feature that distinguishes the theory described here from traditional welfare theory is the presence of uncertainty. Securities has time dimensions and the state and outcome of the future are really uncertain. This problem resulting from this uncertainty can be solved by complete market, but it has a weak power to explain real stock market. Capital Market is faced with the uncertainity because it is a kind of incomplete market. Individuals and firms in capital market made their consumption-investment decision by their own criteria, i. e. the maximization of expected utility form intertemporal consumption and the maximization of the market value of firm. We noted that allocative decisions that had to be made in the economy could be naturally subdivided into two groups. One set of decisions concerned the allocation of first-period resources among consumption $C_i$, investment in risky firms $I_j$, and riskless investment M. The other decisions concern the distribution among individuals of income available in the second period $Y_i(\theta)$. Corresponing to this grouping, the theoretical analysis of efficiency has also been dichotomized. The optimality of the distribution of output in the second period is distributive efficiency" and the optimality of the allocation of first-period resources is 'the efficiency of investment'. We have found in the distributive efficiency that the conditions for attainability is the same as the conditions for market optimality. The necessary and sufficient conditions for attainability or market optimality is that (1) all utility functions are such that -$\frac{{U_i}^'(Y_i)}{{U_i}^"(Y_i)}={\mu}_i+{\lambda}Y_i$-linear risk tolerance function where the coefficients ${\mu}_i$ and $\lambda$ are independent of $Y_i$, and (2) there are homogeneous expectations, i. e. ${\Large f}_i(\theta)={\Large f}(\theta)$ for every i. On the other hand, the efficiency of investment has disagreement about optimal investment level. The investment level for market rule will not generally lead to Pareto-optimal allocation of investment. This suboptimality is caused by (1)the difference of Diamond's decomposable production function and mean-variance valuation model and (2) the selection of exelusive investment or competitive investment. In conclusion, this article has made an analysis of conditions and processes of Pareto-optimal allocation of resources in capital marker and tried to connect with significant issues in modern finance.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.220-227
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• 2018

The cooperative game theory consists of a set of players and utility function that has positive values for a subset of players, called coalition, in the game. The purpose of cost allocation method is to allocate the relevant cost among game players in a fair and rational way. Therefore, cost allocation method based on cooperative game theory has been applied in many areas for fair and reasonable cost allocation. On the other hand, the desirable characteristics of the cost allocation method are Pareto optimality, rationality, and marginality. Pareto optimality means that costs are entirely paid by participating players. Rationality means that by joining the grand coalition, players do not pay more than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of players. Marginality means that players are charged at least enough to cover their marginal costs. If these characteristics are all met, the solution of cost allocation method exists in the core. In this study, proportional method is applied to EOQ inventory game and EPQ inventory game with shortage. Proportional method is a method that allocates costs proportionally to a certain allocator. This method has been applied to a variety of problems because of its convenience and simple calculations. However, depending on what the allocator is used for, the proportional method has a weakness that its solution may not exist in the core. Three allocators such as demand, marginal cost, and cost are considered. We prove that the solution of the proportional method to demand and the proportional method to marginal cost for EOQ game and EPQ game with shortage is in the core. The counterexample also shows that the solution of the proportional method to cost does not exist in the core.

• Journal of Ocean Engineering and Technology
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.404-410
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• 2014

The purpose of this study was to find the optimal arrangement of FPSO equipment in a module while considering the economic value and fire risk. We estimated the economic value using the pipe connections and pump installation cost in an HP (high pressure) gas compression module. The equipment risks were also analyzed using fire scenarios based on historical data. To consider the wind effect during a fire accident, fuzzy modeling was applied to improve the accuracy of the analysis. The objective functions consisted of the economic value and fire risk, and the constraints were the equipment maintenance and weight balance of the module. We generated a Pareto-optimal front group using a multi-objective GA (genetic algorithm) and suggested an equipment arrangement method that included the opinions of the designer.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.312-316
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• 2010

In this paper, we propose a game theoretic channel sharing model that allocates resources of a base station between MNO(Mobile Network Operator) and MVNO(Mobile Virtual Network Operator) in a fair and efficient manner. Considering the input traffic loads of MNO and MVNO, the proposed model uses the bargaining game theory to allocate channel resources between MNO and MNVO. When the input loads of the carriers are asymmetric, the proposed model increases the resource utilization by allocating more channel resources to the operator with high input load. In addition, the proposed model prevents the quality of service of an operator from degrading even if the input load of the other operators increases excessively.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.66-71
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• 2007

To adapt environment changing high speed and improve rapidly response ability for variation of environment and reduce delay time of decision making inlet agents, the derivation of user's preference and alternative are required. In this paper, we propose an efficient coordination method of multi-agents based on fuzzy decision making with the solution proposed by agents in the view of Pareto optimality. Our method generates the optimal alternative by using weighted value. We compute importance of attributes of winner agent, then can obtain the priorities lot attributes. The result of our method is analyzed that of Yager's method.

• IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.50-64
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• 2012

Quality of Service (QoS) and fairness considerations are undoubtedly essential parameters that need to be considered in the design of next generation scheduling algorithms. This work presents a novel game theoretic cross-layer design that offers optimal allocation of wireless resources to heterogeneous services in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) networks. The method is based on the Axioms of the Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (S-NBS) concept used in cooperative game theory that provides Pareto optimality and symmetrically fair resource distribution. The proposed strategies are determined via convex optimization based on a new solution methodology and by the transformation of the subcarrier indexes by means of time-sharing. Simulation comparisons to relevant schemes in the literature show that the proposed design can be successfully employed to typify ideal resource allocation for next-generation broadband wireless systems by providing enhanced performance in terms of queuing delay, fairness provisions, QoS support, and power consumption, as well as a comparable total throughput.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.52-63
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• 2017

The inventory level of concurrent spare parts (CSP) has a significant impact on the availability of a weapon system. A failure rate function might be of particular importance in deciding the CSP inventory level. We developed a CSP optimization model which provides a compromise between purchase costs and shortage costs on the basis of the Weibull and the exponential failure rate functions, assuming that a failure occurs according to the (non-) homogeneous Poisson process. Computational experiments using the data obtained from the Korean Navy identified that, throughout the initial provisioning period, the optimization model using the exponential failure rate tended to overestimate the optimal CSP level, leading to higher purchase costs than the one using the Weibull failure rate. A Pareto optimality was conducted to find an optimal combination of these two failure rate functions as input parameters to the model, and this provides a practical solution for logistics managers.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.04a
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• pp.240-242
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• 2007

The game theoretic analysis in wireless networks can be classified into the jamming game of the physical layer, the multiple access game of the medium access layer, the forwarder's dilemma and joint packet forwarding game of the network layer, and etc. In this paper, the game theoretic analysis about the multiple access game that selfish nodes exist in the IEEE 802.11 DCF(Distributed Coordination Function) wireless networks is addressed. In this' wireless networks, the modeling of the CSMA/CA protocol based DCF, the utility or payoff function calculation of the game, the system optimization (using optimization theory or convex optimization), and selection of Pareto-optimality and Nash Equilibrium in game strategies are the important elements for analyzing how nodes are operated in the steady state of system. Finally, the main issues about the game theory in the wireless network are introduced.