• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.795-804
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• 2006

Most internet auction sites open to users the bid history with the ascending order of bid amounts. Whereas eBay.com presents second bid prices, auction.co.kr provides highest bid prices. In this paper, the bidhistory is arranged according to the passage of tim, which can help to understand the situations and trends of bid prices, especially for multiple auctions. This manipulated data can be visualized by using profile plots. The successful bid prices could be estimated based on some prediction models with appropriate prior informations. Both sellers and bidders can be provided useful informations with these statistical analyses, and then fair online auctions in Korea will grow actively and rapidly.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.133-148
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• 2009

This study has tried to suggest a new model that can effectively redistribute the tickets in the online ticket resale market, while suggesting a new allocation mechanism based on an agent negotiation. To this end, this study has analyzed an auction in the online ticket resale market through Game theory. As a result of new agent mechanism, it has been proved that the price stability of ticket resale market leads to an increase. An agent negotiation helps to stabilize the ticket prices that are usually inclined to rise at auction, benefiting all the participants in the negotiations, consequently showing a Pareto solution. Especially, a framework for a negotiation process is suggested and domain and processes ontology are designed interrelatedly. With this modeling, a possibility of Ontology based agent negotiation is suggested.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2009.05a
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• pp.827-834
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• 2009

In respond to the demand of an open, fair, transparent, and efficient environment for procurement, many governments have incorporated the use of internet in their procurement systems with online procurement (e-procurement). Given the different policies and laws which have to be complied with, the practice of government e-procurement system varies from one country to another. Thus, experiences in running e-procurement will vary as well. The achievements and obstacles of one country's experience will be a constructive reference for other countries in establishing e-procurement system. In this regard, government e-procurement system practices in two Southeast Asia countries i.e., Thailand and Indonesia particularly in public works are consecutively presented and finally compared in this paper. The government of Thailand has applied Online Auctions (e-Auctions) as the national procurement practice since 2005 and performed the e-Auctions in two types: Reverse Auction and Sealed Bid Auction. Contrary to the common practice of e-procurement, the Thai government, with some rationales, runs the bid documents obtaining manually as well as qualification and technical documents submission and holding the e-Auctions at bidding office. Whereas Indonesian government runs Online Sealed Bid Bidding (e-Procurement) and most of the bidding stages are performed electronically except bid evaluation for both technical and financial. The advantages and drawbacks of these two e-procurement practices are discussed as well as improvements that have to be made for successful of e-procurement.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.19-33
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• 2007

The current advance of IT and the e-commerce triggers the wide practice of dynamic pricing in all industries although the price discrimination has been very cautiously applied in the limited areas in the past. The price discrimination which offers different prices for each customer depending on their preference and buying behaviors has recently gained attention as it could provide superior benefits to sellers. The wide adoption of price discrimination, on the other hand, is reported to face buyer resistances and complaints. Our limited understanding on the perception of price fairness, which we think is key concept in the price discrimination on the Internet-enabled transactions, motives us to investigate factors that affect the perception of price fairness. This study focuses on illusion of control and lateral customer relationship to investigate their effects on price fairness in online auction and group purchase context. By conducting laboratory experiments, our study demonstrates that customers' perception on illusion of control in price determination and advantageous lateral customer relationship significantly affect price fairness perception in both online auction and group purchase environment. The findings are expected to provide researchers and managers with useful insights to develop better pricing strategies and design effective dynamic pricing mechanisms.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.33-43
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• 2021

Purpose: This study aims to verify sellers' economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing negative information in online markets and provide practical guidelines to online sellers in terms of whether, when, and how sharing low quality to buyers increase sales. Research design, data and methodology: Our model examines the number of bidders in Internet auctions to measure potential demand and uses count data analysis following previous studies that have also analyzed the number of bidders in auctions. After checking over-dispersion and zero-inflation in our data, we have run a Poisson regression to analyze the effect of sharing negative information on sales. Results: This study presents a counterintuitive result that low-quality sellers can increase their demand by fully disclosing negative information in an online market, if appropriate risk-reducing methods are employed. Our finding thus shows that there exists economic incentive for online sellers to voluntarily disclose negative information about their products, and that the context of transactions may affect this incentive structure as the incentive varies across product categories. Conclusions: As the positive impact of disclosing negative information has rarely been studied so far, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a unique empirical analysis on the impact of sellers' honesty on sales. By verifying economic incentives of disclosing low quality with actual online sales data, this study suggests practical implications on information disclosure strategy to many online sellers dealing with negative information.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2009.04a
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• pp.473-476
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• 2009

미술품 시장의 발전과 함께 미술품 경매가 보다 대중화되고 있다. 그러나 기존의 미술품 경매는 불투명한 가격 결정 등 여러 문제점을 노출하여 시장의 발전에 걸림돌이 되고 있는 것도 사실이다. 본 논문은, 기존의 미술품 경매 방식을 개선하여, 투명한 시장 가격의 형성과 미술품 시장의 발전에 기여할 수 있는 온라인 미술품 경매 시스템을 구현하였다.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.143-154
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• 2008

This study has tried to suggest a new model that can effectively redistribute the tickets in the online ticket resale market, while suggesting a new allocation mechanism based on an agent negotiation. To this end, this study has analyzed and simulated the secondary ticket market through System dynamics. As a result of these simulations, it has been proved that the price stability of ticket resale market leads to an increase in revenue. An agent negotiation helps to stabilize the ticket prices that are usually inclined to rise at auction, benefiting all the participants in the negotiations, consequently showing a Pareto solution.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.144-170
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• 2010

This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is 75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher. When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ(Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data. In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference. By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference. In case of PPP(Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%. In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.147-163
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• 2004

For the purchase of a cheaper product on the Internet, many customers have been trying to search online shopping mall sites and visit comparison-pricing shops that compare prices and other criteria of the product. Others have been participating into online auction markets or group-buying markets. However, a lot of online shopping malls, auction markets, and group-buying markets provide the same product with different prices. Since these marketplaces have different price settlement mechanism, it is very difficult for the customers to determine marketplace to purchase, considering different kinds of marketplaces at the same time. To overcome such limitations, decision rules and solution procedures for purchase decision making are necessary, which can cover multiple marketplaces simultaneously. For this purpose, purchase decision making in each market must be conducted to maximize customer's utility, and conflicts with other marketplaces must be resolved. Therefore, we have developed the rules and methods that can negotiate cooperatively the purchase decision making in several marketplaces, and designed an architecture of Intelligent Buyer Agent and a message structure to support the idea.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.1115-1122
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• 2015

In recent years, the use of game bots by illegal programs has been expanded from individual to group scale; this brings about serious problems in online game industry. The gold farmers group creates an in-game social community so-called "guild" to obtain a large amount of game money and manage game bots efficiently. Although game developers detect game bots by detection algorithms, the algorithms can detect only part of the gold farmers group. In this paper, we propose a detection method for the gold farmers group on a basis of normal and bot guilds characteristic analysis. In order to differentiate normal and bots guild, we analyze transaction patterns for individuals, auction house and chatting. With the analyzed results, we can detect game bot guilds. We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methods with real datasets from one of the popular online games named AION in Korea.