• Proceedings of the Korea Society of Information Technology Applications Conference
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• 2005.11a
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• pp.247-250
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• 2005

Recently, a concept of bid-rigging is issued in electronic auction. To prevent this attack, Abe-Suzuki proposed firstly receipt-free scheme based on bidding-booth. Chen-Lee-Kim pointed out that Abe-Suzuki's scheme only provides receipt-freeness for losing bidders. Also, they introduced a new receipt-free sealed bid auction scheme using the homomorphic encryption technique. The main participants of their scheme are Auctioneer, Auction Issuer, Bidder and Seller. Bid-rigging can happen by a seller in their scheme. We propose receipt-free sealed-bid auction scheme using a universal re-encryption mixnet. For our receipt-free sealed-bid auction, we use Pseudo ID of a bidder and universal re-encryption technique of Golle et al. Also, our scheme satisfies privacy, correctness, public verifiability, non-reputation, and receipt-freeness.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.23-31
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• 2024

This study highlights the importance of understanding the fair bidding behavior of bid practitioners in order to eliminate bid-rigging, which has a detrimental impact on the construction industry and the overall economy. The research collected survey data from bid practitioners in the Daegu and Gyeongbuk regions of South Korea and analyzed the causal relationships between attitudes towards bid-rigging, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and the intention to engage in fair bidding using PLS-SEM analysis. The analysis results confirm that attitudes towards bid-rigging and perceived behavioral control are significant variables predicting the intention to engage in fair bidding among bid practitioners. This indicates that bid practitioners' perceptions of bid-rigging and personal behavioral control influence their willingness and actions towards fair bidding. The insights gained from this research provide valuable insights into bid practitioners' behavioral changes and can aid in the development of policies and measures to promote fair bidding and prevent bid-rigging.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.12-20
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• 2020

To estimate collusion effects on bid award in Public Construction works, this paper uses Logit Model, which is a choice variable model. Price, design, competition, and other factors are included, with a special focus on collusion, as independent variables in the model. The empirical results are as follows. First, collusion has little effects on bid award, but great impacts on bidding behavior. Secondly, the score of design is the most important and significant factors among all variables. Thirdly, competition has also significant effects on bid award. Finally it is analyzed that institutional framework and characteristics of public work have some effects on bidding award.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2015.05a
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• pp.111-112
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• 2015

Garak Market Modernization Project Phase 1, which is the public projects worth 1,75 billion won, was delivered by adopting modifiable bid of BOQ on the lowest price award system. The modifiable bid of BOQ system allows bidders to modify quantities based on their own drawings and construction specifications and requirements. It was initiated by the government for minimizing design error and for inducing technical competition between tenders by checking errors. At that time the bidding, it allowed modifying the BOQ all the works. In the construction phase, the responsibility for the design changes, due to mistakes and omissions on design documents and BOQ were disputed between the owner and the contractors. This study analyzed the problem of the system and addressed a need of improvement.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.1053-1061
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• 2017

The study is concerned with providing the improvement method on making a reasonable and scientific decision on the damages accrued from the bid rigging in the construction work. According to the review on the precedent studies and decision cases on the damages caused by bid rigging, the representative problems include the insufficiency of the classification system on the damage calculation method and the omission of the necessary stage in the damage determination process. First, the improved classification system on calculating the damages caused by bid rigging is presented with the application to the bid rigging in the construction work by adding the ratio factor in addition to the damage calculation parameters such as price and cost. Second, the standard procedures organized with six stages is presented as the process required for determining the damages if the indemnification for bid rigging is claimed. The study becomes the foundation for resolving the problem with the undue burden on a party and for preventing the opportunity loss by resolving a dispute early through the improvement classification system and standard procedures presented in the study.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.61-93
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• 2014

This paper analyzes Onbid car auction data by employing various methods, including structural estimation, to identify main factors which decides auction prices and figure out what effects those factors are making on the auction price. I then discuss on how to maximize sellers' revenue in OnBid car auctions. The government and public institutes sell their assets through the OnBid auction, hence the optimal design of the OnBid auction is important. The paper's main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) The independent private value model explains OnBid car auction data better than the correlated private value model or the interdependent value model; (ⅱ) Both the number of bidders and the ratios of the auction price to the evaluation value were lower in the auctions posted by the Kamco than auctions by institutes other than the Kamco; (ⅲ) Some auctions require that at least two bidders should submit a bid no less than the reserve price for sale. In those auctions, both the number of bidders and each bidder's valuation on the auctioned object were lower than in auctions without that requirement; (ⅳ) The sum of sellers' revenue would be decreased in the simulation with the reserve price higher by 5%, 10%, and 20% across auctions by institutes other than Kamco.

• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.61 no.5
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• pp.875-898
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• 2024

This study estimates the true price of an asset and finds the optimal bid/ask prices for market makers. We provide a novel state-space model based on the exponential Ornstein-Uhlenbeck volatility and the Heston models with Gaussian noise, where the traded price and volume are available, but the true price is not observable. An objective of this study is to use Bayesian filtering to estimate the posterior distribution of the true price, given the traded price and volume. Because the posterior density is intractable, we employ the guided particle filtering algorithm, with which adaptive rejection metropolis sampling is used to generate samples from the density function of an unknown distribution. Given a simulated sample path, the posterior expectation of the true price outperforms the traded price in estimating the true price in terms of both the mean absolute error and root-mean-square error metrics. Another objective is to determine the optimal bid/ask prices for a market maker. The profit-and-loss of the market maker is the difference between the true price and its bid/ask prices multiplied by the traded volume or bid/ask size of the market maker. The market maker maximizes the expected utility of the PnL under the posterior distribution. We numerically calculate the optimal bid/ask prices using the Monte Carlo method, finding that its spread widens as the market maker becomes more risk-averse, and the bid/ask size and the level of uncertainty increase.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2022.06a
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• pp.238-244
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• 2022

Civil projects are associated with many uncertainties because they involve a long duration, many resources, a large area, and many supply chains. Therefore, the price of a civil project is not simply proportional to the quantity and unit price of the item but has a variable value, including uncertainty risk. This study investigates the influence of the uncertainty factors in the pre-bid clarification document on bid price formation during the project bidding phase. To this end, civil projects from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) were used as research data. This study randomly selected fifty sample data from each of twelve counties from 2008-to 2020: six hundred. The authors observed that each project sample had 0 to n query cases due to uncertainty. Then, this study examined the project uncertainty cases and categorized them into the following four uncertainty factors: 'conflict' (UF1), 'impossibility' (UF2), 'lack' (UF3), and 'missing' (UF4). Under the extracting process, the cases are classified into four uncertainty factors. With the project not containing any uncertainty factors as a control group, the project containing these uncertainty factors was designated as an experimental group. After comparing the bidder's price, the experimental group's bid price was higher than the control group's. This result suggests that uncertainty factors in bid documents induce bidders to set a high bid price as a defense against uncertainty.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.213-230
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• 2022

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to find out any potential factors for explanatory variables when calculating the virtual successful bid rate in case of no collusion. Design/methodology/approach - An empirical analysis was conducted in this study with a regression analysis that included 725 bid samples under the public construction technical type bidding. Findings - The result of the basic analysis showed that there are several factors affecting the successful bid rate. First, collusion variable; second, government variable; third, successful bidder design score variable and the number of bidder variable among bidding features; fourth, turnkey variable based on the alternative method; fifth, civil works variable and plant works variable based on building work; sixth, asset variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable. However, the technical proposal method variable among bidding features was found to be statistically insignificant in column(4). Research implications or Originality - The significance of this research is that new variable such as the government variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable were added in the regression model, which showed statistically significant research results.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.682-700
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• 2012

Over the last several years, Korea has increasingly adopted design-build for public construction projects. There is a much greater awareness of the need to change to a system based on 'Value for Money', which is high on the government's agenda. A whole life performance bid evaluation model is proposed to aid decision makers in the selection of a design-builder. This is based on the integration of a framework using an analytic hierarchy process, as the bid awarding system is being changed from one based on the lowest price to one based on best value over the life-cycle. Key criteria such as whole life cost, service life planning and design quality are important through the key stages of the evaluation process. The model uses a systematic and holistic approach, which enables the public sector client to make better decisions in design-builder selection, which will deliver whole life benefits based on long-term cost-effectiveness.