• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.4
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• pp.351-379
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• 2006

Former ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, intellectuals such as former and incumbent professors, and various NGO groups are demanding the South Korean government to stop promoting independence in operational control which is currently held by the United States Armed Forces in Korea commander. Although the Korea should exercise operational control independently in the future, orientation on the direction which should be taken under consideration in promoting this transfer should be assumed. First of all, South Korea must sufficiently examine the criticisms and dissenting opinions, and reflect them in promoting independence in operational control. From now on, the South Korean government should reflect the opinions of experts in operational control, and must promote the transfer with national consensus. Unilateral enforcement of the transfer may cause serious errors and aggravate conflicts Second, ROKA's exercise of independence in operational control should take place only after gaining restraint on North Korea's attack against the South, and the issues on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) has been resolved, and a peace regime has been reached. Furthermore, exercise of independence in wartime operational control should be promoted only if there is a guarantee that international trust and the military collaboration will be restored to a level beyond the present state. Third, the USFK and the Korean-US alliance is providing South Korea with national security, not to mention tremendous diplomatical, and economical benefits However, if the alliance between the two countries become weakened due to the exercise of the independence in operational control, we might suffer a great deal of loss. Even though reasonable justification and external independence may be gained through promoting independence in operational control, it should be promoted in a longitudinal manner because national security problems and conflicts may be intensified, and there is no actual profit in doing so. Fourth, if the Korean-US alliance becomes weakened and therefore the United States decides to discuss eastern-asia strategies, North Korea deterrence strategies, and Japanese rearmament issues with other neighboring countries, South Korea may become diplomatically isolated and a subordinate to surrounding countries, destroying the independence we have now instead of restoring it Therefore searching for means to reinforce international trust and collaboration between South Korea and the United States, and leaving ROKA’s independence in operational control as a long term objective would be a more realistic method.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.141-151
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• 2023

Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.93-112
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• 2018

The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games is a good example of functionalism in integration theories. President Moon Jae-in is extremely lucky to play host to the Winter Olympics. Moon should be particularly happy to have declared the 23rd Winter Games open, because a handful of North Korean athletes marched into the Pyeongchang Stadium as members of a joint team from "Corea," the result of his strenuous efforts to have the North participate in the world festival of sports on snow and ice. But the president of this divided nation hardly draws envy from other world leaders, as he is faced with the daunting task of accommodating the selfish positions of surrounding powers concerning North Korean nuclear and missile threats. North Korea, a trivial competitor in winter sports, scored big outside the games' sporting arenas by inviting President Moon to summit talks in Pyongyang. As a precondition for a 2018 summit, Pyongyang will first ask for the cessation of the annual joint Korea-US military exercises. President Moon invested a lot in the Olympic delegates from the North. Korea's leader will now have to start a truly difficult game which will require the best of best strategies as well as a great deal of wisdom and tenacity not only to deal with the weapons of mass destruction-toting North Koreans, but also with allies. On the other hand, Moon needs to make the effort to reset domestic politics with tolerance and compromise, so he can better concentrate on the conundrum of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.575-579
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• 2016

The aim of this research is to determine the characteristics of endothelial factors and the hemostatic system conditions with malignant neoplasms patients, which were exposed to ionizing radiation. Total number of examined people is 223, 153 of them are patients with gastrointestinal tract oncopathology. The article presents the results of the analysis of numerical indicators of endothelial condition and platelet hemostasis of patients, who had cancer. They lived in the regions of Kazakhstan, subjected to contamination of radionuclides as a result of nuclear weapons tests, which took place in this region from 1949 to 1989. These results then were compared to cancer patients and healthy individuals with no radiation risk. The study revealed the presence of higher levels of endothelial dysfunction and following trigger of the hemostatic system in patients with malignant tumors of the gastrointestinal tract. In particular, the defined high degree of endothelial dysfunction include endothelium-dependent vasodilation, content desquamated endothelial cells in peripheral blood and von Willebrand factor. These indicators have a clear correlation with the degree of disorder of studied parameters of the hemostasis, which can cause the development of thrombotic complications.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.123-128
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• 1995

The concentration of Cs-137 and Sr-90 has been analyzed in soils around Taejon region. A correalation was found between the concentration of Cs-137 and the organic matter content. The mean value of Cs-137 was 14.37Bq/kg-dry and that of Sr-90 was 7.95Bq/kg-dry in undisturbed soils around Taejon region. The concentration ratio of Cs-137/Sr-90 was 1.99. The distribution of Cs-137 and Sr-90 was similar to cumulative fallout level and had been more affected by nuclear weapons test than by the chernobyl accident.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.6_1
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• pp.51-58
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• 2016

"History is a mirror" means that we should be prepared for the threats of enemies through learning from repeating history. Currently South Korea is facing various provocations, including North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile s. For the protection of the life and property of its people, South Korea should regard North Korea as a main enemy and be fully prepared for the threats. The Korean War was a war between well-prepared North Korea and ill-prepa red South Korea. After Liberation, North Korean army incorporated the Chinese Communist army, placed battle equi pment with the support of the Soviet army, and finished corps-level training while South Korea at that time did not finish battalion-level training. In wartime and peacetime, an army should improve military security by concealing its own information and find its enemy's information. North Korea carefully prepared for the war, collecting information about the organization, deployment and operation of the South Korean army. South Korean army failed to cope with it and had hard times in its early battles. In this paper, I will emphasize the importance of military security, focusing on the Battle of Gaeseong, the early part of the Korean War.