• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.203-237
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• 2011

Since USSR successfully launched its satellite "Sputnik"in 1957, many countries including US and USSR began military use of space, and engaged in arms race in space, which is against spirit and ideals of peaceful use of space as common heritage of mankind stipulated in many treaties such as Outer Space Treaty. With worsening Cold War between East and Western Bloc, this military use of space and arms race in space has been intensifying. Regarding the ideals of peaceful use of space, it is interpreted that military use of space is possible unless it does not have the purpose of aggression. The military use of space may have diverse forms such as attacking satellites in space, or attacking from satellites, making use of present and future technologies available which should include the use of nuclear and kinetic/hyper-speed weapons, laser, particle beams, near explosion, disturbance weapons in different directions (i.e., surface to space, space to space, and space to surface). Arms control is being implemented by the efforts of many countries in different formalities including legislature of international treaties under the auspices of UNCOPUOS and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Taking outstanding examples aiming at arms control by international community, there are confidence building measures (CBM), strengthening implementation of existing treaties, partial ban of nuclear tests, countryand regional approach, comprehensive approach and measures having legally binding force. While U.S. has surpassed other countries concerned in the area of military useof space, it withdrew from OST in early 2000s, thereby raising concern of international community. It requires concerted efforts of cooperationand implementation by international society to make sure peace of mankind and environmental conservation through arms control in space. Observing de facto possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea following series of nuclear tests and launching satellites, and efforts of launching rockets by South Korea, it is strongly needed for both countries to take part in arms control efforts by international community.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.143-151
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• 2009

Due to a more favorable climate in the recent relationship between U.S. and North Korea, North Korea nuclear issue is expected to enter the new phase of nuclear verification. From now on, our government should make preparation for taking the appropriate steps against the situation developed after the declaration by North Korea. Therefore, this paper is to identify the problems that may be occurred in the process of verifying and dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and to suggest the policy considerations that should be incorporated in establishing the action plan for verifying and dismantling her nuclear program, based on the analysis of experiences to verify and dismantle the WMDs in the former Soviet Union and in Iraq, respectively.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.315-327
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• 2023

In South Korea, the exporters of items related to nuclear power generation are diversified. Consequently, there is a risk of illegitimate export by companies failing to recognize the export control system because the awareness about this system for the strategic items among the subcontractors of nuclear power facilities is limited. To prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items, it is necessary to conduct outreach activities regarding the export control system for the related companies. Additionally, the exporters and export license examiners should consider whether an export target is on the Denial List, who may divert the strategic items to weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control developed two systems for controlling illegitimate export of the Trigger List items. The first system, Nuclear Industry Information Collection and Analysis System, can gather information about the key nuclear industries in Korea and analyze the dealing of strategic items. The second system, Denied Persons Information Gathering System, can regularly gather information about the denied persons and provide the updated data to the exporters and regulatory examiners. These two systems can be used for outreach activities and export license examination to prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.120-125
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• 2018

Various security threats, such as North Korea's nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, are becoming issues. Considering the current security situation in South Korea, proper selection of weapons and efficient defense acquisition systems are essential. In this paper, we conduct a survey and analysis of the defense core technology necessary for the development of weapons systems, and review whether current defense research and development is carried out efficiently. A theoretical study was conducted on ways to enhance the linkage between defense core technology and weapons systems development. As a result of the study, the necessity for development of weapons systems and the linking of defense core technology planning with the need for institutional improvement in enhanced utilization of defense core technology were derived. We propose a method for a long-term weapons systems concept plan that integrates defense core technology planning with forces planning and pre-project research programs to improve planning efficiency.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.56-69
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• 2022

Various advanced countries are accelerating the competition in the development of hypersonic weapons. North Korea is on the verge of building a new submarine equipped with a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). A series of new guided missiles tests have continued due to political competition between the U.S. and China. The Republic of Korea is planning to boost its military capabilities, which involves the development of nuclear-powered submarines, light aircraft carriers, and new guided missiles. The northeast Asian region continues to be tense amid military rivalry between the Republic of Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. Accordingly, these countries' competition to develop weapons is also at the world's highest level. In this paper, we examine the functioning of a hypersonic weapons system conduct a technical analysis of its components. In addition, we analyze the direction of military development that the Korean military wants to pursue through the recently announced mid-term defense plan. We conclude by highlighting the technical limitations and implementation strategies to overcome the development of hypersonic weapons.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.109-115
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• 2019

The North's short-range projectiles and missiles are the Iskander-class missiles of the S-300 series, with a range of 270-420 kilometers and an altitude of 40-50 kilometers, making it very difficult to respond with South Korea's detection radar or striking weapons. The North's handling of the Seoul sea of fire also makes it very urgent for the South to deploy the weapons to power or introduce them as soon as possible, as it can identify its intention to strike the Seoul metropolitan area by equipping such short-range rockets and missiles with nuclear or chemical weapons. We will be prepared to prep are for reckless provocations by securing our own technology by continuously developing the Korean missile defense system and striking system, Kill Chain, which is designed to defend short-range missiles in the long-term, and securing our own technology.

• Applied Chemistry for Engineering
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.352-366
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• 2022

Nuclear power plant operations for electricity generation, rare-earth mining, nuclear medical research, and nuclear weapons reprocessing considerably increase radioactive waste, necessitating massive efforts to eradicate radioactive waste from aquatic environments. Cobalt (⁵⁸Co) and strontium (⁹⁰Sr) radioactive elements have been extensively employed in energy generation, nuclear weapon testing, and the manufacture of healthcare products. The erroneous discharge of these elements as pollutants into the aquatic system, radiation emissions, and long-term disposal is extremely detrimental to humans and aquatic biota. Numerous methods for treating radioactive waste-contaminated water have emerged, among which the adsorption process has been promoted for its efficacy in eliminating radioactive waste from aquatic habitats. The current review discusses the adsorptive removal of radioactive waste from aqueous solutions using low-cost adsorbents, such as graphene oxide, metal-organic frameworks, and inorganic metal oxides, as well as their composites. The chemical modification of adsorbents to increase their removal efficiency is also discussed. Finally, the current state of ⁵⁸Co and ⁹⁰Sr removal performances is summarized and the efficiencies of various adsorbents are compared.