• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.853-859
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• 2017

Terrorists always threats the global security with the possibility of using prohibited warfare, NBCs(Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare). Compared to other prohibited warfares, most of biological warfare agents (BWAs) have no physical properties and time delays from spread to affect. Therefore the early detection is important to protect and decontaminate from BWAs. On the preliminary detection stage for suspicious material, most of detection kits only serve to know weather the BWAs exists or not. Due to this reason, simple field confirmation testing for suspicious substances have been used to identify materials which show negative result on detection kits. Considering the current Lab on a Chip(LOC) technologies, we suggest simple identification platform for unknown suspicious substances based on paper fluidics. We hope that our research will envision the future direction for the specific point-of-view for LOC technologies on detection strategy of BWAs.

• Journal of Astronomy and Space Sciences
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• v.39 no.2
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• pp.51-57
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• 2022

Cosmic radiation exposure of the flight crews in Korea has been managed by Radiation Safety Management around Living Life Act under Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. However, the domestic flight crews are excluded from the Act because of relatively low route dose exposure compared to that of international flight crews. But we found that the accumulated total annual dose of domestic flight crews is far from negligible because of relatively long total flight time and too many flights. In this study, to suggest the necessity of management of domestic flight crews' radiation exposure, we statistically analyzed domestic flight crew's accumulative annual dose by using cosmic radiation estimation models of the Civil Aviation Research Institute (CARI)-6M, Nowcast of Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation for Aviation Safety (NAIRAS), and Korean Radiation Exposure Assessment Model (KREAM) and compared with in-situ measurements of Liulin-6K LET spectrometer. As a result, the average exposure dose of domestic flight crews was found to be 0.5-0.8 mSv. We also expect that our result might provide the basis to include the domestic flight crews as radiation workers, not just international flight attendants.

• Fire Science and Engineering
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.105-113
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• 2019

This study investigates the toxicity characteristics of two Non-Class 1E Cables (For security reasons, we refer to company A and company B) used in nuclear power plants according to the accelerated deterioration period. In accordance with NES 713 test equipment and standards, tests were carried out on non-aged cables and the cables subjected to 20- and 40-year-accelerated-deterioration; each of the cables was further classified into sheath and insulation. The test results showed that the toxicity indices of 20- and 40-year-accelerated-aged cables were higher than those for the non-aged cables, and 20-year-aged cables of both A and B companies showed the highest toxicity indices. This is attributed to the extensive emissions of carbon monoxide and halide gases such as hydrogen chloride and hydrogen bromide. Furthermore, to analyze the toxicity indices of sheath and insulation in detail, the US Department of Defense standard (MIL-DTL) was applied to determine whether the Toxicity index (T.I.) allowance was exceeded, and the results showed that the insulating materials emitted considerably more than the allowable limit.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.47 no.4
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• pp.237-245
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• 2022

Background: The current study reports measurements of activity concentrations of radon (²²⁰Rn) and thoron (²²⁰Rn) in dwellings, followed by inhalation dose assessment of the public, and then by the development of regulation and the national radon action plan (NRAP) in Cameroon. Materials and Methods: Radon, thoron, and thoron progeny measurements were carried out from 2014 to 2017 using radon-thoron discriminative detectors (commercially RADUET) in 450 dwellings and thoron progeny monitors in 350 dwellings. From 2019 to 2020, radon track detectors (commercially RADTRAK) were deployed in 1,400 dwellings. It was found that activity concentrations of radon range in 1,850 houses from 10 to 2,620 Bq/㎥ with a geometric mean of 76 Bq/㎥. Results and Discussion: Activity concentrations of thoron range from 20 to 700 Bq/㎥ with a geometric mean of 107 Bq/㎥. Thoron equilibrium factor ranges from 0.01 to 0.6, with an arithmetic mean of 0.09 that is higher than the default value of 0.02 given by UNSCEAR. On average, 49%, 9%, and 2% of all surveyed houses have radon concentrations above 100, 200, and 300 Bq/㎥, respectively. The average contribution of thoron to the inhalation dose due to radon and thoron exposure is about 40%. Thus, thoron cannot be neglected in dose assessment to avoid biased results in radio-epidemiological studies. Only radon was considered in the drafted regulation and in the NRAP adopted in October 2020. Reference levels of 300 Bq/㎥ and 1,000 Bq/㎥ were recommended for dwellings and workplaces. Conclusion: Priority actions for the coming years include the following: radon risk mapping, promotion of a protection policy against radon in buildings, integration of the radon prevention and mitigation into the training of construction specialists, mitigation of dwellings and workplaces with high radon levels, increased public awareness of the health risks associated with radon, and development of programs on the scientific and technical aspects.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.38-45
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• 2014

This paper describes the results of assessment of radiological dose resulting from operation of the Daedeok nuclear facilities including the HANARO research reactor, which has been performed to assure whether or not to comply with the regulation standards of the radioactive effluents releases. Based on the meteorological data and the radiation source term, the maximum individual doses were evaluated from 2010 to 2012. The atmospheric dispersion and the deposition factors of gaseous effluents were calculated using the XOQDOQ computer code. ENDOS-G and ENDOS-L code systems were also used for maximum individual dose calculation from gaseous and liquid effluents, respectively. The results were compared with the regulation standards for the radioactive effluents presented by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). The effective doses and the thyroid doses of the maximum individual were calculated at the maximum exposed point in the Daedeok site, and contributions of exposure pathways to the radiological doses resulting from gaseous and liquid radioactive effluents were evaluated at each facility of the Daedeok site. As a result, the maximum exposed age was analysed to be the child group, and the operation of HANARO research reactor had a major effect more than 90% on the individual doses. The main exposure pathways for gaseous radioactive effluent were from ingestion and inhalation. The effective doses and the thyroid doses were considerably influenced by tritium and iodine, respectively. The gaseous radioactive effluents contributed more than 90% on the total doses, whereas the contributions of the liquid radioactive effluents were relatively low. Consequently, the maximum individual dose due to radioactive effluents from the nuclear facilities within the Daedeok site were less than 3% of the regulation standard over 3 years; therefore, it can be concluded that radioactive effluents from the nuclear facilities were well managed, with the radiation-induced health detriment for residents around the site being negligible.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.14 no.5
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• pp.563-575
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the activation characteristics that occur in a linear accelerator for container security inspection. In the computer simulation design, first, the targets consisted of a tungsten (Z=74) single material target and a tungsten (Z=74) and copper (Z=29) composite target. Second, the fan beam collimator was composed of a single material of lead (Z=82) and a composite material of tungsten (Z-74) and lead (Z=82) depending on the material. Final, the concrete in the room where the linear accelerator was located contained magnetite type and impurities. In the research method, first, the optical neutron flux was calculated using the MCNP6 code as a F4 Tally for the linear accelerator and structure. Second, the photoneutron flux calculated from the MCNP6 code was applied to FISPACT-II to evaluate the activation product. Final, the decommissioning evaluation was conducted through the specific activity of the activation product. As a result, first, it was the most common in photoneutron targets, followed by a collimator and a concrete 10 cm deep. Second, activation products were produced as by-products of W-181 in tungsten targets and collimator, and Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-134, Eu-152, Eu-154 nuclides in impurity-containing concrete. Final, it was found that the tungsten target satisfies the permissible concentration for self-disposal after 90 days upon decommissioning. These results could be confirmed that the photoneutron yield and degree of activation at 9 MeV energy were insignificant. However, it is thought that W-181 generated from the tungsten target and collimator of the linear accelerator may affect the exposure when disassembled for repair. Therefore, this study presents basic data on the management of activated parts of a linear accelerator for container security inspection. In addition, When decommissioning the linear accelerator for container security inspection, it is expected that it can be used to prove the standard that permissible concentration of self-disposal.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.6_1
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• pp.75-87
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• 2014

It may be meaningful that analysis of possible continuity and change of North Korea's Kim Jong-un's ruling in its third year. For this analysis, for the application more rational and statistical analysis methods, this study takes advantage of the new years' messages of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong-un. In North Korea, the new years' messages are rare enough to give influence to every field of the North Korea's community and the New Year's message performs tutorial role throughout the whole year. The said messages of Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong-un regimes have been researched and comprehensively summarized. The summarized New Year's Message by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are separated, compared and analyzed by the regime by presentation method, configured information, and others followed by New Year message's characteristics and implications of each North Korean regime that have been investigated. Based on the results of this analysis of Kim Jong-un era, possibility of its continuation and change is forecasted. Above all, for possible continuation of the ruling, sticking to the governing socialist way and military-first politics are presented. For possible causes of change, such the four factors as partial opening to overcome economic problems, the North Korean nuclear issue, influx of the nature of capitalism, and Kim Jung-un's control weakness have been presented. Such the factors of possible change and continuation of the North Korea Kim Jung-un ruling are expected to work as a combination of factors. The issue of continuation and change of North Korea Kim Jong-un's control is a key point for us to solve the issues between North and South Koreas. In the situation that the whole people of South Korea have a national consensus in the effort of gathering the public opinion, it is a high time that we needed to have much flexibility to actively cope with the North Korean issues.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

This paper is to analyse the development of the U.S.-China relationship and pending issues and implications. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the relationship between the US and China in the early and hostile confrontation period; the relationship of US-Chinese approach/normalization period and the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s; the relationship by mid-2010 since the opening of the G2 era; the US-China relations and major pending issues and implications in the era of Trump-Xi Jinping; and conclusion. The rapid growth of China over the past three decades has changed the existing US-centered international order and has triggered competition between the two countries. The United States and China have become the only countries that regularly hold strategic and economic dialogue, and the topic has also developed into a country that discusses not only bilateral relations but also global issues. The issues of US-China cooperation and conflicts encompass global issues as well as bilateral relations issues. For example, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear issue and the THAAD, the economic and financial order, and the Taiwan issue. It is not a matter of another country, but a problem that directly or indirectly leads to Korea's diplomacy, security and economy. In order to prevent 'Korea passing' in the US-China relationship, we need a hedging strategy that maintains and strengthens the strong ROK-US security cooperation and harmonious promotion of ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.120-125
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• 2018

Various security threats, such as North Korea's nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, are becoming issues. Considering the current security situation in South Korea, proper selection of weapons and efficient defense acquisition systems are essential. In this paper, we conduct a survey and analysis of the defense core technology necessary for the development of weapons systems, and review whether current defense research and development is carried out efficiently. A theoretical study was conducted on ways to enhance the linkage between defense core technology and weapons systems development. As a result of the study, the necessity for development of weapons systems and the linking of defense core technology planning with the need for institutional improvement in enhanced utilization of defense core technology were derived. We propose a method for a long-term weapons systems concept plan that integrates defense core technology planning with forces planning and pre-project research programs to improve planning efficiency.