• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.38-45
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• 2014

This paper describes the results of assessment of radiological dose resulting from operation of the Daedeok nuclear facilities including the HANARO research reactor, which has been performed to assure whether or not to comply with the regulation standards of the radioactive effluents releases. Based on the meteorological data and the radiation source term, the maximum individual doses were evaluated from 2010 to 2012. The atmospheric dispersion and the deposition factors of gaseous effluents were calculated using the XOQDOQ computer code. ENDOS-G and ENDOS-L code systems were also used for maximum individual dose calculation from gaseous and liquid effluents, respectively. The results were compared with the regulation standards for the radioactive effluents presented by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). The effective doses and the thyroid doses of the maximum individual were calculated at the maximum exposed point in the Daedeok site, and contributions of exposure pathways to the radiological doses resulting from gaseous and liquid radioactive effluents were evaluated at each facility of the Daedeok site. As a result, the maximum exposed age was analysed to be the child group, and the operation of HANARO research reactor had a major effect more than 90% on the individual doses. The main exposure pathways for gaseous radioactive effluent were from ingestion and inhalation. The effective doses and the thyroid doses were considerably influenced by tritium and iodine, respectively. The gaseous radioactive effluents contributed more than 90% on the total doses, whereas the contributions of the liquid radioactive effluents were relatively low. Consequently, the maximum individual dose due to radioactive effluents from the nuclear facilities within the Daedeok site were less than 3% of the regulation standard over 3 years; therefore, it can be concluded that radioactive effluents from the nuclear facilities were well managed, with the radiation-induced health detriment for residents around the site being negligible.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.14 no.5
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• pp.563-575
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the activation characteristics that occur in a linear accelerator for container security inspection. In the computer simulation design, first, the targets consisted of a tungsten (Z=74) single material target and a tungsten (Z=74) and copper (Z=29) composite target. Second, the fan beam collimator was composed of a single material of lead (Z=82) and a composite material of tungsten (Z-74) and lead (Z=82) depending on the material. Final, the concrete in the room where the linear accelerator was located contained magnetite type and impurities. In the research method, first, the optical neutron flux was calculated using the MCNP6 code as a F4 Tally for the linear accelerator and structure. Second, the photoneutron flux calculated from the MCNP6 code was applied to FISPACT-II to evaluate the activation product. Final, the decommissioning evaluation was conducted through the specific activity of the activation product. As a result, first, it was the most common in photoneutron targets, followed by a collimator and a concrete 10 cm deep. Second, activation products were produced as by-products of W-181 in tungsten targets and collimator, and Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-134, Eu-152, Eu-154 nuclides in impurity-containing concrete. Final, it was found that the tungsten target satisfies the permissible concentration for self-disposal after 90 days upon decommissioning. These results could be confirmed that the photoneutron yield and degree of activation at 9 MeV energy were insignificant. However, it is thought that W-181 generated from the tungsten target and collimator of the linear accelerator may affect the exposure when disassembled for repair. Therefore, this study presents basic data on the management of activated parts of a linear accelerator for container security inspection. In addition, When decommissioning the linear accelerator for container security inspection, it is expected that it can be used to prove the standard that permissible concentration of self-disposal.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.6_1
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• pp.75-87
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• 2014

It may be meaningful that analysis of possible continuity and change of North Korea's Kim Jong-un's ruling in its third year. For this analysis, for the application more rational and statistical analysis methods, this study takes advantage of the new years' messages of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong-un. In North Korea, the new years' messages are rare enough to give influence to every field of the North Korea's community and the New Year's message performs tutorial role throughout the whole year. The said messages of Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong-un regimes have been researched and comprehensively summarized. The summarized New Year's Message by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are separated, compared and analyzed by the regime by presentation method, configured information, and others followed by New Year message's characteristics and implications of each North Korean regime that have been investigated. Based on the results of this analysis of Kim Jong-un era, possibility of its continuation and change is forecasted. Above all, for possible continuation of the ruling, sticking to the governing socialist way and military-first politics are presented. For possible causes of change, such the four factors as partial opening to overcome economic problems, the North Korean nuclear issue, influx of the nature of capitalism, and Kim Jung-un's control weakness have been presented. Such the factors of possible change and continuation of the North Korea Kim Jung-un ruling are expected to work as a combination of factors. The issue of continuation and change of North Korea Kim Jong-un's control is a key point for us to solve the issues between North and South Koreas. In the situation that the whole people of South Korea have a national consensus in the effort of gathering the public opinion, it is a high time that we needed to have much flexibility to actively cope with the North Korean issues.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

This paper is to analyse the development of the U.S.-China relationship and pending issues and implications. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the relationship between the US and China in the early and hostile confrontation period; the relationship of US-Chinese approach/normalization period and the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s; the relationship by mid-2010 since the opening of the G2 era; the US-China relations and major pending issues and implications in the era of Trump-Xi Jinping; and conclusion. The rapid growth of China over the past three decades has changed the existing US-centered international order and has triggered competition between the two countries. The United States and China have become the only countries that regularly hold strategic and economic dialogue, and the topic has also developed into a country that discusses not only bilateral relations but also global issues. The issues of US-China cooperation and conflicts encompass global issues as well as bilateral relations issues. For example, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear issue and the THAAD, the economic and financial order, and the Taiwan issue. It is not a matter of another country, but a problem that directly or indirectly leads to Korea's diplomacy, security and economy. In order to prevent 'Korea passing' in the US-China relationship, we need a hedging strategy that maintains and strengthens the strong ROK-US security cooperation and harmonious promotion of ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.120-125
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• 2018

Various security threats, such as North Korea's nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, are becoming issues. Considering the current security situation in South Korea, proper selection of weapons and efficient defense acquisition systems are essential. In this paper, we conduct a survey and analysis of the defense core technology necessary for the development of weapons systems, and review whether current defense research and development is carried out efficiently. A theoretical study was conducted on ways to enhance the linkage between defense core technology and weapons systems development. As a result of the study, the necessity for development of weapons systems and the linking of defense core technology planning with the need for institutional improvement in enhanced utilization of defense core technology were derived. We propose a method for a long-term weapons systems concept plan that integrates defense core technology planning with forces planning and pre-project research programs to improve planning efficiency.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.6_1
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• pp.3-13
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• 2016

We take it for granted that strong sides defeat weaker counterparts, while predicting the outcome of the battles. But in modern war, we can find plenty of evidence that weak sides won against the strong. This phenomenon can be understood logically by the fourth-generation war theory. the North Korean does not give up its unification strategy, which is unification by force, even though its inferior power. It is continuing various political, social and military levels of provocations toward both the international community and South Korea. Recently, North Korea did nuclear test, launched ICBM test, provoked the DMZ, and expecting to continue the provocations of the fourth-generation war level. We have to understand the nature of North Korea's fourth-generation war threats and provocations that it is focusing on. Based on this, have a new understanding of the value of the Homeland Defense Reservists as fundamental measures as the fourth-generation war threat and supplement related systems. We can firmly refuse the balance of power and power shift of the Korean Peninsula through improved Homeland Defense Reservists. As the expected North Korea's the fourth-generation war threats, our Homeland Defense Reservists is a firm will of conduct war, and political-social-economic-military means, it is possible to display as the best alternative.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.40 no.4
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• pp.429-435
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• 2020

North Korea declared itself complete with nuclear force after its sixth nuclear test in 2017. Despite efforts at home and abroad to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the prospects for the denuclearization are not bright. Along with political and diplomatic efforts to deter NK's WMD threats, the government is required to strengthen its consequence management capabilities against 'catastrophic situations' expected in case of emergency. Accordingly, this study was conducted to present measures to strengthen follow-up management against CBRN threats. The research model was partially supplemented and utilized by the THIRA process adopted and utilized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security among national-level disaster management plan development models. Korea's consequence management (CM) system encompasses risk and crisis management on disaster condition. The system has been carried out in the form of a civil, government and military integrated defense operations for the purpose of curbing the spread or use of CBRNs, responding to threats, and minimizing expected damages. The preventive stage call for the incorporation of CBRN concept and CM procedures into the national management system, supplementing the integrated alarm systems, preparation of evacuation facilities, and establishment of the integrated training systems. In the preparation phase, readjustment of relevant laws and manuals, maintenance of government organizations, developing performance procedures, establishing the on-site support systems, and regular training are essential. In the response phase, normal operations of the medical support system for first aid and relief, installation and operation of facilities for decontamination, and development of regional damage assessment and control guidelines are important. In the recovery phase, development of stabilization evaluation criteria and procedures, securing and operation of resources needed for damage recovery, and strengthening of regional damage recovery capabilities linked to local defense forces, reserve forces and civil defense committees are required.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.257-264
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• 2017

For the safe disposal of intermediate level radioactive waste according to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission's notice and KORAD's management plan for low and intermediate level radioactive waste, the disposal concentration limit was derived based on the IAEA methodology. The evaluation of the derived disposal concentration limit revealed that it is not suitable as a practical limit for intermediate level radioactive waste. This is because the disposal concentration limit according to the IAEA methodology is derived using a single value of radioactive waste density and the disposal facility's volume. The IAEA methodology is suitable for setting the concentration limit for vault type disposal, which consists of a single type of waste, whereas an underground silo type disposal facility is composed of several types of radioactive waste, and thus the IAEA methodology has limitations in determining the disposal concentration limit. It is necessary to develop and apply an improved method to derive the disposal concentration limit for intermediate level radioactive waste by considering the radioactivity of various types of radioactive waste, the corresponding scenario evaluation results, and the regulatory limit.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.719-725
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• 2018

After 9/11 attacks in the U.S, Terrorism has increased the number of unspecified casualties through multi-use facility terror attacks compared to the past. The subsequent London bombings and the self-destruction of Pakistan increased people's fear and social anxiety. As international events have been held in Korea recently, awareness and concern over radioactive terrorism and security management of radioactive materials are increasing. In this paper, we compared the results of different meteorological conditions using HotSpot Code. After creating a possible terror scenario in Korea, sources likely to be use in RDD and Dirty bomb were investigated. The meteorological condition was selected by comparing the Pasquill-Gifford stability class with the most stable condition F and the most unstable condition A. The result value of the A and F condition through simulation were shown not to cause citizens to die from acute effects due to radiological effects. The range of radioactivity is different according to the wind speed and the meteorological stability, and the degree of radioactivity dilution is different according to meteorological conditions. Analysis results are expected to be used for initial response in the event of a radioactive terrorist attack.