• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.87-103
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• 2019

In December 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration announced a major policy shift away from nuclear and coal, committing itself to the vision of creating a society where renewable sources account for 20% of its electricity generation by 2030. This energy transition involves not just a technical transition from conventional energy sources to renewable energy but also active participation of multiple stakeholders in the energy governance. While energy policy making has long been dominated by the central government in Korea with the aim of managing the supply for rapid industrialization and economic growth, the Moon administration aims to diffuse the central government's authority across various actors in society. Among those actors, this study focuses on the roles that local governments play in energy transition. Despite deepening local autonomy since 1995, Korean local governments have remained policy targets or recipients in the energy policy domain. This article discusses how such a traditional role has evolved under the new administration's energy transition policy and examines what challenges and limitations local governments face in creating a more decentralized energy governance system.

• 기술혁신연구
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• 제20권3호
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• pp.1-28
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• 2012

본 연구에서는 시나리오 기반의 전략적 미래예측을 통하여 2030년경 우리나라의 원전산업 분야를 정성적으로 분석하였다. 구체적으로 STEEP맵 작성과 네트워크 분석(Network Analysis)을 활용하여 다차원적인 관점에서 미래원전산업 분야 환경변화 영향요인간의 관계성을 규명하였다. 이어 시나리오 기법을 활용하여 미래원전산업의 핵심 불확실성 요인(Key Uncertainty Factor: KUF)을 중심으로 예상 가능한 3가지의 전략적 시나리오 (Optimistic, Business as usual, Pessimistic)를 생성하고, 해외 원전수출을 위해 정부가 시급히 추진해야 될 시나리오별 공통전략과 최대 위험회피 전략도 함께 제시하였다. 본 연구결과를 통해 에너지 가격, 세계 경기 동향, 원전기술 경쟁력, 원전 마케팅 능력 등이 미래 원전산업 분야의 핵심 불확실성 요인으로 작용함을 알 수 있었다. 또한, 실효성 있는 미래원전 산업의 수출전략 마련을 위해서는 '원전 안전 등 기술력 확보', '원전 인력 확보', '우라늄 등 안정적 자원 확보' 및 '원전 수용성 증대'등에 관한 전략 추진이 중요 정책과제로 상정되어야 함을 제안 하였다. 끝으로 이러한 연구결과에 따른 시사점과 연구의 한계에 대하여 논의하였다.

• Molecules and Cells
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• 제43권5호
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• pp.459-468
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• 2020

Nuclear receptor subfamily group H member 4 (NR1H4), also known as farnesoid X receptor, has been implicated in several cellular processes in the liver and intestine. Preclinical and clinical studies have suggested a role of NR1H4 in colon cancer development; however, how NR1H4 regulates colon cancer cell growth and survival remains unclear. We generated NR1H4 knockout (KO) colon cancer cells using clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)-CRISPR-associated protein-9 nuclease (CAS9) technology and explored the effects of NR1H4 KO in colon cancer cell proliferation, survival, and apoptosis. Interestingly, NR1H4 KO cells showed impaired cell proliferation, reduced colony formation, and increased apoptotic cell death compared to control colon cancer cells. We identified MYC as an important mediator of the signaling pathway alterations induced by NR1H4 KO. NR1H4 silencing in colon cancer cells resulted in reduced MYC protein levels, while NR1H4 activation using an NR1H4 ligand, chenodeoxycholic acid, resulted in time- and dose-dependent MYC induction. Moreover, NR1H4 KO enhanced the anti-cancer effects of doxorubicin and cisplatin, supporting the role of MYC in the enhanced apoptosis observed in NR1H4 KO cells. Taken together, our findings suggest that modulating NR1H4 activity in colon cancer cells might be a promising alternative approach to treat cancer using MYC-targeting agents.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제28권2호
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• pp.177-200
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• 2019

전력수급계획의 근간이 되는 전력수요 전망은 GDP와 기상변수 등 다양한 요인에 의해 영향을 받기 때문에 확률 프로세스로 이해할 수 있다. 이 전망치를 바탕으로 전력설비의 구성 방안이 수립되는데, 실제 의사결정 과정은 주어진 확률분포에 대한 정보가 온전하다고 가정한다는 한계를 가진다. 그러나 현실적으로는 확률분포 자체의 중첩 불확실성이 존재하기 때문에 강건한 최적계획(robust optimization)의 수립이 필요하다. 본 논문은 중첩 불확실성을 포함한 발전설비 조정의 최적의사결정을 연구한다. 구체적으로 원자력의 감축투자 관련 실물옵션 모형을 수립하고 우리나라 전력수급기본계획의 특성을 고려한 중첩 불확실성하에서 원전감축 투자를 분석한다. 분석 결과, 현재의 원전축소 정책은 전력수요 증가율이 낮다는 것을 전제로 한 정책으로서 전력수요 증가에 대응할 수 있는 정책 강건성을 갖추지는 못한다는 것을 보여준다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제54권4호
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• pp.1295-1300
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• 2022

There has been increased interest in researching risk perception of radiation to implement successful risk communication, particularly given the recent worldwide nuclear policy movement regarding nuclear energy. This study aimed to investigate characteristics of risk perception among residents living near normally operating nuclear power plants in South Korea by identifying factors associated with risk perception. A survey was conducted with face-to-face interviews for 1200 residents aged 20e84 years by gender- and age-stratified random sampling. Risk perception was associated with trust perception in nuclear safety, but was not highly correlated with benefit perception for utilizing nuclear power. Relatively high risk perception was observed in women, older age groups, and residents not having experience of nuclear-related education or work. This association remained after adjusting for other factors including benefit perception, trust perception, and psychological distress. In addition to these individual characteristics, risk perception was also associated with a residential district's own unique context, indicating that a strategy of risk communication should be developed differently for residents facing nuclear-related circumstances. Given that risk perception can be changed, depending on social values such as safety culture and economic setting, further studies are required to understand the changing characteristics of radiation risk perception.

• 방사성폐기물학회지
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• 제6권2호
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• pp.141-145
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• 2008

후행 핵연료주기 경제성 평가는 추정 비용의 불확실성, 평가 대상기간의 장기성, 적용 할인율에 따른 계산결과의 변동성 등 많은 불확실성을 내포하고 있기 때문에 평가기관 또는 평가자에 따라 그 결과가 서로 상이하다. 본고에서는 지금까지 수행된 주요 경제성 평가 연구들을 조사/분석하여 그 특징과 한계를 알아봄으로써 현재 국내에서 추진되고 있는 사용후핵연료 공론화 및 후행 핵연료주기 정책 연구 추진에 기초자료로 활용될 수 있도록 하고자 하였다. 분석 결과 사용후핵연료 재활용 옵션에 비해 직접처분 옵션이 유리하나, 입력 자료로 사용된 파라미터 값에 따라 결과의 불확실성이 많이 나타나 이 부분에 대한 추가적인 연구가 필요하다는 사실을 알 수 있었다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제40권1호
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• pp.9-20
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• 2008

Since plutonium accounts for 40-50% of the power produced by uranium fuels, spent fuel contains only residual plutonium. Management of this plutonium is one of the aspects influencing the choice of a fuel cycle back-end option: reprocessing, direct disposal or wait-and-see. Different grades and qualities of plutonium exist depending from their specific generation conditions; all are valuable fissile material. Safeguard authorities watch the inventories of civil plutonium, but access to those data is restricted. Independent evaluations have led to an estimated current inventory of 220t plutonium in total (spent fuel, separated civil plutonium and military plutonium). If used as MOX fuel, it would be sufficient to feed all the PWRs and BWRs worldwide during 7 years or to deploy a FBR park corresponding to 150% of today' s installed nuclear capacity worldwide, which could then be exploited for centuries with the current stockpile of depleted and spent uranium. The energy potential of plutonium deteriorates with storage time of spent fuel and of separated plutonium, due to the decay of $^{241}Pu$, the best fissile isotope, into americium, a neutron absorber. The loss of fissile value of plutonium is more pronounced for usage in LWRs than in FBR. However, keeping the current plutonium inventory for an expected future deployment of FBRs is counterproductive. Recycling plutonium reduce the required volume for final disposal in an underground repository and the cost of final disposal. However, the benefits of utilizing an energy resource and of reducing final disposal liabilities are not the only aspects that determine the choice of a back-end policy.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제54권10호
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• pp.3878-3887
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• 2022

For the future energy-mix policy for carbon neutrality, demand for the capability of load-follow operation has emerged in nuclear power plants in order to accommodate the intermittency of renewable energy. The short-term decay heat analysis is also required to evaluate the decay heat level varied by the power level change during the load-follow operation, which is a very important parameter in terms of short-term decay heat removal during a grace time. In this study, the short-term decay heat level for 10 days after the shutdown was evaluated for both seasonal and daily load-follow cases. Additionally, the nuclide-wise contribution to the accumulated decay heat for 10 days was analyzed for further understanding of the short-term decay heat behavior. The result showed that in the seasonal case, the decay heat level was mainly determined by the power level right before the shutdown and the amount of each nuclide was varied with the power variation due to the long variation interval of 90 days. Whereas, in the daily case, the decay heat level was strongly impacted by the average power level during operation and meaningful mass variations for those nuclides were not observed due to the short variation interval of 0.5 days.

• 방사성폐기물학회지
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• 제21권1호
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• pp.95-114
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• 2023

During the decades after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) accident, ambient dose rates have markedly decreased when compared to those at the early state of the accident. Government projects have been continuously conducted by surveying the ambient dose rate and radiocesium distributions. Airborne surveys using crewed helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are the best methods for obtaining an overall picture of the distribution. However, ground-based surveys are required for accurate measurements near the population. The differences between these methods include the knowledge of the post depositional behavior of radionuclides in land use. The survey results form the basis for policy decisions such as lifting evacuation zones, decontamination, and other countermeasures. These surveys contain crucial findings regarding post-accident responses. This paper reviews the survey methods of government projects and current situation around the FDNPS. The visualization methods and databases of ambient dose rates are also reviewed to provide information to the population.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.