• Title/Summary/Keyword: North Korean Nuclear Weapons

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An Analysis of North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Strategy through the Clausewitzian Framework (클라우제비츠의 전쟁이론으로 본 냉전 이후 북한의 핵.미사일전략에 관한 연구)

  • Park, Ji-Sun;Lee, Sang-Ho
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.271-309
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    • 2010
  • The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.

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A Review on the South Korean Non-nuclear "Plan B": Improvement of its Own Deterrence and Defense Posture (북핵 대응에 대한 한국의 비핵(非核) "플랜 B" 검토: 자체 억제 및 방어태세의 보완)

  • Park, Hwee-rhak
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.25 no.3
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    • pp.69-96
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    • 2019
  • This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an (천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망)

  • Kim, Sung-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

Evaluation and Forecast of North Korea's Nuclear Policy through Libya Model (리비아 모델을 통한 북한의 핵 정책 평가와 전망)

  • Han, Seung Jo;Shin, Jin
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.18 no.3
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    • pp.113-122
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    • 2018
  • The issue of security on the Korean peninsula is facing the greatest upheaval in 2018 with the inter-Korean summit and the US-North Korea summit. North Korea has pursued the parallel policy developing military and economic at the same time. However, North Korea is changing its route to give up nuclear weapons and focus on the economy through summit talks. Since the change in North Korea is similar to that of Libya in the past, it is necessary to analyze why North Korea is trying to abandon its nuclear program and how the process is flowing compared to the case of Libya. The Libya model was constructed and analyzed in terms of international and domestic perpectives and recognition of the situation by leadership. North Korea's nuclear policy was evaluated based on the Libya model. The nuclear development of Libya and North Korea has caused diplomatic and economic pressures from the international community and ultimately led to instability of the regime. Two countries have tried to abandon nuclear program in order to solve the instability of the regime, also gain the economic reward insead. Libya took economic benefits and secured some of the stability of the regime, but the regime collapsed under the wave of democracy due to the influx of foreign capital and ideas. North Korea will seek diplomatic and economic gains with the example of Libya, but will try to limit as much as possible the culture of democracy and the full opening that can be incidental.

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A Study on the Countermeasures of Iskander (이스칸데르 미사일 대응방안 연구)

  • Kim, Sea Ill;Shin, Jin
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.19 no.3
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    • pp.109-115
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    • 2019
  • The North's short-range projectiles and missiles are the Iskander-class missiles of the S-300 series, with a range of 270-420 kilometers and an altitude of 40-50 kilometers, making it very difficult to respond with South Korea's detection radar or striking weapons. The North's handling of the Seoul sea of fire also makes it very urgent for the South to deploy the weapons to power or introduce them as soon as possible, as it can identify its intention to strike the Seoul metropolitan area by equipping such short-range rockets and missiles with nuclear or chemical weapons. We will be prepared to prep are for reckless provocations by securing our own technology by continuously developing the Korean missile defense system and striking system, Kill Chain, which is designed to defend short-range missiles in the long-term, and securing our own technology.

Study on Consideration of Artificial Rain Technology in Aspect of National Security (국가안보측면으로서의 인공강우기술 고찰)

  • Choi, Kee-Nam;Lee, Sun-Je
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.12 no.2
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    • pp.99-106
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    • 2012
  • March 11, 2010, in Japan located over East Sea of Korea, due to the strong earthquake tsunami, Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was ceased and exploded resulting in leaking radioactive substances. Even though it was an accident happened in a nation, leaked radioactive substances were spread across the world moving along ocean currents and air current. Our nation also had terror and confusion about radioactive rain after the accident, and even though a year has been passed by after the accident, the problem on the radioactive contamination isn't solved. So to speak, nuclear accident of neighboring country is a threat to our nation but not only Japan but also Chinese ocean across the West Sea has nuclear power plants. Beside threat of nuclear accident of neighboring countries, North Korea in military confrontation is the world 3rd country holding chemical and biological weapons and can spray the biological weapons to South Korea at any time like Yeonpyeong-do bombard provocation in November, 2010. The study is the strategy confronting such threats and grafted artificial rain technology which is weather control technology. Since radioactive substances on radioactive accidents and North Korean biological weapons can differ in the density by the weather condition, only artificial rain technology can remove the threat perfectly but it is worth to try as the method to reduce damage and in the aspect of psychology. To use the artificial rain technology in the aspect of national security to acquire the public safety, research institutes such ADD should fulfill active and symbolic technology research development.

Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy (유엔의 북핵 대북제재조치의 실효성과 북한의 체제생존전략)

  • KIM, JOO-SAM
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.69-92
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    • 2018
  • North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea : Focusing on the Maritime Aspects of Economic Sanctions (대북경제제재의 효과성과 미래 발전 방향에 대한 고찰: 해상대북제재를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Sang-Hoon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.46
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    • pp.239-276
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    • 2020
  • The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

ROKN's Response Strategy to North Korea's SLBM Threat (북한 SLBM 위협과 대응방향)

  • Moon, Chang-Hwan
    • Strategy21
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    • s.40
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    • pp.82-114
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    • 2016
  • The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

A Study on the Planning of Civil Defense Shelter and Design 3 - Focusing on Considerations Related to Military Threat - (민방위 대피시설 계획 및 설계 방안에 관한 연구 3 - 군사위협에 따른 고려 요소를 중심으로 -)

  • Park, Namkwun
    • Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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    • v.11 no.1
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    • pp.97-106
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    • 2015
  • Currently, South Korea is exposed to various attacks of North Korea such as traditional, nuclear, and ABC weapons. Now it is hard to make an accurate estimate the damage may have been occurred to citizens due to those attacks. It is only possible to assume the rough outline. As a countermeasure to such military threats of North Korea, government-aided evacuation facilities services are going along across the board concerning the object, installation range, budget, and drawing standards. Whereas, in case of public evacuation facilities, there is no special regulation or principle in designation. Since various facilities are regarded as applicable, any protection against military threats can't be anticipated. In this study, military threats provoked by North Korea are figured out, thus the problem of plan and design that public evacuation facilities have are pointed out. This study suggest the result and proposal.