• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• 방사성폐기물학회지
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• 제20권1호
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• pp.111-118
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• 2022

The denuclearization of North Korea was unpredictable and resulted in radical changes. Despite the skepticism and disappointment surrounding denuclearization, it is important for certain verification technologies to establish what is technically possible or practically impossible, and how reliable these technical means are. This article presents the technical hurdles in nuclear verification by systematically categorizing them into issues of correctness and completeness. Moreover, it addresses the safety and security risks during the denuclearization process, including the radiological impact on humans, environmental effects, and the illegal transfer of material, information, and technologies.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.135-144
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• 2019

최근에 북한의 김정은 정권은 핵무력 완성을 선언한 가운데, 국제사회와 대한민국을 향해 북한 핵의 완전한 폐기로 한반도 비핵화를 추진하겠다며 한국과 미국 행정부를 상대로 정상회담을 하고 있다. 북한의 김정은은 완전한 비핵화를 선언하고 있지만, 우리가 추구하는 진정한 한반도 비핵화를 완성하기 위해서는 보다 실질적인 준비와 대비가 필요하다. 현대 국제사회에서는 약육강식의 논리가 정확히 적용된다. 준비되지 않은 국가가 상대방의 선의만 믿고 실질적인 대비를 하지 않으면, 그 국가는 역사 속에 존재할 수 없다. 따라서 우리가 현시점에서 준비해야 할 최우선 과제는 북한이 보유한 대량살상무기의 실체에 대하여 완벽한 정보를 확보하고 관리하는 것이다. 특히나 북한이 보유한 대량살상무기는 그 피해의 치명성으로 인하여 조기에 파악하고 이에 대한 대비가 필수적이다. 따라서 본 연구는 우리 국민과 국가 생존에 직결되는 위중한 사안(事案)인 북한 대량살상무기 위협에 대한 정확한 정보획득을 위해 현대화된 기술정보의 본질적인 한계를 보완하기 하면서, 대량살상무기를 유형별로 구분하여 이에 대한 인간 정보 운용방안을 구체화하였다.

• 방사성폐기물학회지
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.143-151
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• 2009

최근 미-북간 관계 개선 등으로 인하여 북핵 문제가 핵 검증단계로 진전될 것이라는 예상이 나오고 있다. 이제부터 우리 정부는 북핵 프로그램의 성공적 검증 폐기를 위해, 북한의 신고 후 전개될 상황에 대비하여 철저히 준비해야 한다. 본 논문에서는 구 소련과 이라크의 대량살상무기 검증 폐기 사례로부터 두 나라의 대량살상무기 검증 폐기 과정에서 발생한 문제점을 조사 분석하여, 북핵 검증 폐기 과정 시 발생할 수 있는 문제점을 파악하고 이를 방지하기 위한 정책적 고려사항을 도출하는데 목적을 두었다.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.71-96
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• 2017

이 연구는 북한 핵위협에 대한 대응과 미래 한반도 통일과정에서 한 미 중 3개국의 공조체제와 협력구상에 관한 것이다. 북핵문제와 한반도 통일문제에서 한 미 중의 공조와 협력 및 역할과 책임에 있어서 한국은 민족분단의 당사자이고, 미국은 국제문제의 책임국가이자 북한과는 적대적 미수교국이라는 점이며, 중국은 전통적 사회주의 우호관계의 당사국이자 북한 후견인 당사국이라는 점을 지적할 수 있다. 북한의 핵무기와 탄도미사일 등의 전략무기는 국제적 문제로서 향후 김정은의 돌발적 행동에 대비하기 위해서는 한 미 중 3국의 적극적인 공조와 협력 등 대응방안이 모색되어져야 할 시점이다. 그러나 북핵문제의 로드맵에 있어서 G2체제의 미국과 중국의 인식과 대응방법은 유엔안 보리결의사항인 대북제재 이행에서 미묘한 차이를 보이고 있다. 미국은 북핵위협에 대해 한미동맹차원에서 공동위협에 기반한 대북제재와 대북군사력 억제정책을 강력히 추진한 반면, 중국은 북핵위협에 대해 미국의 한반도개입에 대한 안보불안 등으로 북핵해결 과정에서 소극적인 입장을 보이고 있다. 북한은 체제생존 차원에서 중동국가들과 전략무기 거래를 지속적으로 해 온 전례국가라는 점에서 세계평화유지 차원에서라도 중단된 6자회담 다자안보 채널가동 등 압박과 외교협상의 현실적 방안으로 전환해야 한다. 한반도 통일문제는 남북한 당사자의 문제가 전제되어야 함에도 남북한은 민족적 문제를 강대국에 논리에 편승하려는 기현상을 보이고 있다. 그럼에도 북핵과 남북통일문제는 민족 당사자문제로서 국제적 지지를 확보하지 못한 북한의 해법보다는 한국주도의 평화적 해법에 더 설득력이 있어 보인다. 하지만 한 미 중은 한반도 평화정착을 위한 북한에 대한 '대북제재'와 '북한과의 대화'라는 투트랙 전략을 전방위적으로 강구해 나갈 필요성이 있으며, 북한자체의 경제적 자생력을 꾸준히 향상시키는 지원노력을 지속적으로 추진해 나가야 한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.43-81
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• 2016

Security environment we face in the Korean Peninsula is unexpectable. Tensions between Seoul and Pyeongyang and its threats are continuously evolving. Kim Jung Un will keep on conducting provocations and DPRK's isolation will result uncertainty to their objective and intention. KPA is centered on ground forces with conventional weapons but they possess modernized missiles and nuclear capabilities. What's more concerning is that North Korea continuously pursue and develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Pursuing defense reform is inevitable for the ROK to deal adequately against the security threats posed by the North and to prepare for the environment of future warfare. If we are satisfied with the current capabilities then our military capabilities and security status will retrogress. We have to reorganize our units to make a small but FMC, smart military organization. Organization analysis is an urgent issue for reorganizing units. However, it isn't an easy task to reform an organization. There are vague parts for analysis and strong resistance from the people within the organization. Therefore should not focus on the reduction of people and the organization. Organization reform should be done with the acknowledgement of most of the personnel and should focus on the task and its method. These should be reflected to the organization analysis.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.32-64
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• 2015

This paper examines the types and trends of North Korea's military provocations and regional maritime threats against South Korea, and is focusing on the Republic of Korea's naval development and modernizations by the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on future actions, what directions of the ROKN has taken thus far in response, as well as an examination of how the ROKN might respond to vulnerabilities identified throughout modern history. Importantly, this paper does not consider the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global political dimensions of the situation on the Korean Peninsula; nor does it consider the North Korea's transitional power politics, but including North Korea's nuclear program and submarine-launched ballistic missile developments, as a caveat, this paper is based on open sources in Korean and English language, and thus information concerning provocations is indicative only.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.127-135
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• 2017

현재 북한에서 3대 세습체제의 김정은은 역대 김일성과 김정일 정권보다 더욱 호전적으로 핵 및 미사일 도발을 자행하고 있다. 대한민국의 역대 정부는 나름대로의 북한의 도발을 억제하는 노력과 한반도에서의 평화정착을 위한 방안을 제시하여 왔지만 결과론적으로는 통치자로서의 기본 역할에 국한되어 온 것이 사실이다. 2017년 2월 미국의 트럼프 행정부 출범에 따라 미국 대선 과정에서의 공약과 현재에는 대통령령으로서의 통치 스타일을 고려할 때 한반도 문제와 관련하여 다소 희망적이었던 것은 사실이나, 최근 들어 트럼프 대통령의 한반도 관련 다양한 발언은 우리의 상황을 암울하게 하고 있다. 이의 연장에서 김정은의 핵 및 미사일 집착은 역대 북한 정권이 기초를 닦아놓았고 이제 마무리하여 실전배치를 앞둔 상황에서 핵 및 미사일의 경량화, 고도화, 다종화를 기치로 더욱 무모한 도발을 하고 있는 현실이다. 이에 우리는 현재 안보상황을 과거처럼 타국에만 의존할 수 없으며, 대한민국 스스로 무엇을 어떻게 할 것인가를 찾기 위해 북한의 핵 및 미사일 도발을 중심으로 대응방안을 제시하고자 한다.