[KSCI] Korea Science Citation Index Service

http://dx.doi.org/10.7733/jnfcwt.2022.008

What are Technical Hurdles of Verification for North Korea's Nuclear Program?

Choi, Sungyeol (Seoul National University)
Jun, Eunju (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)

Publication Information

Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT) / v.20, no.1, 2022 , pp. 111-118 More about this Journal

Abstract

The denuclearization of North Korea was unpredictable and resulted in radical changes. Despite the skepticism and disappointment surrounding denuclearization, it is important for certain verification technologies to establish what is technically possible or practically impossible, and how reliable these technical means are. This article presents the technical hurdles in nuclear verification by systematically categorizing them into issues of correctness and completeness. Moreover, it addresses the safety and security risks during the denuclearization process, including the radiological impact on humans, environmental effects, and the illegal transfer of material, information, and technologies.

Keywords

Denuclearization; Nuclear weapons; Enrichment; Reprocessing; Correctness; Completeness;

Citations & Related Records

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