• Korean Security Journal
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• no.53
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• pp.255-279
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• 2017

The development of North Korea's nuclear weapons has worsened to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and despite the sanctions of the international community including our government, we have not been able to offer clear solutions and alternatives, and the current measures are not enough in case of North Korea is using nuclear weapons. This study suggests how we should be prepared against the use of nuclear weapons under the premise that North Korea will never give up development of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The first chapter outlines the current status of our preparedness if North Korea makes a nuclear attack. The second chapter analyzes and evaluates the power of nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear weapons threat. In the third chapter, we analyze North Korea nuclear attack and analyze the wartime emergency situation and civil defense posture. Finally, in order to implement the solutions presented in the text, we will identify priorities and summarize further developments.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.110-134
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• 2023

North Korea's development and deployment of nuclear weapons increases Pyongyang's diplomatic bargaining leverage. It is a strategic response to counteract the great expansion in US leverage with the collapse of the USSR. Post-Cold War American influence and hegemony is justified partly by claiming victory in successfully containing an allegedly imperialist Soviet Union. The US created and led formal and informal international institutions as part of its decades-long containment grand strategy against the USSR. The US now exploits these institutions to expedite US unilateral global preeminence. Third World regimes perceived as remnants of the Cold War era that resist accommodating to American demands are stereotyped as rogue states. Rogue regimes are criminal offenders who should be brought to justice, i.e. regime change is required. The initiation of summit diplomacy between US President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un occurred following the January 2018 Hawaiian ballistic missile false alarm. This event and its political consequences illustrate the efficacy of nuclear weapons as bargaining leverage for so-called rogue actors. North Korea is highly unlikely to surrender those weapons that were the instigation for the subsequent summit diplomacy that occurred. A broader, critical trend-focused strategic analysis is necessary to adopt a longer-term view of the on-going Korean nuclear crisis. The aim would be to conceptualize long-term policies that increase the probability that nuclear weapons capability becomes a largely irrelevant issue in interaction between Pyongyang, Seoul, Beijing and Washington.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.411-416
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• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_1
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• pp.107-114
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• 2016

The North Korean regime, Kim Jungun's foreign policy is changed frequently. And their military policy has no gravity. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long range missile. Now they have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. These activities redound a great threat in Korean peninsula. There are a no possibilities to give up its nuclear weapons and missile development. For the peace in Korean peninsula, we should make North Korea to abandon its nuclear himself through effective sanctions. Now China should effort to control North Korea. To reduce the threat we should coordinate the strategic interests of China and US. This study is to predict the North Korea military activities to analyze "military policies."

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.5
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.299-304
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• 2024

Beyond the first nuclear age, which pitted the United States and the Soviet Union against each other, we are now in the second nuclear age, in which the decision-makers of nuclear weapons are diversified among countries large and small. India and Pakistan, two such countries, are antagonistic toward each other and possess nuclear weapons, but their nuclear posture and nuclear strategies are different. The examples of these two countries can provide clues to the future nuclear posture of North Korea, which faces South Korea. In particular, Pakistan's chosen posture of pre-emptive deterrence is a highly offensive nuclear posture that threatens to use nuclear weapons against an adversary to deter aggression. This is an option that can be accomplished even with a small nuclear arsenal that can be used as a first strike, so it seems to be the optimal posture for a nuclear-powered Pakistan to choose in response to an Indian threat. North Korea, which is outgunned by the United States and South Korea, is likely to continue to threaten to use nuclear weapons preemptively like Pakistan. However, it is expected to be defensive and quite conservative, like India, until it actually uses them to maintain its regime.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.1102-1112
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• 2012

The policy of the United States is a Korean Peninsula free of all nuclear weapons. The United States government was considering the possibility of military action to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Talk of military action peaked from mid-1993 through mid-1994. Such an attack might have led directly to a Korean war. At that time the nuclear crisis solutioned by North Korea-United States negotiation and ROK-United States alliance. PSI's purpose is to prevent or at least inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors whose possession would be a serious threat to global or regional security. The most controversial activity of PSI is interdiction. North Korea has expressed grave concern over the initiative, stating that it has a sovereign right to develop, deploy, and export weapons, and that it would view any interdiction of its ships as a declaration of war. If South Korea is to execute interdiction North Korean ships expect tensions to increase dramatically on the peninsula with North Korea doing something quite provacative in response. South Korea cannot help approaching PSI with great caution, since it has to consider the ROK-United States alliance, and inter-Korean relations.