• Strategy21
• /
• 통권39호
• /
• pp.5-46
• /
• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• 한국과 국제사회
• /
• 제1권2호
• /
• pp.171-208
• /
• 2017

본 논문은 북한 핵전략의 유형적 특징과 전망을 분석하기 위한 것이다. 이를 위해 핵전략의 개념과 유형, 북한의 핵능력과 선언적 핵전략, 북한 핵전략의 운용상의 특징과 전망을 살펴본 후 결론에서 우리의 대응을 도출해본 것이다. 최근 북한의 핵무기 배치와 핵능력 증강은 우리의 안보와 군사적 대비태세에 매우 심각한 문제를 제기하고 있다. 핵전략이란 핵무기의 구성 배치 운용을 둘러싼 군사전략을 의미한다. 북한의 핵전략에 대한 연구는 북한의 핵무장이 실체화되었다는 매우 현실적인 가정에서 출발한다. 우리 국방당국이 북핵에 대한 대응책으로 선제공격, 미사일방어, 대량응징보복 개념을 제시하고 그 도입과 전개를 서두르는 것은 북한의 핵무장을 전제로 한 조치이다. 표출된 북한의 선언적 핵전략은 (1)'핵보유국법'상의 핵억제 보복전략, (2)핵선제공격론, (3)제7차 당대회에 나타난 '핵선제 불사용원칙으로, 그리고 북한 핵전략의 저의 및 운용상의 특징은 (1)기존핵국가 관행모방을 통한 비난회피, (2)선언적 핵전략을 통한 자신의 핵전략의 호도, (3)핵전력과 핵태세간 격차로 인한 핵전략의 미정착 등으로 각각 요약해 볼 수 있다. 북한은 개정헌법(2012.7), '핵무력과 경제건설의 병진노선(2013.3),' 그리고 핵보유국법(2013.4) 등을 통해 스스로 핵보유국임을 규정 선언하고 있다. 하지만 '핵보유국(핵국가)' 지위는 오로지 NPT만 부여할 수 있는데, 이것은 이미 닫힌 시스템이다. 현실적으로 우리가 당면한 북핵위협을 억제 극복해 나가기 위해서는 튼튼한 한미동맹과 긴밀한 한미 공조하에 북한핵의 억제는 물론 비핵화 무력화를 위한 우리의 단 중 장기적인 정치 군사적 대응책의 수립 이행노력이 긴요하다.

• 인간식물환경학회지
• /
• 제22권6호
• /
• pp.563-573
• /
• 2019

The North Korean government conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 and more recently the sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017. In order to identify how North Korea's nuclear tests have affected the environment, a scientific approach is required. Although North Korea's nuclear tests and their environmental destruction are not a severe threat to the environment of the Korean Peninsula at this time, identifying environmental damage and taking countermeasures in advance are essential to minimize their potential threats to the environments. The purpose of this study is to study the environmental impact of North Korea's nuclear tests using Google Earth image analysis. As a method of the study, we compare Google Earth images taken before and after each nuclear test was conducted in North Korea. To overcome limitations of the suggested comparison method, we cross-checked our results with those of previous scientific research. After the 1st-3rd nuclear tests, green spaces were found to be considerably reduced. In particular, when comparing the Google Earth images before and after the second nuclear test, some ground subsidences were observed. Such subsidences can cause tunnels on the mountainsides and cracks in rocks around the mountains, leading to the release of radioactive materials and contaminating groundwater. Besides, after the 4th-6th nuclear tests, decay and deforestation were observed not in the nuclear test sites, but in their surrounding areas. Especially after the 5th and 6th nuclear tests, the topography and the forests of the surrounding areas were severely damaged. In relation to North Korea's nuclear tests and their impact on the natural environment, we need to prepare various policy measures to reduce North Korea's environmental pollution and natural environment destruction. Those policy measures include the establishment of various cooperative governance between the Korean government, the private sector, the academia, NGOs, and international organizations.

• 국제지역연구
• /
• 제13권4호
• /
• pp.3-22
• /
• 2010

본 연구의 목적은 제2차 북한의 핵 위기 특히 2006년 10월 북한의 핵실험 이후 중국의 대북 정책이 왜 압박과 유인 정책간의 혼선을 보이고 있는지를 분석하는데 있다. 본 연구는 혼선을 보이고 있는 중국의 대북 정책의 근본적인 원인이 북한에 대해 중국이 갖고 있는 두 가지 목표 즉 한반도와 동북아시아의 안정 그리고 한반도의 비핵화간에 존재하는 딜레마로 인한 것이라고 주장한다. 북한이 핵개발 의도를 가시화하고 중국 역시 자국 안보의 위협으로 중재자의 역할을 자처하게 되면서 북한에 대한 중국의 목표는 상호 모순적인 상황에 처하게 되었다. 중국이 북한에 대해 갖고 있는 두 가지 목표는 1978년 개혁개방 이후부터 중국의 기본노선인 '경제발전'을 이룩하기 위해 추구해온 주변 지역 안정과 직결되기 때문에 중국의 대북 목표 전환은 그리 쉽지 않다. 따라서 북한이 비핵화에 대한 노력을 기울이지 않고 중국이 북한에 대해 한반도 평화와 비핵화라는 두 가지 목표를 지속한다면, 북한에 대한 중국 정책의 혼선은 앞으로도 지속될 것으로 전망할 수 있다.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권5호
• /
• pp.173-202
• /
• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.5-26
• /
• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권3호
• /
• pp.169-196
• /
• 2005

The point of Bush administraion’s foreign policy is to support the promotion and stability of Democracy in Iraq and counter terrorism and spread of WMD with his strong propulsive force caused by his reelection. In such an environment, there are his leadership, his team, himself, Kim Jung Il, and a new understanding of North Korea after September 11 as the effective factors of Bush administration’s policy toward Pyongyang. Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea also shows the process of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program and the future scenario of the Korean Peninsula with "the persistence of solving North Korea’s nuclear weapon program such as the method having done in Lybia", "the holding unconditional talks with Pyongyang, and "the continual concerns with human rights in North Korea." The purpose of Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea is to make North Korea do not support terrorism rather than remove the nuclear weapon in North Korea. The process of outlining South Korea’s policy toward North Korea must be considered for "national interest" with reasonable analyses not just hopes For this, South Korea must access systematically human rights of North Korea, prepare projects for a daring approach on North Korea, and strengthen South Korea’s defense ability toward North Korea with deep alliance with U.S and systematize the mutual understanding channel between U.S and South Korea. In conclusion, South Korea must try to get specific methods and practices about Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea with national wisdom

• 융합보안논문지
• /
• 제17권2호
• /
• pp.127-135
• /
• 2017

현재 북한에서 3대 세습체제의 김정은은 역대 김일성과 김정일 정권보다 더욱 호전적으로 핵 및 미사일 도발을 자행하고 있다. 대한민국의 역대 정부는 나름대로의 북한의 도발을 억제하는 노력과 한반도에서의 평화정착을 위한 방안을 제시하여 왔지만 결과론적으로는 통치자로서의 기본 역할에 국한되어 온 것이 사실이다. 2017년 2월 미국의 트럼프 행정부 출범에 따라 미국 대선 과정에서의 공약과 현재에는 대통령령으로서의 통치 스타일을 고려할 때 한반도 문제와 관련하여 다소 희망적이었던 것은 사실이나, 최근 들어 트럼프 대통령의 한반도 관련 다양한 발언은 우리의 상황을 암울하게 하고 있다. 이의 연장에서 김정은의 핵 및 미사일 집착은 역대 북한 정권이 기초를 닦아놓았고 이제 마무리하여 실전배치를 앞둔 상황에서 핵 및 미사일의 경량화, 고도화, 다종화를 기치로 더욱 무모한 도발을 하고 있는 현실이다. 이에 우리는 현재 안보상황을 과거처럼 타국에만 의존할 수 없으며, 대한민국 스스로 무엇을 어떻게 할 것인가를 찾기 위해 북한의 핵 및 미사일 도발을 중심으로 대응방안을 제시하고자 한다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권41호
• /
• pp.208-231
• /
• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권8호
• /
• pp.271-309
• /
• 2010

The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.