• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.111-118
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• 2022

The denuclearization of North Korea was unpredictable and resulted in radical changes. Despite the skepticism and disappointment surrounding denuclearization, it is important for certain verification technologies to establish what is technically possible or practically impossible, and how reliable these technical means are. This article presents the technical hurdles in nuclear verification by systematically categorizing them into issues of correctness and completeness. Moreover, it addresses the safety and security risks during the denuclearization process, including the radiological impact on humans, environmental effects, and the illegal transfer of material, information, and technologies.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.71-77
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• 2023

The issue of North Korea's denuclearization is an global issue that transcends the North and South. It is necessary to prepare for the denuclearization process in preparation for the situation in which North Korea reveals its intention to denuclearize. In the process of North Korea's denuclearization, it is required to guarantee the normal operation of the denuclearization verification equipment. If a performance test criteria that takes into account the North Korean environment is established, it is highly likely that it will be used in the future denuclearization process. For this purpose, basic materials related to performance test standards were established through analysis of test standards such as international standards. After that, we established a performance test criteria. This includes high temperature, low temperature, humidity, vibration and shock tests. Through follow-up studies, validity of test criteria will be established through actual device testing.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.481-487
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• 2023

After conducting a hydrogen bomb test and launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 2017, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea, D.P.R.K.) declared the completion of its national nuclear capabilities. Currently, North Korea is refusing all nuclear inspections, but the possibility of nuclear inspections and the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula still exists. The Republic of Korea (South Korea, Rep. of Korea) has numerous reasons as a neighboring country to participate in North Korea's nuclear inspections and denuclearization, including technological capabilities, geographical proximity, and linguistic benefits. This study assumes nuclear inspections and verification within North Korea and aims to propose scenarios for the transportation and operation of personnel and equipment. The data and results compiled through this research are anticipated to serve as foundational information for future inspections and verifications on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it is assessed that they could contribute to the development of strategies in preparation for participation in denuclearization efforts.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.101-110
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• 2020

Since the third inter-Korean summit, the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore and Hanoi, denuclearization negotiations are under way that will determine the fate of the Korean Peninsula. However, the negotiations are stalled and some skepticism is expected due to the conflicting U.S.-North Korea stance over the terms of denuclearization. The reason why it is difficult to realize the complete denuclearization of North Korea is that there are a variety of variables such as the traditional security dilemma in Northeast Asia, the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China, and the formation of a new cold-war system. At a turning point when three inter-Korean summits and three U.S.-North Korea summits were held in the wake of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, North Korea's complete denuclearization has become a must-do historical task for Northeast Asia and world peace beyond the Korean Peninsula. In this sense, the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang is seen as a historic occasion for presenting a new milestone for the denuclearization of North Korea and the development of inter-Korean relations through the 9.19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Military Agreement. Meanwhile, Constructivism, which has become the main paradigm of international political theory, presents the view that ideological variables such as ideology, history and culture define material factors, identity and interests of state actors, and that the structure of international relations can be changed through interaction. In this study, the historical meaning of the 9.19 Pyongyang Declaration, which is now past its first anniversary, was considered from a constructivist perspective. To this end, the development process of constructivism theory and analysis model and the development process of inter-Korean relations were briefly reviewed, and the military implications of the 9.19 Military Agreement were presented.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.3-22
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• 2010

The objective of this paper is to analyze why China's policy toward North Korea after the second North Korean nuclear crisis have plunged into the dilemma between pressure and inducement. This paper stress that dilemma between China's two aims toward North, that is, stability in Korean peninsula and North East Asia, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that can explain China's inconsistent policies on North Korea. As North Korea publicly revealed the intention of nuclear development and China has played the mediator role for protecting its security, China's two aims toward North have faced the situation of a dilemma. Because China's two aims are directly related with stability in the neighbor that pursuit to perform 'economic development' since 1978, China's two aims toward North would not be changed easily. Therefore, as long as North Korea would not make an effort on denuclearization and China continually would maintain two aims on North, it will be continued a dilemma between China's policies toward North.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.89-99
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• 2018

In the year 2018, South Korea faces a crucial decision with regard to reunification. Starting from inter-Korean and US-North summits held from April through June, A rough journey for North Korea's "Complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" began. Although South Korea insists that North Korea's Nuclear 'CVID' is the only minimum condition in the process of peaceful reunification, North Korea and other countries who support North Korea, including China and Russia, will possibly claim that North Korea's Nuclear 'CVID' will minimize their political and military positions internationally. Despite representatives from each country agreeing to North Korea's denuclearization, it is inevitable that many challenges still need to be resolved during the process. From the perspective of the Chinese government, North Korea is not a country that stimulates international conflicts. Instead, China can utilize North Korea as their political and tactical leverage against the US in order to compete for hegemonic power in Asia. In order to reject the emerging supremacy of China and resolve uncertainties in the denuclearization agreement and implementation process, I suggest the necessity of 'Korea-Japan Security Cooperation' as a 'second alternative' to achieve the North Korea's Nuclear 'CVID'.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.135-144
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• 2019

Recently, the Kim Jong Eun regime announced the completion of nuclear armed forces, and has been holding a summit meeting between the ROK and the US administration to promote the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by the complete dismissal of the North Korean nuclear weapons toward the international community and the Republic of Korea. North Korea's Kim Jong Eun declares complete denuclearization, but in order to complete the real denuclearization of the Korean peninsula we seek, we need more practical preparation and preparation. In modern international society, the jungle law logic is applied precisely. A country that is not prepared cannot exist in history unless it believes only the good will of the other party and makes substantial preparations. Therefore, the top priority for us to prepare at this point is to obtain and manage complete information on the reality of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. In particular, the weapons of mass destruction possessed by North Korea must be identified early on, and preparations for such weapons are essential, due to the seriousness of the damage. Therefore, this study complements the inherent limitations of modernized technology information in order to obtain accurate information on North Korea's threat of weapons of mass destruction, which is a serious issue directly linked to the survival of the Korean people and the state, And the operation plan was specified.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.281-285
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• 2024

Within five years of Kim Jong-un's rise to power, North Korea conducted four nuclear tests and launched the Hwasong-15, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in 2017, declaring the completion of its nuclear forces. During the period when Kim Jong-un completed nuclear forces to maintain the regime, foreign policy factors of the United States, China, Russia, and South Korea drove North Korea's accelerated nuclear development. The main motivating factors were the hostile policies and external threats as security factors. The completion of nuclear forces is also the result of the interplay of domestic political factors, normative factors, and hereditary factors. North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons and missiles for the survival of its regime. To achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, a new modus vivendi must be sought. It is necessary to set the ultimate goal of North Korea's complete denuclearization and engage in strategic thinking for a realistic and effective phased approach.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.