• ETRI Journal
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• 제36권1호
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• pp.31-41
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• 2014

The heterogeneous network (HetNet) has been discussed in detail in the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and LTE Advanced standards. However, the standardization of High-Speed Packet Access HetNet (HSPA HetNet) launched by 3GPP is pushing at full steam. Interference coordination (IC), which is responsible for dealing with the interference in the system, remains a subject worthy of investigation in regard to HSPA HetNet. In this paper, considering the network framework of HSPA HetNet, we propose a quasi-distributed IC (QDIC) scheme to lower the interference level in the co-channel HSPA HetNet. Our QDIC scheme is constructed as slightly different energy-efficient non-cooperative games in the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) scenarios, respectively. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for these games are first revealed. Then, we derive the closed-form best responses of these games. A feasible implementation is finally developed to achieve our QDIC scheme in the practical DL and UL. Simulation results show the notable benefits of our scheme, which can indeed control the interference level and enhance the system performance.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2006년도 제37회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.361-362
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• 2006

This paper presents the result of survey and analysis on a theoretical approach to the application of incomplete information game in deregulated Power Pools. The deregulation power market arc modeled by the incomplete information game. The case where participants have incomplete information about the operation costs of other participants are highlighted. Pool participants define transactions to maximize their benefit in non-cooperative situation, the ISO defines transactions among participants by looking for minimum price that satisfies the demand in the Pool. The incomplete information game determines Nash equilibrium satisfied Pool participants and the ISO.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제22권3호
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• pp.113-143
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• 1997

Most of the conflict problems between 2 persons can be represented as a bi-matrix game, because player's utilities, in general, are non-zero sum and change according to the progress of game. In the bi-matrix game the equilibrium point set which satisfies the Pareto optimality can be a good bargaining or coordination solution. Under the condition of incomplete information about the risk attitudes of the players, the bargaining or coordination solution depends on additional elements, namely, the players' methods of making inferences when they reach a node in the extensive form of the game that is off the equilibrium path. So the investigation about the players' inference type and its effects on the solution is essential. In addition to that, the effect of an individual's aversion to risk on various solutions in conflict problems, as expressed in his (her) utility function, must be considered. Those kinds of incomplete information make decision maker Bayesian, since it is often impossible to get correct information for building a decision making model. In Baysian point of view, this paper represents an analytic frame for guessing and learning opponent's attitude to risk for getting better reward. As an example for that analytic frame. 2 persons'bi-matrix game is considered. This example explains that a bi-matrix game can be transformed into a kind of matrix game through the players' implicitly cooperative attitude and the need of arbitration.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권10호
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• pp.3867-3886
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• 2015

This article investigates the problem of opportunistic spectrum access in dynamic environment, in which the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is time-varying. Different from existing work on continuous feedback, we consider more practical scenarios in which the transmitter receives an Acknowledgment (ACK) if the received SNR is larger than the required threshold, and otherwise a Non-Acknowledgment (NACK). That is, the feedback is discrete. Several applications with different threshold values are also considered in this work. The channel selection problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and subsequently it is proved to be a potential game, which has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Following this, a multi-agent Q-learning algorithm is proposed to converge to Nash equilibria of the game. Furthermore, opportunistic spectrum access with multiple discrete feedbacks is also investigated. Finally, the simulation results verify that the proposed multi-agent Q-learning algorithm is applicable to both situations with binary feedback and multiple discrete feedbacks.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2000년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.403-405
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• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제4A권4호
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제29권1호
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• pp.81-93
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• 2011

본 연구는 다수단 교통망에서 교통시설 운영자와 이용자의 상호 의사결정과정을 고려하여 교통시설의 건설 및 운영 정책 문제를 해결하기 위한 다수단 연속형 교통망 설계문제를 다룬다. 특히, 교통시설에 대한 정책변화에 따라 교통수단간 통행이 어떻게 변화하는가를 고려하기 위하여 승용차 교통망과 대중교통 교통망을 함께 고려하고자한다. 이러한 교통망 설계 모형을 개발함에 있어서 일반적인 Nash 균형(비협력 게임)의 접근법이 아닌 좀 더 합리적이라고 연구되어진 Stackelberg 균형(협력적 게임)의 접근법을 이용하고 그러한 방법으로 다수단 교통망의 교통수단 선택을 고려한 민감도 분석 방법을 적용한다. 본 연구의 다수단 연속형 교통망 설계 모형은 교통정책 결정에 대한 임의의 연속형 교통망 설계변수(${\epsilon},\hat{\epsilon},p$)에 대해서 개발되어진다. 또한 모형의 적용 및 평가를 위하여 1)도로 정책에 대한 최적 도로용량 산정과 2)대중교통 정책에 대한 최적 대중교통 노선빈도 산정 그리고 3)교통체계의 수단분담 정책에 대한 현 교통체계의 최적 목표 수단분담율 산정 문제에 모형을 적용하여 본다.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제11권3호
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• pp.91-104
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• 2001

Like other communication networks, the Internet is establishing and reinforcing connections between market participants. By adapting to these networks, market participants are able to obtain the power of network to create new benefits in on-line markets. In this paper, we develop three stage non-cooperative game models to analyze the community related business market in electronic commerce where network externalities are present. It is found that, regardless of its market share, individual firm in a market tends to favor a community network. The analysis also shows there exist some possibilities that these community networks can trap the market in an inferior state when better alternatives are available to yield greater social welfare.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제16권3호
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• pp.229-241
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• 2006

In this paper, we develop three stage non-cooperative game models to analyze the alliance strategies of companies in internet markets where network effects are present. Regardless of its market share, an internet company's strategic alliance appears to be a superior strategy. The analysis also identifies profit sharing structures in the internet market where a smaller and unknown company is enforced to split its own profits with a larger and well-known company. It is shown that the amount of profit sharing grows as the size of network effects becomes larger.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제7권6호
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• pp.1379-1397
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• 2013

We consider a system where a licensed radio spectrum is shared by multiple primary users(PUs) and secondary users(SUs). As the spectrum of interest is licensed to primary network, power and channel allocation must be carried out within the cognitive radio network so that no excessive interference is caused to PUs. For this system, we study the joint beamforming and power allocation problem via game theory in this paper. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative beamforming and power allocation game, subject to the interference constraints of PUs as well as the peak transmission power constraints of SUs. We design a joint beamforming and power allocation algorithm for maximizing the total throughput of SUs, which is implemented by alternating iteration of minimum mean square error based decision feedback beamforming and a best response based iterative power allocation algorithm. Simulation results show that the algorithm has better performance than an existing algorithm and can converge to a locally optimal sum utility.