• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.3-28
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• 2014

This article examines the Annulment Mechanism of arbitral awards rendered under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The primary feature in the ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration regarding the review of awards involves the unified nature of the ICSID system, as compared to the scattered and multi-layered system of review existing under arbitration rules, national legislation, and international convention. This unity can be perceived at different levels. The ICSID annulment mechanism entails only a set of rules; thus, only one set of application standards of review will be implemented, as opposed to sometimes conflicting layers of application rules, laws, and convention, as in the case of non-ICSID arbitration. However, some of the recent annulment decisions have raised serious questions about the breadth of annulment in practice, as opposed to its original design. Nonetheless, implementing a new system under the ICSID awards to be reviewed by an appellate court appears to create more problems than it solves. The potential impact of introducing that mechanism could result in a longer and more complex proceeding, with uncertain benefits.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.3-21
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• 2020

This study focuses on the binding power of the interim measures of the arbitral tribunal in ICSID arbitration and the effects of non-compliance. Upon consideration of the intentions of those who made these rules, given the interpretation of the provisions of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Article 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, it was found reasonable to consider that the interim measures made by the arbitral tribunal in ICSID arbitration were not binding. However, in actual ICSID arbitration, most arbitral tribunals approve the binding power of the interim measures based on the purposes and the characteristics of the interim measures. As such, there is a certain distance between the legislative intention for interim measures in ICSID arbitration and the judicial practice, but considering the demand for maintaining the integrity of the arbitration procedure, it is reasonable to consider that the interim measures are binding. In addition, the fact that the interim measures have binding power can increase the possibility that the party will comply with the interim measures. Thus, the binding power of interim measures not only encourages voluntary compliance to the interim measures of the party, but can also cause negative consequences for the party if it is not met. In other words, the arbitral tribunal will be able to form negative inferences against the party who does not comply with it in a procedural side, and in the practical side, the party who does not comply with the interim measures will be compensated for the additional damages for non-compliance.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.141-165
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• 2007

This study aims to make a contribution to the promotion of trade and economic development of South Korea, and, at the same time, call attention to the increasing trend of investment agreements concluded within Free Trade Agreements (FTA) by examining theoretically FTAs and dispute resolution and investigating systematically the conclusion procedure of agreements, and the system, institutions, and jurisdiction of dispute resolution, and presenting these findings to the government and investors involved. The most problematic aspect in the legal process of arbitration involving disputes over investment is that of arguments concerning the right of jurisdiction. When a dispute arises, even though an investor files for arbitration at an ICSID institution, the parties become involved in another energy-consuming argument even before proceeding to the hearing and decision of the original plan in cases in which the respondent of the dispute files an objection to the decision rights of the arbitral tribunal. As the main basis for this type of plea, the point of non-existence of jurisdiction is first raised where the applicable dispute does not fall under the range of investments defined in individual investment contracts or investment agreements such as a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). To avoid an open-ended definition of investment for the range of investments, articles concerning investments in the FTA and NAFTA between Canada and the USA adopt the limited closed-list method. Article 96 of the FTA between Japan and Mexico applied the same abovementioned method of limited form of definition regarding range of investments and concluded BITs between member countries of APEC applied a similar method as well. Instead of employing the previously used inclusive definition, the BITs concluded between countries of Latin America and the USA are equipped with limited characteristics of an investment. Furthermore, to correspond with this necessary condition the three following requirements are needed : 1) fixed investment funding; 2) expected profits resulting from such investments; 3) and the existence of fixed risk bearing.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.68
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• pp.65-87
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• 2015

This article examines the Stay of Enforcement of ICSID Arbitration Award. The effect of the stay is that the award is not subject to enforcement proceedings under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention pending the outcome of the annulment application. The annulment committee must decide the stay, unless the applicant sought the stay with the request for annulment, in which case the ICSID Secretary -General must grant it automatically. This automatic stay -which can only relate to the entire award-remains in force until the committee is constituted and issues a decision on the request for stay. ICSID committees have taken different positions on whether a stay of enforcement is exceptional or not. Some committees have held that because the ICSID Convention explicitly recognizes that the rights of the award creditor could be subject to a stay, stays are not exceptional. ICSID practice shows that most committees have rejected the proposition that the merits and prospects of the application for annulment should influence the committee's decision whether to grant a stay. In addition, ICSID practice regarding the specific circumstances that will justify a stay of enforcement is unclear, and committees have focused on different factors to decide whether to grant a stay such as prospect of prompt compliance with the ward, hardship to one of the parties, risk of non-recovery and irreparable harm to the award debtor. Also, ICSID practice shows that even though the Convention is silent on this issue, committees have generally held that they are empowered to condition the stay of enforcement on the granting of security by the requesting party.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.45-58
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• 2014

It is a well recognised rule in international law that the property of aliens cannot be taken. The question of whether indirect expropriation and government regulatory measures require compensation is an important issue in international investment law. Bilateral investment treaties and other investment agreements contain brief and general indirect expropriation provisions. These focus on the effect of government action and do not address the distinction between compensable and non-compensable regulatory actions. It is generally accepted that a state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantages resulting from bona fide general taxation accepted as within the police power of states, provided it is not discriminatory. Yukos Oil Company is a Russian oil and gas company engaged in exploration, refining, and marketing activities. It is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world. Yukos Oil Company has its production operations in Russia and markets its products in Europe. An international tribunal ordered the Russian government to compensate a group of Spanish investors for the losses they suffered when Russia seized the Yukos Oil Company on July 26, 2012. This has been the subject of several judicial proceedings and academic publications. This paper explores which circumstances do not lead to taxation amounting to expropriation. The author suggests that under the following circumstances, taxation would not amount to expropriation. First, taxation should be non-discriminatory. Also a lawful exercise of the taxation powers of governments would not amount to expropriation.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.55
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• pp.63-93
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• 2012

The purpose of this paper is to examine the consideration factors, from both parties' perspective, to select the most appropriate arbitral institution when they inset an arbitration clause in their contract. Accordingly, the author analyzed the advantages of institutional arbitration compared to non-institutional arbitration. The typical advantages of institutional arbitration would include: $\bullet$ Benefits of using an established set of rules $\bullet$ Services provided by the institution $\bullet$ Low risks of obstruction $\bullet$ Enhancement of the possibilities of enforcement $\bullet$ Forecast of the estimated cost $\bullet$ Specially useful for existing disputes Next, this author examined the consideration factors when selecting the institution in respect of the following factors: $\bullet$ Institution's arbitration rules $\bullet$ Institution's rule regarding the appointment of arbitrators $\bullet$ Ability of administrators of each institution $\bullet$ Reputation of the arbitral institution and the likability of enforceability of its award $\bullet$ Cost $\bullet$ Choice of the arbitral institution in relation to the choice of place of arbitration Finally, this author reviewed Model Arbitration Clause of major international or local Institutions, including ICC, AAA, LCIA, KCAB, CIETAC, ICSID and WIPO. Further examination was given to the selection of the numbers of the arbitral tribunal, the seat of arbitration and the language of arbitration, according to the designated articles in each institution's arbitration rules.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.33-52
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• 2014

Although climate change is a global scale question, some concerns have been raised that principles of investment arbitration may not adequately address the domestic implementation of climate change measures. A recent ICSID investment arbitration of Vattenfall v. Germany with regard to the investor's alleged damages from the phase-out of nuclear plants is a salient climate change case. The 2005 Kyoto Protocol was made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and it provides a number of flexible mechanisms such as Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol allows dispute settlement through investor-state arbitration. Any initiation of stricter emission standards can violate the prohibition on expropriations in investment agreements, regardless of the measures created to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The effect-based expropriation doctrine can charge changes to existing emission standards as interference with the use of property that goes against the legitimate expectation of a foreign investor. In regulatory chill, threat of investor claims against the host state may preclude the strengthening of climate change measures. Stabilization clauses also have a freezing effect on the hosting state's regulation and a new law applicable to the investment. In the fair and equitable standard, basic expectations of investors when entering into earlier carbon-intensive operations can be affected by a regulation seeking to change into a low-carbon approach. As seen in the Methanex tribunal, a non-discriminatory and public purpose of environmental protection measures should be considered as non-expropriation in the arbitral tribunal unless its decision would intentionally impede a foreign investor's investment.