• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.48 no.4
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• pp.24-43
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• 2015

Since 2011, when Oegyujanggak Uigwe(Records of the State Rites of the Joseon Dynasty) were returned from France, which were looted in 1866 by the French Navy, national attention to our cultural properties abroad was explosively increased and public pressure has been mounting that those cultural properties should be returned in Korea. According to the statistics of "Overseas Korean Cultural Heritage Foundation" Korean cultural Properties, which exist in foreign countries, amounts 160,342 in total 20 countries. Among them about half of them are estimated to be illegally exported cultural property, these are to be restituted. However, in reality it is not so easy to restitute illegally exported cultural properties. For this, it needs to be established a long-term and systematic plan for return of cultural properties from other countries. This paper starts from such a critical mind and tries to find legal policy measures for the return of illegally exported cultural properties. To this end, the author first describes motive and aim of this research in chapter I. and overviews basic understanding and current situation of export of cultural property as well as means and methods of return of cultural property in chapter II. and then deals with international and national norms that are involved in the dispute concerned return of cultural properties in chapter III. Based on this research, in chapter IV., which can be considered as a key part of this paper, the author proposed nine legal policy measures for restitution of cultural properties from foreign countries. That is, actual condition survey of cultural properties in foreign countries, unified management and implement of export ID on cultural properties, fund-raising for the diversification of means of return of cultural properties. local utilization of cultural properties, joining in the multilateral conventions and expansion of the bilateral agreements, restitution and cooperation through international organizations, restitution through lawsuit and arbitration, training experts on restitution of cultural property and networking with foreign experts. Finally, the author summarized his opinion in chapter V. which comprehended researching the above.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.54 no.2
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• pp.78-97
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• 2021

Seojangdaeyajodo is a drawing of military night training on February 12th (lunar leap month), 1795. Focusing on the Seojangdaeyajodo, the characteristics and of the costumes worn by various types of officials were examined. There were 34 officials located near King Jeongjo in and around Seojangdae, with 27 Dangsanggwan and 7 Danghagwan. They wore three types of costumes, including armor, yungbok, and military uniforms. All of the twelve armor wearers and the five officials wearing yungbok were dangsanggwan, and the military uniform wearers included eleven dangsanggwan and six danghagwan. For the shape of the armor, the armor relics of General Yeoban, suitable for riding horses, and the armor painting of Muyedobotongji were referenced, and the composition of the armor was based on practicality. The armor consists of a helmet, a suit of armor, a neck guard, armpit guards, arm guards, and a crotch guard. The color of the armor was red and green, which are the most frequently used colors in Seojangdaeyajodo. The composition of yungbok was jurip, navy cheollik, red gwangdahoe, socks made of leather, and suhwaja. The composition of the military uniform was a lined jeolrip, dongdari, jeonbok, yodae, jeondae, and suhwaja. There were differences in the fabrics used in dangsanggwan and danghagwan military uniforms. Dangsanggwan used fabric with depictions of clouds and jewels, and danghagwan used unpatterned fabric. Moreover, jade, gold, and silver were used for detailed ornamental materials in dangsanggwan. The weapons included bows and a bow case, a sword, a rattan stick, wrist straps, and a ggakji. In the records of the King Jeongjo period, various colored heopsu were mentioned; the colors of the dongdari and jeonbok of dangsanggwan and danghagwan were referenced in various colors. It was presented as an illustration of costumes that could be used to produce objects accurately reflecting the above historical results. The basic principle of the illustration was to present the modeling standards for 3D content production. Samples of form, color, and material of the corresponding times and statuses were presented. The front, the side, and the back of each costume and its accessories were presented, and the colors were presented in RGB and CMYK.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.339-350
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• 2024

Purpose: This study analyzes accessibility of 10 hydrogen charging stations in Seoul and identifies areas that were difficult to access. The purpose is to re-analyze accessibility by adding a new location in terms of equity and safety of location placement, and then draw implications by comparing the improvement effects. Method: By applying the location-allocation model and the service area model based on network analysis of the ArcGIS program, areas with weak access were identified. The location selection method applied the 'Minimize Facilities' method in consideration of the need for rapid arrival to insufficient hydrogen charging stations. The limit distance for arrival within a specific time was analyzed by applying the average vehicle traffic speed(23.1km/h, Seoul Open Data Square) in 2022 to three categories: 3,850m(10minutes), 5,775m(15minutes), 7,700m(20minutes). In order to minimize conflicts over the installation of hydrogen charging stations, special standards of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy applied to derive candidate sites for additional installation of hydrogen charging stations among existing gas stations and LPG/CNG charging stations. Result: As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that accessibility was significantly improved by installing 5 new hydrogen charging stations at relatively safe gas stations and LPG/CNG charging stations in areas where access to the existing 10 hydrogen charging stations is weak within 20 minutes. Nevertheless, it was found that there are still areas where access remains difficult. Conclusion: The location allocation model is used to identify areas where access to hydrogen charging stations is difficult and prioritize installation, decision-making to select locations for hydrogen charging stations based on scientific evidence can be supported.

• Journal of Korean Society of Archives and Records Management
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.19-35
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• 2001

After almost one century of discontinuity in the archival tradition of Chosun dynasty, Korea entered the new age of records and archival management by legislating and executing the basic laws (The Records and Archives Management of Public Agencies Ad of 1999). Annals of Chosun dynasty recorded major historical facts of the five hundred years of national affairs. The Annals are major accomplishment in human history and rare in the world. It was possible because the Annals were composed of collected, selected and complied records of primary sources written and compiled by generations of historians, As important public records are needed to be preserved in original forms in modern archives, we had to develop and establish a modern archival system to appraise and select important national records for archival preservation. However, the colonialization of Korea deprived us of the opportunity to do the task, and our fine archival tradition was not succeeded. A centralized archival system began to develop since the establishment of GARS under the Ministry of Government Administration in 1969. GARS built a modem repository in Pusan in 1984 succeeding to the tradition of History Archives of Chosun dynasty. In 1998, GARS moved its headquarter to Taejon Government Complex and acquired state-of-the-art audio visual archives preservation facilities. From 1996, GARS introduced an automated archival management system to remedy the manual registration and management system complementing the preservation microfilming. Digitization of the holdings was the key project to provided the digital images of archives to users. To do this, the GARS purchased new computer/server systems and developed application softwares. Parallel to this direction, GARS drastically renovated its manpower composition toward a high level of professionalization by recruiting more archivists with historical and library science backgrounds. Conservators and computer system operators were also recruited. The new archival laws has been in effect from January 1, 2000. The new laws made following new changes in the field of records and archival administration in Korea. First, the laws regulate the records and archives of all public agencies including the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Administration, the constitutional institutions, Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Intelligence Service. A nation-wide unified records and archives management system became available. Second, public archives and records centers are to be established according to the level of the agency; a central archives at national level, special archives for the National Assembly and the Judiciary, local government archives for metropolitan cities and provinces, records center or special records center for administrative agencies. A records manager will be responsible for the records management of each administrative divisions. Third, the records in the public agencies are registered in the computer system as they are produced. Therefore, the records are traceable and will be searched or retrieved easily through internet or computer network. Fourth, qualified records managers and archivists who are professionally trained in the field of records management and archival science will be assigned mandatorily to guarantee the professional management of records and archives. Fifth, the illegal treatment of public records and archives constitutes a punishable crime. In the future, the public records find archival management will develop along with Korean government's 'Electronic Government Project.' Following changes are in prospect. First, public agencies will digitize paper records, audio-visual records, and publications as well as electronic documents, thus promoting administrative efficiency and productivity. Second, the National Assembly already established its Special Archives. The judiciary and the National Intelligence Service will follow it. More archives will be established at city and provincial levels. Third, the more our society develop into a knowledge-based information society, the more the records management function will become one of the important national government functions. As more universities, academic associations, and civil societies participate in promoting archival awareness and in establishing archival science, and more people realize the importance of the records and archives management up to the level of national public campaign, the records and archival management in Korea will develop significantly distinguishable from present practice.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.49 no.1
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• pp.4-21
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• 2016

The purpose of this study is to investigate changes of Jinju Sword Dance, characteristics of the changes, and the current condition of its preservation and succession after the designation as the important intangible cultural property no. 12 in January 16th, 1967. In other words, this study understands the situation which has established the present state of after changes over generations. As of now. the year of 2015, the 3 generation holders have been approved since 1967. In 1967, 8 members of $1^{st}$ generation holders were selected from gisaengs of Gwonbeon. However, the succession training was incomplete due to conflicts among the holders, the deaths of some holders, and economic activities of the individuals. As the need of a pivot for succession training and activities was rising, Seong, Gye-Ok was additionally approved as the $2^{nd}$ generation holder on June $21^{st}$, 1978. Seong, Gye-Ok who had never been a gisaeng had dramatically changed with a lot of new attempts. After the death of Seong, Gye-Ok in 2009, Kim, Tae-Yeon and Yu, Yeong-Hee were approved as the $3^{rd}$ generation holders in February, 2010. Based on the resources including the "Cultural Research Reports of Important Intangible Cultural Properties" in 1966 and videos up to 2014, the changes of the dance and surroundings are as follow. 1. The formation of musical accompaniment has been changed during the 3 generations. In the video of the $1^{st}$ generation(in 1970), the performance lasted about 15 minutes, whereas the performance lasted 25 minutes in the video of the $2^{nd}$ generation. Yumbuldoduri rhythm was considered as Ginyumbul(Sangryeongsan) and played more slowly. The original dance requiring only 15 rhythms was extended to 39 rhythms to provide longer performance time. In the $3^{rd}$ generation, the dance recovered 15 rhythms using the term Ginyumbul. The facts that Yumbul was played for 3 minutes in the $1^{st}$ generation but for 5 minutes in the 3rd generation shows that there was tendency pursuing the slowness from the $2^{nd}$ generation. 2. For the composition of the Dance, the performance included additional 20 rhythms of Ginyumbul and Ah(亞)-shaped formation from the $2^{nd}$ generation. From the $3^{rd}$ generation, the performance excluded the formation which had no traditional base. For the movement of the Dance, the bridge poses of Ggakjittegi and Bangsukdoli have been visibly inflexible. Also, the extention of time value in 1 beat led the Dance less vibrant. 3. At the designation as an important intangible cultural property (in 1967), the swords with rotatable necks were used, whereas the dancers had been using the swords with non-rotatable necks since late 1970s when the $2^{nd}$ generation holder began to used them. The swords in the "Research Reports" (in 1966) was pointy and semilunar, whereas the straight swords are being used currently. The use of the straight swords can be confirmed from the videos after 1970. 4. There is no change in wearing Jeonlib, Jeonbok, and Hansam, whereas the arrangement of Saekdong of Hansam was different from the arrangement shown in the "Research Reports". Also, dancers were considered to begin wearing the navy skirts when the swords with non-rotatable necks began to be used. Those results showed that has been actively changed for 50 years after the designation. The $2^{nd}$ generation holder, Seong, Gye-Ok, was the pivot of the changes. However, , which was already designated as an important intangible cultural property, is considered to be only a victim of the change experiment from the project to restore Gyobang culture in Jinju, and it is a priority to conduct studies with historical legitimacy. First of all, the slowing beat should be emphasized as the main fact to reduce both the liveliness and dynamic beauty of the Dance.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.