• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.91-114
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• 2007

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm(DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki(2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADS pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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• v.46 no.5
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• pp.36-47
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• 2009

There exists RFID reader-to reader frequency which can not recognize tag in dense reader nude because the interference causes low SIR. To solve this frequency, the many algorithms based on TDM have been proposed. But the most of existing algorithms not obtain the optimal time allocation but propose heuristic scheduling algorithm. In this paper, we apply game theory which deals with interest between players of game to RFID reader-to reader interference and analyze the time allocation problem of reader based on TDM in terms of cooperative game which the players bind agreements using Nash Bargaining Solution(NBS) and non-cooperative game which the players do not bind agreements using Nash Equilibrium(NE). The applied results show that in dense reader mode, NBS of cooperative game is superior to NE of non-cooperative game and present optimal time allocation in dense reader mode.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.11
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• pp.3674-3710
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• 2014

In this tutorial, we integrate the concept of cognitive radio technology into game theory and supermarket game theory to address the problem of resource allocation in multiuser multicarrier cognitive radio networks. In addition, multiuser multicarrier transmission technique is chosen as a candidate to study the resource allocation problem via game and supermarket game theory. This tutorial also includes various definitions, scenarios and examples related to (i) game theory (including both non-cooperative and cooperative games), (ii) supermarket game theory (including pricing, auction theory and oligopoly markets), and (iii) resource allocation in multicarrier techniques. Thus, interested readers can better understand the main tools that allow them to model the resource allocation problem in multicarrier networks via game and supermarket game theory. In this tutorial article, we first review the most fundamental concepts and architectures of CRNs and subsequently introduce the concepts of game theory, supermarket game theory and common solution to game models such as the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, a list of related studies is highlighted and compared in this tutorial.

• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.39 no.5
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• pp.745-764
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• 2002

In this paper we Study a time-optimal model of pursuit in which the players move on a plane with bounded velocities. This game is supposed to be a nonzero-sum group pursuit game. The main point of the work is to construct and compare cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in the game and make a conclusion about cooperation possibility in differential pursuit games. We consider all possible cooperations of the players in the game. For that purpose for every game $\Gamma(x_0,y_0,z_0)$ we construct the corresponding game in characteristic function form $\Gamma_v(x_0,y_0,z_0)$. We show that in this game there exists the nonempty core for any initial positions of the players. The core can take four various forms depending on initial positions of the players. We study how the core changes when the game is proceeding. For the original agreement (an imputation from the original core) to remain in force at each current instant t it is necessary for the core to be time-consistent. Nonemptiness of the core in any current subgame constructing along a cooperative trajectory and its time-consistency are shown. Finally, we discuss advantages and disadvantages of choosing this or that imputation from the core.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.35 no.2B
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• pp.269-278
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• 2010

In the clustering protocol, lifetime of the cluster members radically decrease because frequency interference between clusters make every cluster member consume a lot of energy to maintain or increase its transmission rate. In this paper, we analyze the frequency interference among the clusters with the game theory which deals with resource bargaining problems between players, and present a rational power allocation strategy. Both the cases that each cluster tries to selfishly occupy and cooperatively share the resource are analyzed in terms of non-cooperative and cooperative games. In simulation, we compare the cooperative game with non-cooperative game in terms of the node lifetime.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.42-46
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• 2003

The economic operation of a utility in a deregulated environment brings about optimization problems different from those in vertically integrated one［1］. While each utility operates its own generation capacity to maximize profit, the market operator (or system operator) manages and allocates all the system resources and facilities to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper presents a sequential application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire power transaction process.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.403-405
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• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.9
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• pp.4188-4206
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• 2016

Power control is widely used to reduce co-channel interference in wireless networks and guarantee the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of ongoing connections. This technique is also effective for wireless body area networks (WBANs). Although achieving satisfactory SINR is important for WBAN users, they may not be willing to achieve it at arbitrarily high power levels since power is a scarce resource in WBANs. Besides, for WBANs with different purposes, the QoS requirements and concern about the power consumption may be different. This motivates us to formulate the power control problem using the concepts from microeconomics and game theory. In this paper, the QoS objective is viewed as a utility function, which represents the degree of user satisfaction, while the power consumption is viewed as a cost function. The power control problem consequently becomes a non-cooperative multiplayer game, in which each player tries to maximize its net utility, i.e., the utility minus the cost. Within this framework, we investigate the Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in the game and derive the best response solution to reach the Nash equilibrium. To obtain the optimal transmission power in a distributed way, we further propose a utility-based and QoS-aware power control algorithm (UQoS-PCA). Tunable cost coefficient in UQoS-PCA enables this scheme to be flexible to satisfy diverse service requirements. Simulation results show the convergence and effectiveness of the proposed scheme as well as improvements over existing algorithm.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.1-9
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• 2015

This paper proposes CAC method that is more efficient for RRM using game theory combined with Multiple Attribute Decision Making(MADM). Because users request services with different Quality of Service(QoS), the network preference values to alternative networks for each service are calculated by MADM methods such as Grey Relational Analysis(GRA), Simple Additive Weighting(SAW) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution(TOPSIS). According to a utility function representing preference value, non-cooperative game is played, and then network provider select the requested service that provide maximum payoff. The appropriate service is selected through Nash Equilibrium that is the solution of game and the game is played repeated. We analyze two overlaid networks among four Wireless LAN(WLAN) systems with different properties. Simulation results show that proposed MADM techniques have same outcomes for every game round.