• 환경정책연구
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• 제6권3호
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• pp.91-114
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• 2007

Song and Nagaki(2007)에 나타나 있는 것과 같은 동북아지역의 황사(먼지모래폭풍: DSS) 저감을 위한 비음부담 공조체제는 참여국의 협정불이행으로 실행가능성에 문제가 제기된다. 만일 비협조적 전략이 각국에게 보다 현실적이 라면, 내쉬균형이 실현가능한 비용분담 게임의 결과를 예측하게 하여줄 수 있다. 본 연구에 따르면, 연속전략게임의 경우, ADB의 황사저감사업의 비용이 각국 투자에 의해 조달된다는 가정하에 무한한 내쉬균형이 발견된다. 또한, 비연속전략은 3각형 평면으로 나타나는 연속전략의 내쉬균형의 꼭짓점으로 나타나게 되며, 공조적 게임의 결과는 무한한 균형 점들을 1개의 점으로 수렴하게 된다.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제43권1호
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• pp.17-30
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• 2021

At present, multiple input multiple output radars offer accurate target detection and better target parameter estimation with higher resolution in high-speed wireless communication systems. This study focuses primarily on power allocation to improve the performance of radars owing to the sparsity of targets in the spatial velocity domain. First, the radars are clustered using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. Next, cooperative and noncooperative clusters are extracted based on the distance measured using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. The power is allocated to cooperative clusters using the Pareto optimality particle swarm optimization algorithm. In addition, the Nash equilibrium particle swarm optimization algorithm is used for allocating power in the noncooperative clusters. The process of allocating power to cooperative and noncooperative clusters reduces the overall transmission power of the radars. In the experimental section, the proposed method obtained the power consumption of 0.014 to 0.0119 at K = 2, M = 3 and K = 2, M = 3, which is better compared to the existing methodologies-generalized Nash game and cooperative and noncooperative game theory.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제31권1호
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• pp.89-91
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• 2009

This letter considers the problem of resource sharing among a relay and multiple user nodes in cooperative transmission networks. We formulate this problem as a sellers' market competition and use a noncooperative game to jointly consider the benefits of the relay and the users. We also develop a distributed algorithm to search the Nash equilibrium, the solution of the game. The convergence of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can stimulate cooperative diversity among the selfish user nodes and coordinate resource allocation among the user nodes effectively.

• 대한전자공학회논문지TC
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• 제46권5호
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• pp.36-47
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• 2009

RFID의 리더와 태그간의 비가역성으로 인해 리더들이 밀집한 경우 리더간에 서로 간섭을 일으켜서 태그로부터 오는 신호의 SIR을 낮게 만들어 수신단에서 태그를 식별하지 못하는 RFID 주파수 간섭문제가 존재한다. 현재 이에 대한 해결 방법으로서 서로 다른 시간자원을 할당하는 TDM 기반의 방법들이 제안되고 있다. 그러나 대부분 리더들 간에 최적의 시간 할당을 구하는 것이 아닌 heuristic 스케줄링 알고리즘을 제안하고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 리더들 간의 주파수 간섭문제를 게임의 참여자간에 발생되는 이해관계를 해결하는 게임이론을 주파수 간섭문제에 적용함으로써 TDM을 사용하는 RFID 리더간에 발생되는 시간 자원 할당 문제를 사전 협약이 존재하는 협조 게임의과 협약이 존재하지 않는 비협조 게임의 내쉬 협상 해와 내쉬 균형 관점에서 해석해 보았다. 게임이론을 적용한 결과는 밀집리더환경에서는 협조게임의 내쉬 협상 해가 비협조게임의 내쉬 균형보다 더 큰 이득을 만들어 내는 것을 보여주고, 밀집 리더 환경에서의 최적의 시간할당량을 보여준다.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제36권2호
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• pp.280-285
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• 2014

In this paper, the optimal power control problem in a cooperative relay network is investigated and a new power control scheme is proposed based on a non-cooperative differential game. Optimal power allocated to each node for a relay is formulated using the Nash equilibrium in this paper, considering both the throughput and energy efficiency together. It is proved that the non-cooperative differential game algorithm is applicable and the optimal power level can be achieved.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
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• 제23권3호
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• pp.25-31
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• 2018

In this paper, we consider the game theoretic approach to investigate the transmit power optimization problem where D2D users share the uplink of the cellular system. Especially, we formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. In the user wide sense, each user may try to select its transmit power level so as to maximize its utility in a selfish way. In the system wide, the transmit power levels of all users eventually converge to the unique point, called Nash Equilibrium. We first formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. Next, we examine the existence of Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we present the numerical example that shows the convergence to the unique transmit power level.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제8권7호
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• pp.2281-2301
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• 2014

In wireless ad hoc networks the nodes focus on achieving the maximum SINR for efficient data transmission. In order to achieve maximum SINR the nodes culminate in exhausting the battery power for successful transmissions. This in turn affects the successful transmission of the other nodes as the maximum transmission power opted by each node serves as a source of interference for the other nodes in the network. This paper models the choice of power for each node as a non cooperative game where the throughput of the network with respect to the consumption of power is formulated as a utility function. We propose an adaptive pricing scheme that encourages the nodes to use minimum transmission power to achieve target SINR at the Nash equilibrium and improve their net utility in multiuser scenario.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권5호
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• pp.2286-2309
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• 2016

Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제8권11호
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• pp.3674-3710
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• 2014

In this tutorial, we integrate the concept of cognitive radio technology into game theory and supermarket game theory to address the problem of resource allocation in multiuser multicarrier cognitive radio networks. In addition, multiuser multicarrier transmission technique is chosen as a candidate to study the resource allocation problem via game and supermarket game theory. This tutorial also includes various definitions, scenarios and examples related to (i) game theory (including both non-cooperative and cooperative games), (ii) supermarket game theory (including pricing, auction theory and oligopoly markets), and (iii) resource allocation in multicarrier techniques. Thus, interested readers can better understand the main tools that allow them to model the resource allocation problem in multicarrier networks via game and supermarket game theory. In this tutorial article, we first review the most fundamental concepts and architectures of CRNs and subsequently introduce the concepts of game theory, supermarket game theory and common solution to game models such as the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, a list of related studies is highlighted and compared in this tutorial.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권1호
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.