• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2009.07a
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• pp.569_570
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• 2009

This paper presents a methodology to find the profit maximized Nash Equilibriums of each generator(or GenCo), which considers the Ramp-rate of each generator under a competitive market environment. The ramp-rate of a generator is one of the physical or technical constraints of a generator and means the ability to increase or decrease the output instantaneously. In this paper, we found several Nash Equilibriums of the generation allocation problem through Dynamic Programming in a competitive market. Individual generators participate in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies of its generation quantities in a spot market.

• The Journal of Korean Medicine
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.50-54
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• 2011

Objective: To understand the characteristic of non-alcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) and non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH), and study the traditional Korean medicine (TKM)-based strategies or therapeutics for them. Methods: A male patient with NASH was treated with only Oriental therapies, and then the clinical outcome was evaluated by serum biochemical parameters and radiographs. Result: The clinical and biochemical values of the patient fluctuated over three years according to the treatments and cessation of herbal medicines. Conclusion: NASH or NAFLD are now prevalent and these disorders could be targets of TKM, and this case report would provide useful information.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.509-513
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• 2008

In this paper, we investigate how generators' ramp-rate constraints may influence their equilibrium strategy formulation. In the market model proposed in this study, the generators' ramp-rate constraints are explicitly represented. In order to fully characterize the inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints, a dynamic game model is presented. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution of the game and the backward induction procedure for the solution of the game is designed in this paper. The inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints results in the Markov property of the game, and we have found that the Markov property of the game significantly simplifies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterization. Finally, a simple electricity market numerical illustration is presented for the successful application of the approach proposed.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.13-25
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• 1999

This paper presents a model of competitive positioning and pricing of new products in a multi-segmented market. The segments in the market are located on a multi-dimensional discrete attribute space with fixed demands. Firms launch products sequentially on the attribute space, incurring fixed and variable costs, and then decide on their product prices. Each firm acts to maximize its profit. Market share of a firm is determined by the position and price of Its product. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium Another equilibrium concept is Introduced and related to the Nash equilibrium. A heuristic algorithm based on genetic algorithms is designed to obtain the Nash equilibrium.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.407-414
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• 2011

In an effort to reduce energy consumption, research into adaptive power management in real-time systems has become widespread. In this paper, a novel dynamic voltage scaling scheme is proposed for multiprocessor systems. Based on the concept of the Nash bargaining solution, a processor's clock speed and supply voltage are dynamically adjusted to satisfy these conflicting performance metrics. In addition, the proposed algorithm is implemented to react adaptively to the current system conditions by using an adaptive online approach. Simulation results clearly indicate that the superior performance of the proposed scheme can strike the appropriate performance balance between contradictory requirements.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.379-389
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• 2002

In this paper, we study the competition between two kinds of suppliers, a bricks and mortars(B&M) and a clicks and mortars(C&M). Using the circular spatial market model, we derive and analyze the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of offline market share and efficiency of online channel of the C&M supplier. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium, (2) Under certain conditions, the price of online channel can be higher than that of offline channel, (3) It is impossible for the C&M supplier to encroach on all of the B&M supplier's market, (4) In some cases, the C&M supplier has incentive to lower the efficiency of its online channel for more profit.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.62-67
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• 2003

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.415-419
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• 2010

Bandwidth is an extremely valuable and scarce resource in a wireless network. Therefore, efficient bandwidth management is necessary in order to provide high quality service to users with different requirements. In this paper, we propose a bandwidth reservation algorithm based on Nash Bargaining Solution. The proposed algorithm has low complexity and are quite flexible in the different situations of network. Simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme has excellent performance than other existing schemes.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.181-189
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• 2001

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies and applications has led to a new form of market place known as the electronic store. In this paper, we study competition between two shopping channels, an electronic store and traditional retailers. Based on the circular spatial market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the efficiency of the electronic store. The result shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium for both channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the electronic store has incentive to decrease its efficiency to gain more profit.