• International Journal of Quality Innovation
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.20-31
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• 2007

Moral hazard and adverse selection often exist in asymmetric information environment. In this paper, quality investment decision problem is studied under moral hazard. A basic model for quality investment level decision is developed with the supplier as a principal and the buyer as an agent. And then we regard the supplier and the buyer's rational limitations to set up a model when the buyer's quality evaluation and processing activities are hidden. The model is optimized and the results under different backgrounds are discussed and compared. Results show that the buyer's quality evaluation level and processing level are mostly influenced by the supplier's quality assurance payment. Both the supplier and the buyer choose different quality investment levels under moral hazard because of the supplier's payment to the buyer in case of internal failure and external failure.

• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.11-18
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• 2024

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate the unintended welfare losses induced by paid sick leave, examine the severity of the unintended moral hazard loss caused by paid sick leave, and evaluate how much moral hazard cost society can accept to obtain paid sick leave benefits. Research Design, Data and Methodology: We examine the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data collected in 2013 and 2014 by employing a panel probit analysis to control for individual heterogeneity. Results: The estimation result shows that the probability of absence due to paid sick leave increases from 4.91% to 7.84%. Among them, excluding the probability of increasing absence from 1.29% to 2.69% due to the actual disease, the probability of absence due to the moral hazard was estimated to be 2.41% to 6.49% in the proposed models. Based on the result, if we evaluate the increase in absence caused by moral hazard as a social cost, the estimated cost is approximately $174 to $297 per worker per year. Conclusion: Considering these expected costs, our society can obtain the access benefit from paid sick leave if we are willing to accept the moral hazard cost.

• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.93-98
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• 2017

To recover the capital market's confidence, interest in accounting ethics education has increased recently. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a simple classroom games for moral hazard problem and to analyze the results. This case study introduces the classroom games in which well-known experiment of principal-agent dilemma in experimental economics implemented accounting ethics education. This paper suggests that game lesson is effective and efficient way to understanding moral hazard problem. During the games, cause and effect of players' decision making react upon each other. This paper contributes to generating further discussion on accounting ethics education and providing practical implication.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.12
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.

• Agribusiness and Information Management
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.1-6
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• 2017

Recent scandals of milk additives in several developing countries provoked controversy about quality issue of dairy products, grapping academic attention to the dairy supply chain. In this paper, we first focus on moral hazard problem of self-interested entities about the quality across the dairy supply chain, due to unobservable and unverifiable quality management efforts of all entities - including dairy producers, stations, and a final producer - and high inspection cost for the quality. Based on the identified moral hazard problem, we understand why the adoption of IoT-based tracking systems about quality produced from each entity is a must, different from RFID-based tracking systems.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 2005.02a
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• pp.42-56
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• 2005

Firms cooperating in R&D face a moral hazard problem, because with R&D effort not being observable each partner will focus on its own profit when choosing its effort level. This paper aims to explain the use of optimal license contract for R&D cooperation such as cross-licensing agreement. We argue that in the situations of asymmetric information, the optimal incentive scheme that can solve moral hazard problem is . a linear function of the likelihood ratio. Especially in the case of parallel research, each firm has an extra incentive for cooperative R&D effort, given by the license fee that considers the profit of the cooperating firm, which solely depends on his R&D success if the cooperating firm fails.

• 방재와보험
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• s.79
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• pp.27-31
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• 1998

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.1285-1296
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• 2015

As examples of the region's transition to quasi-public goods a previous stage of full public goods also extremely limited in research. However, in this way can it compensate for this paper as a system to minimize moral hazard by electronic information and communication systems focused on safety in accordance with the methods and gave public goods introduction of grafting of electronic information systems played the Yeosu area to specific cases I went to the deployment.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.249-261
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• 2021

To tranquilize the devastating impact of unnecessary risk-taking behavior of banks towards the economy for maximizing their profits that usually arises due to widely known 'moral-hazard' problem originating from market competition and intensified by bank's limited liability, the banking system is strongly monitored across all countries of the world. The goal of controlling would become more feasible if there exist some self-discipline and motivations which could safeguard the banks' charter value through the mechanism of market discipline. Therefore, our study is aimed to scrutinize the relation between market discipline and charter value of local commercial banks that are registered on the Pakistan Stock Exchange by analyzing a balanced panel data from the year 2007 to 2019. Deposit growth, interbank deposits, and subordinate debt are taken as proxies to measure market discipline whereas Tobin's Q theory is applied for calculating the charter value. Generalized Least Square Regression with Fixed Effect Model is used for evaluation. The outcomes reveal that in the existence of control variables, all proxies of market discipline have a significant positive impact on bank charter value. Our research has important policy implications for monitoring and supervising financial intermediaries for their stability and soundness by offsetting the complications of moral-hazard in the financial systems.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.78-98
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• 2004

The purpose of this study was to categorize the contribution evasion and develop the expected models for contribution arrears in National Health Care System. The modified logistic regression model in non-payments was used as logistic regression model based on the statistical method. By using this model, we arranged non-payment types and typical branches those are appeared by statistical technique. First fact, sex and age branches those are able to take a part in economy had effect mostly. Also they had difference in non-payment probability by existence of their incomes and property. Especially people who didn't have their own house and car were appeared in high non-payment probability, disease and reduction characteristic(rare diseases, reduction of seniors, handicaps, numbers of medical treatments) didn't effect much in probability. The reason for some characteristic of non-payment which is higher than the correct threshold value of Logistic Regression Model (a suggested model for predicting non-payment)'s distribution of probability was mostly moral hazard. Living difficulty was the bigger reason for non-payment, but moral slackening was the bigger reason for non-payment. But it is careless to decide that moral hazard is just the reason, there is a necessity to examine on the side of sociology based in family. By the reason, the member's non-payment reason can be classified by economy, population, and psychology, but there was a comprehension that losing of work desire could be one reason. So we analyzed informations for composition of family of members. In conclusion, we grasped that family conflict makes non-payment and conversion of member in the National Basic Livelihood Protection System difficult.