• 제목/요약/키워드: Military Threat

검색결과 258건 처리시간 0.021초

효율적인 방공 지휘통제경보체계를 위한 설계 및 구현 (The Design and Implementation for Efficient C2A)

  • 권철희;홍동호;이동언;이종순;김영빈
    • 한국군사과학기술학회지
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    • 제12권6호
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    • pp.733-738
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    • 2009
  • In this paper, we have proposed the design and implementation for efficient Command Control and Alert(C2A). Information fusion must be done for knowing the state and identification of targets using multi-sensor. The threat priority of targets which are processed and identified by information fusion is calculated by air-defence operation logic. The threat targets are assigned to the valid and effective weapons by nearest neighborhood algorithm. Furthermore, the assignment result allows operators to effectively operate C2A by providing the operators with visualizing symbol color and the assignment pairing color line. We introduce the prototype which is implemented by the proposed design and algorithm.

전자전 ES 시스템의 수신기를 고려한 탐색대역 생성 (A Search Band Implementation Considering the Receivers of the Electronic Warfare Support System)

  • 윤인복;정창민
    • 한국군사과학기술학회지
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    • 제14권6호
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    • pp.1091-1096
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    • 2011
  • The main factors of radar signals used in electronic warfare are Radio Frequency(RF), Pulse Repetition Interval(PRI), Pulse Width(PW), Scan Parameter(SP) and so on. This radar signals may have some important information for the electronic warfare. So, there is a necessity for making a threat database to decide whether the radar signal is a threat or not. When the electronic support system collects some threat radar signals, it needs the search band to control the receivers and filter banks of the system. In this paper we propose search band implementation considering the type and center frequency of the receivers of the electronic support system.

북한군의 군사적 도발 및 대응방향 - 목함 지뢰 도발에 이어진 비대칭전력 위협을 중심으로- (North Korean military provocations and the corresponding direction - Focus on the threat that resulted in unequal power wood box mines provocation -)

  • 김규남
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제15권6_1호
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    • pp.59-67
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    • 2015
  • 우리가 북한을 보는 시각은 크게 두 가지로 대적해야 할 주적이라는 점과 통일을 염두에 둔 교류협력의 대상이라는 시각이 존재하고 있다. 주적으로 북한은 1950년 6월 25일 불법 남침을 하였고 1953년 7월 27일 정전협정 조인이후 지금까지 정전협정 위반과 불법도발을 계속하고 있다. 2015년 8월 4일 북한은 또다시 DMZ 목함 지뢰 도발에 이어 준전시 상태를 선포하면서 전면전 초기에 운용되는 전력을 시차별로 운영하였다. 그 과정에서 한미 군 당국은 북한군의 전력운용을 실시간 탐지하였고 그 결과가 언론을 통해 생중계 되었다. 이러한 군사적 도발을 보면서 북한의 군사적 위협 중 비대칭전력의 위협에 우리는 어떻게 대응할 것인가를 제시하고자 한다.

북한군사정책 특징 연구 (Study on Military Policy of North Korea)

  • 김성우
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제16권3_1호
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    • pp.107-114
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    • 2016
  • 북한은 그동안 핵을 고도화하고 미사일의 발사 거리를 늘려왔다. 북한이 대화를 통해 핵을 포기할 가능성은 이미 사라진 것으로 보인다. 김정은은 중국 특사가 미사일 발사를 말리기 위해 평양을 방문했는데도 비웃듯이 로켓을 쏘아 올렸다. 상황이 이런데도 대화로 문제를 해결할 수 있을 것인가. 한반도 비핵화의 유일한 길은 실효적인 대북제재를 통해 북한이 스스로 핵을 포기하도록 하는 것이다. 이를 위해 중국은 어떤 형태로든 역할을 해야 한다. 한국 내에서는 북한의 핵 미사일 위협에 대한 자위 차원에서 고고도미사일방어체계(사드)의 도입은 물론 핵무장 여론이 높아지고 있다. 이런 흐름은 중국의 전략적 이익에 부합하지 않을 것이다. 본 논문은 북한이 앞으로 어떤 행보를 해 나갈 것인가를 예측하기 위해서는 북한의 '군사정책'이 될 것이라는 가정 하에 김정은 체제의 군사정책 특징을 분석하고 전망하여 의미 있는 시사점을 찾고자 하는데 목적이 있다.

레이저빔을 이용한 펄스변조 적외선탐색기 기만 (Laser-based Jamming of a Pulse Modulated Infrared Seeker)

  • 김성재;정춘식;신용산
    • 한국군사과학기술학회지
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    • 제22권2호
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    • pp.179-188
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    • 2019
  • Laser beam is directional and small in divergence angle so that it is well qualified to deliver high intensity infrared energy into a coming MANPADS threat for aircraft survivability. The threat will be deceived and loose tracking of a target when it is exposed to the laser beam modulated relevant to the track mechanism of the threat. The laser beam goes through scattering inside the seeker of the threat and reach the detector in a stray light form, which is a critical phenomenon enabling jamming of the seeker. The mechanism of the laser beam based jamming against a pulse modulated infrared seeker is shown. Simulations are carried out to support the understanding of how the jam technique works.

소형드론 위협 사례와 대드론체계 발전방향 (A Case Study on the Threat of Small Drone and the Development of Counter-Drone System)

  • 서강일;김기원;김종훈;조상근;박상혁
    • 문화기술의 융합
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    • 제9권2호
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    • pp.327-332
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    • 2023
  • 2022년 12월 26일 북한의 드론 도발은 8년 만에 재개되었다. 이번 위협은 수도권은 물론 대통령실 경호를 위한 비행금지구역까지 해당되었으며, 이에 대한 우리 군의 대응이 적절하지 못해 큰 논란이 되고 있다. 이러한 가운데 국내에서는 소형드론의 비행 금지 및 제한구역의 불법 침입에 따른 문제점이 점증하고 있으며 해외에서는 테러 공격에 활용되는 등 그 위협이 실체화되고 있다. 본 고에서는 이러한 드론의 위협에 대해 '대드론(Counter-Drone)' 개념과 이와 관련된 기술을 고찰하고 국내 및 해외의 소형드론 위협 사례를 통해 함의를 도출, 대드론체계의 발전방향을 제시하였다. 북한의 드론위협은 더욱 다종화, 다량화, 고도화되어 보다 대담한 공격 및 도발로 이루어질 것으로 보인다. 따라서 우리 군은 통합관제체계 및 대드론체계의 조기 전력화, 소형드론의 위협에 대응한 합동 및 제병협동 차원의 대응, 한·미 대드론 연합작전 수행능력 등을 추진해 나아가야할 것이다.

안전한 공급망 관리를 위한 국방사이버보호 파트너십 인증 방안 연구 (A Study on the Citation of Defense Cyber Protection Partnership for Safe Supply Chain Management)

  • 김종화;김용철;김경민;강정흥
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제19권3호
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    • pp.101-107
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    • 2019
  • 우리 군(軍)의 사이버 공간은 적들로부터 지속적인 위협을 받고 있다. 이러한 사이버 위협은 군(軍)이 보유하고 있는 정보화 자산을 대상으로 한 것으로 조직의 정보화 자산에 대한 안전성 확보는 매우 중요하다. 그러나 정보화 자산은 군(軍) 뿐만 아니라 어떠한 조직도 100% 자급자족할 수는 없기 때문에 공급망에 의한 정보화 자산 획득은 어쩔 수 없는 선택이다. 따라서 군 공급망에 대한 안전을 확보하기 위해 공급망 보호대책 검토 후, 이를 근거로 공급망 업체를 검증된 신뢰모델 기반의 파트너십 인증(引證)을 통해 군 공급망 안전을 확보하기 위한 방안을 제시하였다.

한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로- (The lesson From Korean War)

  • 윤일영
    • 안보군사학연구
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    • 통권8호
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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4D 환경정보를 반영한 광역 경로수정계획 기법에 관한 연구 (An Approach to Global Path Replanning Method Considering 4D Environmental Information)

  • 곽동준;신종호;김종희
    • 한국군사과학기술학회지
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    • 제19권6호
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    • pp.779-788
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    • 2016
  • In this paper, a global path replanning method is proposed in order to plan a global path minimizing the risk of the unmanned vehicle on the battlefield. We first introduce 4D environmental information consisting of mobility, visibility, kill, and hit attributes, and a unified threat map and a mobility map are defined by the four attributes. Using the mobility map, the unmanned vehicle can find the shortest path on the traversable area. And then taking into account the deterrent according to the type of the unmanned vehicle on the integrated threat map, the vehicle can generate a route to suppress or avoid the threat of enemy as well. Moreover, we present a waypoints bypassing method to exclude unnecessary waypoints rather than the mission point when planning paths for the multiple waypoints.

위협 모델링 기반 함정 전투체계 보안 요구사항에 관한 연구 (A Study on Security Requirements of Shipboard Combat System based on Threat Modelling)

  • 윤성철;손태식
    • 한국군사과학기술학회지
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    • 제26권3호
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    • pp.281-301
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    • 2023
  • The shipboard combat system is a key system for naval combat that supports a command and control process cycle consisting of Detect - Control - Engage in real time to ensure ship viability and conduct combat missions. Modern combat systems were developed on the basis of Open Architecture(OA) to maximize acceptance of latest technology and interoperability between systems, and actively introduced the COTS(Commercial-of-the-shelf). However, as a result of that, vulnerabilities inherent in COTS SW and HW also occurred in the combat system. The importance of combat system cybersecurity is being emphasized but cybersecurity research reflecting the characteristics of the combat system is still lacking in Korea. Therefore, in this paper, we systematically identify combat system threats by applying Data Flow Diagram, Microsoft STRIDE threat modelling methodology. The threats were analyzed using the Attack Tree & Misuse case. Finally we derived the applicable security requirements which can be used at stages of planning and designing combat system and verified security requirements through NIST 800-53 security control items.