• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.69-83
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• 2015

The e-commerce market has been more diversified via B2B or P2P, and the size of this market has gradually been expanded as well. A noteworthy phenomenon is the P2P market, which has shown a rapid, approximately 200-fold or more increase in size since 2005. Specifically, the online secondhand-goods market that makes transaction easier and more convenient has attained a fast growth as well, but either sellers or buyers of secondhand goods are properly protected due to a lack of legal regulations on secondhand-goods transaction. The purpose of this study was to examine problems with online secondhand-goods transaction and to suggest some reform measures. There is something wrong with the legal status of brokers for secondhand-goods sales. According to the current law, individual brokers are neither mail-order sellers nor mail-order brokers. So they don't have lots of liabilities, and it means that the burden of risk is all imposed on buyers. Therefore it's suggested that individual brokers should be defined as 'involved operator of electronic commerce' so that proper liability might be imposed on them.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Communication Sciences Conference
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• 2004.07a
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• pp.123-123
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• 2004

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.67 no.2
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• pp.165-172
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• 2018

This paper presents a structure of the retail electricity market based on the local pool with LDERP(Local Distributed Energy Resource Provider) for small energy prosumers. LDERP is an operator for the proposed market, which conducts performance measurement and settlement by the distribution plan determined through contract with participants. The trading process is designed similarly to the negawatt market. In the case study, the many-sided conditions of the proposed market are comparatively analyzed with the existing prosumer programs. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in determining the purpose of market operating for the benefit of participants according to the various situations.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.19-32
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• 2019

Purpose - Since the opening of Korea's distribution market, the domestic network marketing market has been continuing to grow. In this context, research on network marketing independent operators, which plays the most important role in the network marketing industry, is insufficient. This study was to identify the effects of Independent Operator's Company Selection Attributions on the Economic and Non-Economic Satisfaction, Trust, and Recommendation. The results will provide strategic direction, theoretical and practical implications for companies and operators in the network marketing industry. Research design, data, and methodology - In order to verify the research hypotheses, the data were collected from Independent Operators of Network marketing industry using questionnaires. The pretest was conducted from January 8 to 19, 2018, and the main survey was conducted from February 1 to 28. A total of 210 questionnaires, of which 193 copies were collected. The data were analyzed with SPSS 21.0. and AMOS 21.0. Results - The results are as follows; product competitiveness and system competitiveness have significant effects on economic satisfaction and non-economic satisfaction. Economic and non-economic satisfaction have significant effects on business trust. Economic and non-economic satisfaction did not influence recommendation intention directly, but influence it indirectly. Business trust has a significant effect on business recommendation intention. Conclusions - After starting network marketing business as an independent operator, the competitiveness of the company is meaningless, and product competitiveness and system competitiveness are important factors for economic and non-economic satisfaction. Therefore, network marketing companies and independent operators should prioritize product competitiveness and system competitiveness between business development. The findings show that trust in the business is very important for active business Recommendation to others. Therefore, network marketing firms and independent operators need to make efforts to meet economic and non-economic satisfaction, which have a significant impact on business trust.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

This study was motivated by a recent channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset between a service provider and a handset manufacturer in the mobile communication market. In this study, we have developed a two-person non-zero sum game for the channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset, and derived its optimal strategic game solution. As a result, we have found that, between the service operator and the handset manufacturer, one who has high level of market leadership in his own market has a power to affect the optimal strategic game solution. We have also found that, when the service operator and the handset manufacturer have relatively high level of market leadership in their own market, there exist both of potential channel conflict and cooperation. The result of this study may provide an effective reference for a solution of similar channel conflicts.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 1999.06a
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• pp.203-225
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• 1999

In this paper, I tried to analyze the relationship between the market structure of teleommunicatin industry and market performance using Economides and Lehr's results considering composite goods methods. And I took three policy scenarios into account. First, government tires to implement the policy which divides the integrated monopoly into network operator and service provider, then invite competition to service part. Second, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to service part only. Third, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to integrated duopoly. I gained the best result in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel vertical integration is the best market structure. I also specially checked the relationship between the market structure and service quality. I gained the best service quality in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel Vertical Integration is also the best market structure with regard to the service quality.

• Journal of Biosystems Engineering
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.1-8
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• 2011

Six models of operator seat supplied to local tractor manufacturers were tested in the laboratory in accordance with ISO 5007 and 78/764/EEC. No models out of the six met the allowable damping and transmissibility performance criteria of both ISO 5007 and 78/764/EEC. From the ISO criterion standpoint, one model failed in damping performance and 4 models in isolation performance. From the 78/764/EEC criterion standpoint, 4 models failed in damping performance and 4 models in isolation performance. However none of them failed in all of the criteria, either. Each model met the one acceptance criterion but failed in another. This indicated that operator seat must be improved to meet the current ISO 5007 or 78/764/EEC and the exposure limit value that will be enforced in EU tractor market from 2014 by EU Directive 2002/44 EC.