• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2003년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.670-672
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• 2003

The market participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits in competitive electricity market. Also, It is concerned with transmission congestion in power market. Two methods are generally used for congestion management;nodal pricing and uplift. The participants will have different strategies for their profits in the two methods. This paper analyzes their equilibrium strategies by using the supply function model and congestion methods.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제3권4호
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• pp.509-513
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• 2008

In this paper, we investigate how generators' ramp-rate constraints may influence their equilibrium strategy formulation. In the market model proposed in this study, the generators' ramp-rate constraints are explicitly represented. In order to fully characterize the inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints, a dynamic game model is presented. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution of the game and the backward induction procedure for the solution of the game is designed in this paper. The inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints results in the Markov property of the game, and we have found that the Markov property of the game significantly simplifies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterization. Finally, a simple electricity market numerical illustration is presented for the successful application of the approach proposed.

• 한국정보통신학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국정보통신학회 2016년도 추계학술대회
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• pp.197-199
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• 2016

최근 약 10년 동안, 인지무선환경에서 1차사용자와 2차사용자간의 스펙트럼 공유를 시장 (market) 논리와 접목시키는 연구들이 활발하게 진행되어 왔다. 즉, 1차사용자가 자신이 소유하고 있는 주파수 자원을 2차사용자에게 금전적 보상을 받고 대여하는 형태를 고려하는 것이다. 그리고, 이에 대한 시장의 평형 (market equilibrium)을 이론적으로 제시하는 것이 그 연구들의 주요 목표이다. 우리는 이 논문에서, 1차사용자들은 2차사용자들에게 자신들의 유휴 채널의 사용권을 대여 또는 판매하는데, 1차사용자들은 허용가능한 간섭의 양을 정해놓고, 2차사용자가 그 간섭의 양을 초과하게 되면 금전적인 보상을 받는 시장 모델을 고려한다. 그리고, 각 2차사용자는 자신들이 1차사용자들에게 지급할 수 있는 예산에는 제한이 있는 상황도 추가 고려한다. 2차사용자의 재화는 자유공간상에서 획득 가능한 전송률이고 1차사용자의 재화는 금전적인 순이득 (net profit)이다. 우리는 이러한 인지무선네트워크 시장을 확장된 Fischer 마켓으로 모델링하고, Eisenberg-Gale convex program을 통해 마켓 균형을 찾는 방법을 제안한다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권11호
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제36권1호
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• pp.71-76
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• 2014

This study aims to analyze the market interactions among the main farmed fish species in Korea, using both multivariate and bivariate cointegration analysis. For the analysis of market interactions among farmed fish species, major four farmed fish species, olive flounder (Paralichthys olivaceus), black rockfish (Sebastes schlegeli), red seabream (Pagrus major), and grey mullet (Mugil cephalus) were selected as the analytical target species. And their real price data by month from January 2000 to December 2011 were used in the analysis. The results of the multivariate cointegration test for four farmed fish showed that there would be no long-term equilibrium relationships among farmed fish species, and consequently they do not share the same market. The results of bivariate cointegration test indicated that there was little evidence to suggest that all farmed fish species were cointegrated each other. However, it was only analyzed that olive flounder and grey mullet might have a long run equilibrium relationship.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권6호
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.11-16
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• 2013

This paper derives an equilibrium asset price when there exist three kinds of traders in financial market: a risk-averse informed trader, noise traders, and risk neutral market makers. This paper is an extended version of Kyle's (1985, Econometrica) continuous time model by introducing insider's risk aversion. We obtain not only the equilibrium asset pricing and market depth parameter but also insider's value function and optimal insider's trading strategy explicitly. The comparative static shows that the market depth (the reciprocal of market pressure) increases with time and volatility of noise traders' trading.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제51권8호
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• pp.403-408
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• 2002

As the electricity industry undergoes a process of fundamental restructuring, horizontal market power appears as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below competitive levels. In models for imperfect competition under the consideration of the transmission constraints, the Nash equilibrium has the form of a mixed strategy. In this paper, the models for analyzing imperfect competition are compared using the solution of pure and mixed equilibria. The relation between market power and the capacity of a transmission line is investigated by imperfect competition analysis methods: Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply Curve model.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권4호
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• pp.403-411
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• 2005

At present, the Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in an oligopoly type market. However, several problems exist in the successful application of this model to the electricity market. The representative one is obtaining the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In the Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to obtain maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect the real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears over the long-term through statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as the trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium.