• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.2
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• pp.580-586
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• 2023

Diversified fuel types such as methanol, hydrogen, liquefied natural gas, ammonia, biofuels, have been come to fore in consideration of the limitations, regulations, environmental perception and efficient use of resources on maritime sector. NE is described as a substantial alternative energy source on the marine vessels in the sense of de-carbonization and fuel efficiency activities carried out by IMO. Although NPVs have been constructed for the merchant, navy and supply fields over the years, their numbers are few and working ranges are quite limited. NE generation techniques, reactor types, safety and security issues in case of any leakage or radiation pollution are analyzed and comparisons are performed between fossil-based fueled and NP based on icebreakers. The comparison are conducted on the basis of dimensions, resistances and operational competences by the VIKOR. NP icebreakers operated in recent years occupy a notable position in the ranking, although fossil fueled ones are most prevalent. Consequently, refueling period and emissions are the principal benefits of NPVs. Nevertheless, the use of such systems on marine vessels especially for merchant ships may come to the fore when all concerns in terms of safety, security and society are resolved since the slightest mistake can have irreversible consequences.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

Although China's maritime militia has not been well known despite its long history, it is recently emerging as a serious threat to maritime security, causing neighboring countries' security concerns due to the growing number of maritime disputes with China. In this regard, it is now time to clearly define the true nature of the Chinese maritime militia. A close look at the organization and roles of the Chinese maritime militia reveals that it is an organization that is systematically managed and operated by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of China. Its role is to serve the purpose of "contributing to the protection and expansion of China's marine interests." In addition, the threat factors of the Chinese maritime militia were analyzed by examining the cases of maritime disputes between the Chinese maritime militia and neighboring countries. First, the Chinese maritime militia has implemented the "Gray Zone Strategy." Second, it is a systematic organization supported by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army. Third, it is a maritime power that cannot be ignored as the world's largest militia organization. Fourth, it has a strategic flexibility that enables the execution of the dual mission of working for a living such as commercial fishing and serving in the maritime militia. The threats of the Chinese maritime militia are not limited to Southeast Asian countries located in the South China Sea. This is also the case in Korea as the country cannot avoid maritime disputes with China such as the Ieodo issue and the boundary delimitation of the West Sea. Accordingly, this study was focused on presenting a predictable scenario and countermeasures based on the analysis through a scenario technique with respect to the two cases that are most likely to occur in Korea-China relations. Finally, beyond identifying the nature of the Chinese maritime militia, this study takes a further step to share considerations as to how the organization may operate and develop in the future and how we can cope with its moves.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.250-286
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• 2015

The main purpose of this article is to provide an understanding on current maritime issues in the Northeast Asia, and thereby help formulating the right strategy for our national security. The article summarizes core arguments in the recently published 『The 21^st Century Maritime Strategies in the Northeast Asia: Dilemma between Competition and Cooperation』. It will help readers to comprehend historical backgrounds as well as recent updates related to maritime issues and strategies in the region. Also, readers may find guidance to conceive their own maritime strategies for the Republic of Korea. Currently, the U.S. is shifting its focus from Atlantic to Pacific, and increasing its naval presence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 21^st century China views the maritime interests as the top priority in its national security and prosperity. PLA Navy's offensive maritime strategies and naval building such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are unprecedented. Japan is another naval power in the region. During the Cold War JMSDF faithfully fulfilled the mission of deterring Soviet navy, and now it is doing its job against China. Lastly, Putin has been emphasizing to build the strong Russia since 2000, and putting further efforts to reinforce current naval capabilities of Pacific Fleet. The keyword in the naval and maritime relations among these powers can be summarized with "competition and cooperation." The recent security developments in the South China Sea(SCS) clearly represent each state's strategic motivations and movements. China shows clear and strong intention to nationalize the islands in SCS by building artificial facilities - possibly military purpose. Obviously, the U.S. strongly opposes China by insisting the freedom of navigation(FON) in international waters as recent USS-Lassen's FON operation indicate. The conflict between China and the U.S. surrounding the SCS seems to be heading towards climax as Russia and Japan are searching for their own national interests within the conflict. Also, the neighboring small and middle powers are calculating their own economic and security interests. This is no exception for us in establishing timely strategies to maximize our own national security. Hopefully, this article leads the readers to the right direction.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.73-114
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• 2021

This study examines the distribution of power in Northeast Asia based on the balance of power theory, a representative theory of realism, assuming military capabilities as the core power of states. The results of previous studies on the balance of power and military forces are reviewed and used to analyze changes in the strength of the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea through 2020 to predict the security environment in 2030. In the balance of power theory, if the balance of power between a nation or a group of powers collapses, the possibility of war is high, and to survive in the international community with high uncertainty and distrust, the theory predicts that states must increase their powers in a self-help world and strengthen cooperation and alliance. Countries in Northeast Asia are also continuing to strengthen their military capabilities, and countries neighboring China are paying keen attention and remaining vigilant due to the rapid changes in the international security environment after the rapid rise of China. To mark the future 100th anniversary of the Chinese armed forces in the 2030s, China aims to realize 'defense and military modernization' and build a 'world-class military force' by the nation's 100th anniversary in the 2050s. The US is busy checking China's rise by strengthening international cooperation and alliances. The security environment and power dynamics in Northeast Asia are slowly changing as the US and China continue to compete for global hegemony. The changes and implications of the distribution of power in Northeast Asia after 2030 are examined based on the balance of power theory.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Maritime Security
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.1-35
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• 2023

The purpose of this study is to present the direction of development of our navy's response strategy through analysis at the ends, ways, and means level of the Chinese navy's offensive strategy for the West Sea. As a result of the analysis, at the ends level, the Chinese Navy's offensive strategy for the West Sea strategy is being linked to a grand strategy to protect maritime rights and achieve maritime power between the U.S. and China competition, at the ways level, the Chinese Navy is expected to create a foundation for the international community to recognize the West Sea as China's inland sea through "routine entry" and "exercise authority", and in case of emergency, it will try to secure sea control in the West Sea in a short period of time by blocking Korea's maritime transportation route based on the overwhelming preemptive attack capability of aircraft carriers. At the means level, it is accelerating the construction of aircraft carrier warfare units and improving its ability to engage long-range missiles. As a direction of development of the Korean Navy's response strategy in response to this, first, Establishment and Development of National Maritime Security Strategy in conjunction with the Korean Indo-Pacific Strategy. Second, it proposes the development of the concept of effective security operations for the east sea area of the West Sea intermediate line, and third, the development of the concept of combat performance and capacity building to strengthen survival and lethality.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.79-93
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• 2007

With international urgence of terror situation, many methods of terror techniques and skills are appearing and more intense and threatening terror is braking out not only in the air(plane), but also in the sea(ship). Korea is surrounded by 3 sides of sea and is a proud maritime nation that should advance to foreign country through the sea because South Korea and North Korea are confronting. Korea depend on the maritime transportation, 99.7% of exporting, importing material resources. Therefore, acquisition of the marine safety has the great affect on national security and economical life. On the high tension of situation about threat and possibility of maritime terroism, the potential ways of the improvement policy for counter-tactics against big maritime terror are the following. First, we should construct clear and well-organized network for accurate information about maritime terrorism Second, we should have the information of all domestic, foreign passenger's ships Third, national important facilities such as atomic energy plant, thermo-electric power plant, shipyard need policies to manage all emergency situation Fourth, government authorities should improve tactic abilitities by competing with support and budget inside of nation as well as outside of nation. To develop big maritime terror of our country, we will have to hold cooperative training & tactics contest of big maritime terror by cooperating educational industry organization with similar institute, improve the ability of members of big terror and acquire tactics information by excavating and exchanging a new technique through tactics seminar and public hearing.