• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.5-31
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• 2015

The Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) started from scratch. However, ROKN demonstrated its Blue Navy capabilities successfully to the entire world by conducting "Operation Early Dawn" at the Aden Bay, Yemen in Jan 2011. On the event of the 70th anniversary of the ROKN, I would like to retrospect past gleaning from voyages and challenges we had in the past. At the very inception of the ROKN, Korean government as well as senior military leaders recognized that it had no time to spare to clean up military those were insinuated deeply by communist agents. It was the top priority of the government. The Mongumpo Operation which was not well known, conducted by ROKN was one of the clean-up drive. The Korean War sometimes called as "a fire from land put-off at the sea". The world famous "Incheon Landing" which reversed war situation from the Nakdong Perimeter also done by Sea Power. ROKN conducted various maritime operations including not only Incheon Landing, but amphibious operation at Hungnam, mine sweeping, sea convoy, Wonsan Withdrawal. On the same day of the Korean War started, 25th June 1950, unless the victory of the ROKNS Baekdusan (PC 701) at the Korean Strait, the waning lamp light of Korea could not be rekindled by the participation of the U.N. The ROKN rescued the 17th regiment of Korean Army from the isolation at the Ongjin Peninsular and transported gold and silver bars stored at the Bank of Korea to the Navy supply deposit in Jinhae safely. ROKN special intelligence unit conducted critical HUMINT which led Incheon Landing success. One of important mission ROKN conducted successfully was not only transporting war fighting materials but also U.S. provided grains to starving Koreans. ROKN participated Vietnam campaign from 1960s and conducted numerous maritime transportation operations supplying materials to Vietnam military forces along the long coastal lines. Experienced Naval Officers and enlisted men who discharged and acquired as merchant marine certificate supported most of the U.S. sea lift operations throughout the Vietnam campaign. ROK-US Combined Forces which had been honed and improved its war fighting capabilities through the Korean War and out of Vietnam jungle playing key deterrent against threat from north Korea. However, those threat level will be completely different when north Korea finish its nuclear weapon ambition. In order to stand firm against north Korean nuclear threat, I would like to expect strong political leadership supporting nuclear submarine for ROKN.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.83-113
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• 2017

After defeat in World War II, Japan's Peace Constitution committed the country to forego the acquisition of offensive military capabilities. However, in the midst of the post-cold war period, Japan began to change its security posture in line with the so-called 'normal state theory', which called for a more robust defense posture and expanded security activities. The second Abe administration promoted these security policies by issuing a National Security Strategy as well as a new National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) in 2013 and by establishing new security institutions such as the National Security Council. The Abe administration also adopted the new concept of a 'Unified Mobile Defense Force' in the 2013 which replaced the 'Dynamic Defense Force' as a new criteria for the Self-Defense Force's acquisition of military capabilities. In this new concept of military capabilities, the Ground Self-Defense Force is planning to replace existing divisions with mobile divisions and to form 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' for the first time in 2018, which has long been taboo in Japan. Japan has experience a Marine Corps in the past. Likewise, an offensive changes in the military strategy can change the spectrum of strategy and 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' plays a big role in this. Furthermore, Japan is increasing the Coast Guard's budget and capabilities in preparation for contingencies around the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu in Chinese). The South Korea navy should utilize Japan's changing security posture to deter immediate threat such as North Korea's military provocations and potential enemy threat such as China, Japan, Russia.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.216-234
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• 2016

본 논문은 자위권 사용과 군사력 사용 간의 관계를 분석하고 이를 한반도 서해에서의 한국과 북한 간 해상긴장 상황에 적용시킨 이슈를 다룬다. 국가가 행사하는 자위권(self-defense: 自衛權)은 기본적으로 전쟁 방지를 위한 기본적 원칙이다. 그러나 이는 군사력 사용(Use of Forces: 軍事力 使用) 또는 무력행사(武力行事)이라는 측면에서 칼의 양날과 같은 결과를 낳는다. 즉 자위권 행사로 전쟁의 확산을 방지하는 반면에 자위권 행사로 상대방에 대한 적성(敵性)을 인정해 주는 경우이다. 반면 북한의 군사도발은 전방향적이며, 1953년 한반도 정전협정 위반이다. 1953년 정전협정 체결 이후 양국은 서해 북방한계선(NLL)에서의 군사적 충돌을 거쳤으며, 이는 과연 한국이 자위권 차원에서의 방어태세와 군사력 사용 측면에서의 대응태세 간에 괴리가 존재하고 있다는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 당연히 피해를 받는 곳은 한국이며, 이는 서해 북방한계선에서의 남북한 해군 간 대결국면에서 나타나고 있다. 이에 본 논문은 자위권을 국가 차원 행사하는 수준과 작전에 투입된 현장 작전 지휘관 차원에서 행사하는 수준으로 구분하여 다룬다. 서해 북방한계선 부근 수역에서의 북한의 해상 군사도발에 대해 현장 작전 지휘관이 행사하는 자위권은 대한민국 정부 차원에서의 자위권 행사와는 다르면, 이 문제를 국제법을 중심으로 분석하기에는 너무나 많은 제한점이 있다. 현행 국제법상 국가 자위권 문제는 군사력을 동반하는 문제로서 그 행사요건이 매우 애매모호하고 까다롭다. 그러나 현장 작전지휘관의 자위권 행사는 단호해야 하며, 이는 군사력 운용으로 나타나야 한다. 실제 서해에서의 남북한 대결국면에서의 대한민국 해군의 자위권 행사는 정전협정에 의거 제한되고 있으며, 이는 2010년 북한의 천안함 침몰과 연평도 폭격도발 시 대한 민국 해군과 해병대의 대응에서 증명되었다. 현재 대한민국 국방부는 현장 작전 지휘관에서 소위 '선제적 자위권 행사' 부여 필요성에 대한 논의를 진행 중으로 알려져 있다. 이에 따라 선제적 자위권 행사를 위한 조치들을 제도화하는 움직임을 보이고 있다. 예를 들면 2013년 발표된 대한민국 합참과 유엔사령부/한미 연합사령부/주한미군사령부 북한 군사 도발에 대한 대응계획(ROK JCS and UNC/CFC/USFK Counter-Provocation Plan)이 이를 간접적으로 증명하고 있다. 선제적 자위권은 행사에 있어 몇 가지 원칙을 요구하고 있으며, 이에 대한 합법성 문제는 아직 해결되고 있지 않다. 따라서 이 문제와 북한 군사도발 시에 대한 대한민국의 선제적 자위권 행사 간 연관성 문제를 어떻게 해석할 수 있는가에 대한 연구가 필요한 실정이다. 평시 군사력 사용에 따른 무력행사의 적법성은 그 인정이 대단히 어려운 것이 현실이며, 이에 따라 북한의 군사도발에 대한 가장 효율적 방안이 선제적 자위권이라면, 이에 대한 법적 대응이 무엇인가에 대한 제도적 근거를 필요로 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제4권1호
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• pp.63-87
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• 2020

This article not only theoretically explores the necessity and effect of constructive minilateralism and subregionalism in Northeast Asia, but also delves into a series of practical solutions from viewpoint of seeking common ground while reserving differences in this region. The main contents are as follows: First, the various obstacles that hinder the formation of regionalism, subregionalism and minilateralism in the Northeast Asia are discussed. That is to say, geopolitical realism, My Country First ideology, exclusive nationalism in the socio-historical context, and North Korea's latest provocations, etc. Second, this article explores the philosophy and basic principles of realizing Northeast Asia regionalism and minilateralism. Third, in the 21st century, Northeast Asia becomes the center of the world. It examines the core points, controversial focus and platform for building sub regionalism in the region. Finally, based on the institutional platform such as minilateralism and sub regionalism, the various ideas and practical plans of cross-border cooperation among major countries in Northeast Asia were discussed. Because there are a lot of obstacles, so first of all it is more appropriate to promote economic or functional minilateralism or sub regionalism than multilateral cooperation. In order to promote the formation of regionalism and minilateralism in Northeast Asia, the issues to be considered are as follows: First, for the sake of leading regional solidarity and minilateral economic cooperation, it is advisable for China, as a regional economic power, to implement a stable and responsible diplomacy. Secondly, regional solidarity based on credible politics and security should be promoted for a long time beyond the level of economic cooperation. Third, the primary prerequisite for the realization of Northeast Asian regionalism is that in the process of denuclearization of North Korea, the stability and peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula should be established. Fourth, with the continued hegemonic competition between the United States and China in Northeast Asia, under the circumstance that countries in the region are pushed into so-called "East Asian Paradox", it is profoundly important for them to consider transition from the hostile relationship as the "Thucydides trap" to the order of "coexistence" in which competition and cooperation run side by side, and the two countries should explore a conversion plan for the foreign policy line. This mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the US-China relationship will create a friendly atmosphere for the formation of regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the future, the cooperation of minilateralism in Northeast Asia will break the existing conflict between the maritime forces and the continental forces in order to promote peace. And along with the philosophy that "peace is economy", recent policies of common prosperity as the framework, such as China's "Belt and Road Initiative", North Korea's "Special Zone and Development Zone Policy", Russia's "New Eastern Policy", Japan's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and South Korea's The "Korean Peninsula New Economy Map" are organically linked and it should promote the so-called "networked regionalism".

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.