• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.141-185
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• 2021

The growing U.S.-China rivalry has placed the countries of Southeast Asia in exceedingly precarious positions. The Republic of Korea (ROK) likewise has been tasked with the challenge of "navigating the waters" between deepening geopolitical divides. It is in this context that the "New Southern Policy" (hereafter NSP) has become a key word in Korea's foreign policy circles. Through NSP, ROK aims to diversify its economic and security interests by strengthening ties with its southern partners, focusing on three key areas (termed as the "3 Ps"): People, Prosperity, and Peace. At the same time, the NSP seeks cooperation with other key diplomatic agendas such as the U.S.'s "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," rendering it crucial for the overall stability of the region. Considering such strategic significance, deeper analysis of the policy is more timely than ever. A brief assessment of the policy's outcome so far, however, reveals that relatively, the "Peace" pillar has been insufficient in achieving satisfactory outcomes. Here, this paper asks the question of: 1) How can the "Peace" pillar of South Korea's New Southern Policy be strengthened? Based on an analysis on the causes of the "Peace" pillar's weakness, this paper identifies counter-piracy cooperation as a solution. This paper then proceeds to answer the next question of: 2) How can ROK and ASEAN cooperate on counter-piracy, and how can these efforts be integrated into ROK's NSP? To answer the above question, this paper conducts in-depth case studies on ASEAN's and ROK's approaches to counter-piracy and identifies specific mechanisms of cooperation. In Chapter I, the paper begins with an overview of the NSP's strategic significance and an evaluation of its "Peace" pillar. Chapter II conducts a literature review on the causes of, and prescriptions for, the weakness of the "Peace" pillar. The paper then justifies why counter-piracy may be a solution. Chapter III examines ASEAN's and ROK's approaches to counter-piracy. By analyzing the general framework and each region's cases, the paper displays the strengths and weaknesses of each region's piracy responses. Based on this analysis, Chapter IV suggests ways to incorporate counter-piracy cooperation into the "Peace" pillar of the NSP. This research bears significance in that it identifies a specific area of cooperation (counter-piracy) to strengthen the "Peace" pillar of ROK's NSP. Such identification is based on a comprehensive study into the two parties' past and current experience in counter-piracy, making it contextual in nature. Furthermore, the study suggests practical mechanisms of cooperation, and considers ways of incorporation into the existing framework of NSP. This approach differs from existing literature that failed to generate case-specific, policy-oriented solutions. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated piracy issues and deepened geopolitical divides. Turbulent seas such as these call for careful navigation. When it comes to promoting "peace," the key lies in combating the pirates that sail those very waters.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.26-32
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• 2014

The increased threat to commercial shipping by Somalia-based pirates has triggered an increased use of PMSC(Private Maritime Security Contractors). The use of PMSC to protect merchant ships against Somali-based piracy threat seems to have been most effective counter-piracy measures. However, there are various legal and practical questions around using PMSC and PCASP(Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel) on board at sea. This paper aims to study the regulation and its problems of PMSC and PCASP on board to protect merchant ships against Somali-based piracy in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. In particular, this paper focuses on the legal issues including jurisdictional issues of PCASP on board merchant vessels, use of force by PCASP in self-defense, and authority for using PMSC. Currently, the legal framework relating to use of PMSC and PCASP on board protecting ships from Somali-based piracy is complex, sometimes ambiguous or inconsistent, and currently in a state of flux. Thus, this paper concludes that at this juncture an effort to coordinate this legal framework is necessary, as regards both the interpretation of existing rules related to PCASP on board merchant ships under UNCLOS(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the creation of new rules. Also, this paper suggested that there is an urgent need to establish the PMSC-specific laws in Korea.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.59
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• pp.113-135
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• 2013

Piracy has been an ongoing and serious problem in international shipping industry. Somalia is often in the news these days. Somalia has been in a state of unrest for more than two centuries. In recent times, the situation has remained unstable. The persistent unrest is the major driver behind the piracy epidemic in Somalia waters. By the MIA 1906, s.78(1), the expenses in order to be recoverable must have been "properly incurred". The underwriter is also liable in certain circumstances for expenses incurred by the assured in an attempt to avert or diminish loss covered by the policy, under provisions. This class of expenditure is commonly referred to as sue and labour expenses, or suing and labouring expenses; less commonly, as particular charges. The standard marine policy(the S.G.Form) contained what was invariably called the sue and labour clause, which has been replaced in the current Institute Clauses by the "Duty of Assured(Sue and Labour)" Clause in the Hull Clauses, and the "Duty of Assured" Clause, headed "Minimizing losses", in the Cargo Clauses. Sue and labour charges are not confined to expenditure on the part of the assured and his agents, but can include quantified loss consequent upon a sacrifice properly and reasonably made to avert or minimize an insured loss.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.192-221
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• 2013

In order to deal with the current economic crisis, the U.S. government, as a part of its austerity fiscal policy, implemented a budget sequester. The sequester will hit the U.S. defense budget the hardest, and as a result will most likely put the security of the international community in jeopardy. The U.S. will have to cut 46 billion dollars from its original 525 billon defense spending in 2013. And by the year 2022, will have to cut 486.9 billion dollars. Such an astronomical decrease in the U.S. defense spending will inevitably burden the friendly nations. According to recent studies, pirate related incidents in Somalia, where piracy is most active, has declined from its 226 incidents to 76 incidents per year in 2012, a 66% drop from previous years'. However, piracy threats as well as those related to firearms still remain and thus participants of anti-piracy operations, namely the U.S., U.K., France, Canada, NCC, EUNAVFOR, and NATO, are facing a problem of declining forces. Considering the current situation as well as rising expectations from the international community, Republic of Korea, a supporter of NCC's maritime security operation, not to mention its foremost duty of securing its sea, is at a stage to re-examine its operational picture. Such action will be a good opportunity for Republic of Korea to build the trust and live up to the international community's expectation. To quote from the network theory, although in relation to other friendly nations participating in the anti-piracy operation, Republic of Korea currently remains at a single cell level, this opportunity will certainly develop Korea to a 'node' nation in which power and information would flow into. Through this expansion of operational capability, Republic of Korea will be able to exert more influence as a more developed nation. Currently however, not only is the single 4,500 ton class destroyer deployed in Somalia a limited unit to further expand the scale and amount of force projection in the area, but also the total of six 4,500 ton class destroyers ROK feet possess is at a high fatigue degree due to standard patrolling operations, midshipman cruise and the RIMPAC exercise. ROK fleet therefore must consider expanding the number of ships deployed along with either deploying combat support ships or constructing logistics support site in the African region. Thus, by expanding its operational capabilities and furthermore by abiding to the rightful responsibilities of a middle power nation, Republic of Korea will surely earn its respect among the members of the international community.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.293-327
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• 2011

소말리아 해적 문제는 전례가 없는 단계에 다다랐다. 2010년 까지만 해도 445대가 넘는 선박이 해적들로부터 피해를 당했으며 1,181여명의 사람들이 몸값을 위해 인질이 되어야 했다. 그러나 소말리아만이 해적문제가 이슈화 되는 곳은 아니다. 지난 20년간 동남아시아의 해적문제도 큰 이슈가 되어 왔다. 본 논문은 해적 행위의 원인, 영향, 그리고 유형의 분류에 대한 분석을 위해 두 가지의 사례 연구를 통해 이를 살피려 한다. 각각의 해적 관련 사례가 서로 다른 특징들을 가지고 있으나현재 신문이나 인터넷 상의 보도뿐만 아니라 학문, 법률상의, 그리고 공식적 문서들에서 얻어지는 정보들을 이용해 분석한 결과 해적 행위의 원인은 대부분 육지에서 발견된다는 것으로 결론을 낼 수 있다. 본 논문을 통해 제 국가들은 경제, 안보, 지리적인 이유의 이해를 달리 하여 해적 행위를 근절하려 한다는 것을 살펴본다. 또한 현재의 해적 행위에 대한 대응적 접근은 전체론적으로 육지에서의 원인에 근거하여 다루어지는 것이 아니라 바다에서의 해양법 시행에 집중되어 있다. 이는 해적의 소탕을 위한 과정이라기보다는 여전히 문제를 내포하고 있을 수밖에 없다는 점을 지적 하고자 한다.

• Journal of the Korean Professional Engineers Association
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.43-45
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• 2011

Somalian pirates with the onset of civil war in the early 1990s have caused a threat to international transportation. Various international organizations including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Program are concerned about this problem. The cost of shipping is increasing and food-aid shipment is hindered by these ships are needed military escort. Since 2008, international society has deployed multinational naval vessel in the nearby Somalian sea and strengthen multinational naval operations to minimize damages from piracy.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.121-134
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• 2019

The areas be affected maritime police authority of the Republic of Korea, are largely classified as inland waters, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf(hereinafter referred to as "domestic sea area") and high seas. Of these, the maritime police authority in domestic sea area follows a municipal law that accommodates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In addition, this Convention shall apply on the high seas. Meanwhile, on the high seas, foreign vessels other than domestic vessels are allowed to be subject to limited jurisdiction only for the anti-mankind criminal acts, such as piracy etc. this is in accordance with the principle of "Freedom of the high seas" and "maritime flag state," under this Convention. However, the illegal acts of foreign vessels that threaten the security of coastal states and the safety of ships on the high seas can cause many types of crimes other than anti-mankind criminal acts, and the jurisdiction of the coastal states exercised may lead to conflicts between countries. Therefore, this article would like to suggest a plan for institutional improvement to maintain international maritime order on the high seas and secure maritime police authority in coastal states.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.22
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• pp.91-111
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• 2010

Around the middle of the ninth century the strict bone-rank system of Silla frustrated many people who had political ambition but lacked nobility. They had to seek other ways, including maritime trade. Such an undertaking reflected and also increased their economic and military power. Trade prospered with T'ang China and with Japan as well. The threat of piracy to Silla's thriving maritime trade caused to create a succession of garrisons at important coastal points. Chonghae Jin (Chonghae garrison) was regarded as the most important of these. It was established in 828 by Chang Pogo. Chonghae Jin was on Wando, an island just east of the southwestern tip of Korea and a key place at this time in the trade between China, Korea, and Japan. From this vantage point Chang Pogo became a merchant-prince with extensive holdings and commercial interests in China and with trade contacts with Japan. Although piracy was rampant in East Asia at that time, either the Chinese or Silla government was not able to control it due to inner political strife and lack of policing resources. Infuriated by the piracy and the government's inability to control it, Chang Pogo came back to Silla to fight against the pirates and to protect maritime trade. He persuaded the king of Silla and was permitted to control the private armed forces to sweep away the pirates. In 829 he was appointed Commissioner of Chonghae-Jin with the mission of curbing piracy in that region. Chang's forces were created to protect people from pirates, but also developed into traders among Silla Korea, T'ang China, and Japan in the 9th century. This was geographically possible because the Chonghae Garrison was situated at the midpoint of Korea, China, and Japan, and also because Chang's naval forces actually dominated the East Asia Sea while patrolling sea-lanes. Based on these advantages, Chang Pogo made a great fortune, which might be collected from a charge for protecting people from pirates and the trades with China and Japan. Chang's forces could be termed the first private security company in the Korean history, at least in terms of historical documents. Based on historical documents, the numbers of private soldiers might be estimated to exceed tens of thousands at least, since Chang's forces alone were recorded to be more than ten thousand. Because local powers and aristocratic elites were said to have thousands of armed forces respectively, the extent of private forces was assumed to be vast, although they were available only to the privileged class. In short, the domination of Chang's forces was attributable to the decline of central government and its losing control over local powers. In addition it was not possible without advanced technologies in shipbuilding and navigation.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.12 no.2 s.25
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• pp.115-123
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• 2006

The policy regime of ocean is changed from ocean liberty paradigm to ocean management paradigm. Ocean resources have the characteristics of weak excludability and strong rivalry. Therefore, they need rational ocean management so as to curb the tragedy of commons. The important ocean issues and policy regimes today is ocean pollution, coastal management, sea-level rise, fishery, whaling, ocean jurisdictions, deep seabed resources, military security, piracy, ecological environmental security and so on. This paper aims at reviewing these major international ocean issues, the policy regimes for them, and the desirable tasks of ocean policy regimes in the future from the macro perspective of international ocean politics or policy-making.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.181-202
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• 2013

After the Cold War, international terrorism and related issues have been the most urgent problems. However, Korea hasn't recognized this seriousness due to relatively slight damage. Yet the interest about the international maritime terrorism and related issues is increasing as the maritime terrorism issues emerged. This is because Korea is located next to three oceans and majority of international trades depend largely on international maritime transportation due to its scarce natural resources. Therefore this study has the purpose that it reviews the advanced researches and documents, analyzes the priority about response system against international maritime terrorism, suggests the practical solutions. For these purposes, it conducted Delphi technique to international maritime terrorism experts with response system factors selected among the advanced researches and documents. As the result of analysis, this study figured out that legal and institutional countermeasures are needed as international measures, strategic countermeasures are needed as domestic measures to set up the response system against international maritime terrorism. Synthetically, for the efficient and practical counteract against international maritime terrorism, the response institute against international maritime terrorism and the awareness of relevant experts are preferentially necessary.